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ABSTRACT
A GENEALOGY OF CONVENIENCE*
A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF TECHNICAL CULTURE
FEBRUARY 1990
THOMAS F. TIERNEY, B.A., MORAVIAN COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
This dissertation presents a critique of modern,
technical culture. it focuses on the value of convenience,
and argues that this value underlies, to a great extent,
modern attitudes toward technology, especially attitudes
toward the consumption of technology. in a sense, the
dissertation is meant to be a complement to that line of
thought which identified the domination of nature as the
value which guided the development of science and
technology. While the domination of nature may be the value
which underlies the activity of those who develop and
produce technology, the value of convenience is the value
which guides those who consume the various technological
apparatuses which are produced by the modern economy.
Ultimately, the claim of the dissertation is that the
modern prominence of the value of convenience reveals
something not only about modern attitudes toward technology,
but more importantly, it reveals something about current
attitudes toward the human body, mortality, and necessity.
The pursuit of the value of convenience is interpreted as an
vi
attempt to overcome the body and the various limits which
are imposed by man's embodiment.
The evidence which is used to support this claim covers
a wide range. Shifts in religious ideas and doctrines are
examined, and the decline of Christianity in modernity is
presented as one factor which has helped to establish the
prominence of the value of convenience. Material conditions
in the United States are also accorded an important role in
the emergence of this value as a dominating force in
modernity. Along the way, several competing perspectives on
the consumption of technology are criticized. Among these
perspectives are those of several contemporary Marxists, as
well that of Hannah Arendt.
The objective of the dissertation is to foster a
critical revaluation of modernity's attitudes toward
technology, in the hope that such a revaluation may help to
prepare the way for the emergence of a new attitude toward
the body and the earth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
.on
In this essay, I will offer a critical interpretati<
of technological culture. While such interpretations were
prevalent in this century until about twenty years ago,
today they appear outdated and outlandish, at least in
their broad form. Narrower critiques, which focus on the
technology of war, are still offered and received, but
critiques which indict technological culture itself are no
longer acceptable. The hope of both the East and the West
is now centered on technological innovation and development,
and "less-developed" countries look to technology as the key
to progress. Any challenge to this technological fetishism,
therefore, is surely and sorely resented. Nevertheless,
this essay is, on the one hand, an attempt to revitalize the
critical attitude of such thinkers as Jacques Ellul and
Martin Heidegger, who viewed technological culture not only
as a threat to alternative ways of life but also as a threat
to man's receptiveness to as yet unconceived possibilities.
It is because of this menacing nature of technological
culture that I seek to criticize and challenge it. But, on
the other hand, this essay differs from many earlier
critiques in several important respects.
To begin with, this essay does not claim to reveal
anything about the essence of technology, anything that is
2present in, or underlies, every manifestation of technology.
Rather, what I offer here is nothing more than a perspective
on technological culture. As a perspective, it is one among
others, without any claim to special status because it has
glimpsed something timeless in the phenomenon of technology.
To put it differently, this essay treats technology as
something which can be thought of along various lines, none
of which is capable of revealing the "heart of the matter"
of technology. it is only by approaching technology from
various perspectives that one can begin to understand and,
perhaps, resist it. And there is no reason for believing
that after experiencing technology from various
perspectives, one will be able to completely grasp it and
utter a final word on the subject. So in regard to those
interpretations which have been offered as revelations of
the essence of technology, it is not so much that I find
them wrong, but that I find they claim too much for their
insights
.
Another difference between this and many other
perspectives on technology is that the one offered here does
not trace the phenomenon of technique (Ellul) , or the
machine (Mumford)
, or techne (Heidegger) , back to its
origins. If the goal was to uncover the essence of
technology, perhaps it would be necessary to follow the
leaders back in their search for the original manifestations
of technology. Even if one abandons the hope of glimpsing
3
essences, however, there is still the temptation to extend
one's perspective to include some of the historical
developments of technology. such a historical foundation
provides a certain legitimacy to one's perspective, in the
sense that one would appear to have a thorough understanding
of the issue, and in the sense that one would be able to
engage other leading perspectives (e.g. those of Jacques
Ellul and Lewis Mumford) on many points.
But even if one could effectively borrow the
legitimating form of essential interpretations, while
renouncing their exaggerated claims, there is still reason
for resisting the temptation to subsume the history of
technology under one's perspective. By tying one's
interpretation of modern technical culture to a long tradi-
tion of technical apparatuses, one recognizes the important
innovations in technological development, but one risks
losing sight of the web of relations, or better, the lines
of power, through which technology flows in modernity. And
it is through such an ensemble of lines that technology
helps to form and shape the modern self. Since the primary
concern of this essay is the fetishistic attitude of the
modern self toward technology, I will focus only on modern
technology, and even then the concern will be primarily with
the relation between men and technical culture, and not with
the features of technical apparatuses.
4It must be emphasized that this imposition of limits on
the historical treatment of technology is not offered as a
methodological principle which is to be universally applied.
I am not making the claim that modernity can be understood
only on its own terms, that only by focusing on the modern
can one understand modernity. On the contrary, this essay
will develop a broad historical perspective, but one that
does not take the phenomenon of technology as its central
theme. Instead, modern technology will be portrayed as an
element of a different historical line, one which reveals
aspects of technology which are often overlooked by
histories of technical development.
In its treatment of modern technology, this essay
differs in a third way from many other perspectives on
technology. This difference lies in what I, but not they,
would describe as the line of attack. (This difference in
description is telling in itself. Many interpreters of
modern technology focus on the way in which technology
expands and invades every facet of nature and/or society,
establishing an order throughout. I have in mind here
interpreters such as Ellul and Heidegger. 1 There is no
doubt that technology does expand in such a manner and that
it does tend to engulf not only nature, but all human
activities as well. But by focusing on this expansion, and
mapping out the advances of technology, one does little to
foster resistance to the power of technology. Indeed,
5Ellul's monolithic portrayal of modernity in The
Technolog ical Society leaves virtually no room for
resistance. But there is resistance to technical culture.
A paradoxical example of this resistance is the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism, which rejects the technological
culture of the West. In its resistance to this culture,
fundamentalism has indeed employed certain military
techniques and apparatuses from the West, and has also
developed terroristic techniques of its own, but the point
is that this technology is directed against the ever-
expanding technical culture, in order to resist it. While
the image of black-veiled women carrying automatic rifles
and grenade-launchers may be disturbing to the logic of the
West, Islamic fundamentalism, despite its inconsistencies,
does reject technological development. (Could these Islamic
countries effectively resist Western culture without using
its weapons?) And even within technical culture itself,
there are subterranean economies which lie beyond the
control of the economic techniques of the state, and there
are acts of sabotage and protests which are intended to
thwart the deployment of new military and nuclear-power
technology. Without getting into the merits of any of these
forms of resistance, the point is simply that technical
culture is not nearly so tightly ordered, or efficient, as
some have portrayed it. Resistance, however effective,
occurs at various levels.
6This essay, in its attempt to challenge technical
culture, will not focus on the imperialistic character of
modern technology. This is not to deny that it might be
worthwhile to draw a map which complements the one of
technological expansionism, and points out the various ways
in which technology is resisted as it expands in society and
nature. 2 But the resistance which this essay strives to
incite is found in a different area, or on a different
level, and therefore requires a different approach. Instead
of focusing on the way in which technical culture expands,
this essay is concerned with the way in which it becomes
narrow and pointed, that is, the way it penetrates and
shapes modern individuals and renders them techno-
fetishists. In other words, this essay is concerned with
the way in which technology effects the values of
individuals. There are two basic questions which can be
asked at this level: What is the value of technology to
modern individuals?; and why do they hold this value in such
high esteem that, even when faced with technological dangers
and dilemmas, they hope for solutions that will enable them
to maintain and develop technical culture? Before I begin
to answer these questions, however, there are a few points
that must be made about inquiries which are carried out at
the level of values.
The first of these points is that the interpretation of
technoloqical culture from the perspective of values does
7not constitute a novel approach to the issue. Early in the
twentieth century Max Scheler pointed out that despite its
claim of value-neutrality, modern science, as well as its
technological application, were guided by a particular value
- namely, the domination of nature. 3 For various reasons,
Scheler
-s influence and reputation have not kept pace with
those of his contemporary German colleagues, Husserl and
Heidegger/ During the peak of his career, however, he was
considered one of the most influential of the German
philosophers. 5 Indeed, Heidegger expressed his gratitude
toward Scheler by dedicating Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics to his memory, saying that the content of that
book "was the subject of the last conversation in which the
author was privileged once more to experience the unfettered
power of his [Scheler' s] mind." 6 Despite the neglect into
which Scheler 's thought has since fallen, there does remain
one area in which his influence is still effective, and this
area concerns his insight into the value of modern
technology. Several thinkers, such as Herbert Marcuse and
William Leiss, have taken up and developed Scheler 's ideas
about the domination of nature.
There are several reasons for briefly examining
Scheler' s insight into the technological age, as well as the
development of that insight by others. First, Scheler 's
approach to the question of the value of modern technology
is structurally similar to my interpretation. An
8examination of Scheler 's thought will help to clarify
through examples some of the distinctions I made above
concerning the differences between my and other perspectives
on technology. Second, Scheler and I have both been
influenced in our attitude toward technology by the thought
of Nietzsche, and we both seek to expand Nietzsche's
critique of Christian morality into a critique of
technology. Third, the value which Scheler identifies and
examines is the complement, or shadow, of the value I
examine. And fourth, the development of Scheler's insight
by certain theorists constitutes a strand of thought which
has greatly influenced the perspective offered here.
Nevertheless, this strand of thought succumbs to certain
pitfalls which will be avoided in this inquiry into the
value of technology.
Scheler pointed out that scientific knowledge was not
value-free; for Scheler, no form of knowledge or action
could be. Echoing Nietzsche's claim that "[t]he question of
values is more fundamental than the question of certainty," 7
Scheler wrote that "all perceptions and thoughts, with
regard to the laws governing the selection of their possible
objects, and, not any less fundamental, all our actions, are
rooted in the conditions of valuation and drive-life .
"
8
(Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis in quoted material is
that of the author quoted, and any brackets are mine.)
Nietzsche's "profound influence" 9 upon Scheler, however,
9e
extended far beyond the latter 's general recognition of th
primacy of values and valuation. indeed, Scheler's critical
interpretation of modern, technological culture was grounded
upon another of Nietzsche's insights.
From Scheler's perspective, the distinction between the
medieval and modern periods is based on a difference in
their ethos, or value structure. In the medieval period,
spiritual values were held in high esteem, and a caste of
priests and monks served as the guardians of these values. 10
Nobility and status were also valued in this age, and there
was, according to Scheler, a strong sense of community
uniting all levels of feudal society. 11 with the rise of
the bourgeoisie, however, a new ensemble of values emerged
which challenged the feudal order. In opposition to the
feudal values of nobility and hierarchy, the bourgeoisie
raised the banner of equality; in opposition to the strong
bonds of the community, individualism was touted. Most
importantly for Scheler, however, was the bourgeoisie's
elevation of the value of utility to the position of
preeminence which spiritual values had held in the medieval
period. This elevation of utility above spiritual values
indicated, for Scheler, a fundamental subversion of the
hierarchy of values. Revealing a certain hesitancy on his
part to fully accept the implications of Nietzsche's
thoughts about values, Scheler had tried to establish an
absolute hierarchy of values against which any culture or
10
age could be measured. 12 m this hierarchy, spiritual
values were superior to utilitarian ones.
What is important for this essay, however, is not
Scheler's hierarchy of values, but is rather his explanation
of the motivation for the modern subversion of that
hierarchy. in this explanation, Scheler relied once again
on the thought of Nietzsche, and claimed that the source of
the bourgeois subversion of values was ressentiment.
Nietzsche developed the idea of ressentiment in The
Genealogy of Morals
,
where he traced the tenets of Christian
morality back to a moral revolution initiated by the Jewish
slaves. Unable to live according to the noble, powerful
(i.e. good 13 ) standards and values of their masters, the
slaves' resentment and hatred of those masters festered and
eventually poisoned their minds. The slaves' frustration
with their inability to live a noble life was compounded by
their inability to act upon their hatred. Eventually,
however, the slaves, with the assistance of their priests,
were able to have their revenge, in the form of an inversion
of the existing values. 14 The priests declared to the
slaves that the traits and values of the noble masters were
actually evil, and that those who lived according to that
code were, despite all appearances, not happy, but damned.
Along with this derogation of the masters and their values,
the slaves also exalted their own impotence and servility to
the position of virtues. Their inability to do great
11
things, to exert power and influence, was portrayed as a
choice, and in "choosing" not to live a life of nobility,
but a life of meekness and humility, the slaves attained™
other-worldly salvation.
Given the "subterranean- nature of such a revolt, it
has taken "two millennia to prevail." 15 Christianity, of
course, has been the primary vehicle for this revolution,
but in the nineteenth century Nietzsche recognized that
Christianity had served its purpose and was becoming a
hindrance to the continuation of the revolt. 16 it is at
this point that Scheler took up the Nietzschean theme.
Scheler was concerned with the post-Christian, utilitarian
ethos of modernity, and as indicated above, he interpreted
the emergence of this ethos as another instance of
ressentiment. Unable to live according to the standards of
the feudal aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie elevated their
situation and circumstances to the level of the highest
values, and judged all other values accordingly. As the
slaves had exalted their meekness and humility, and looked
upon their masters as objects of pity, the petty bourgeoisie
elevated their commonness (equality) and usefulness, and
derogated the spiritual values of the aristocracy. 17 in
both these instances, the inversion or subversion of values
was motivated by ressentiment. But Scheler did not treat
the bourgeois ethos simply as an analogy to the moral revolt
of the slaves; rather, he saw the utilitarian ethos as the
12
s
era
latest phase of that revolt. As Scheler put it,
utilitarianism was the "chief manifestation of the
ressentiment slave revolt in modern morality." 18 m thi
sense, Scheler can be said to have carried Nietzsche-
genealogy of morals forward into the post-Christian
(It should be mentioned that Scheler, as in the case of his
interpretation of Nietzsche's thoughts on values, tried to
pull back from some of the consequences of Nietzsche's
genealogy of Christian morality. m fact, Scheler tried to
salvage the essence of Christianity, as opposed to its par-
ticular historical manifestations, from Nietzsche's
attack. 19 )
Toward the end of his career, Scheler seems to have
reevaluated his earlier interpretation of the modern age.
It was no longer the value of utility which served as the
distinguishing feature of the technological age. As Scheler
emphasized
:
The basic value that guides modern technology is notthe invention of economical or 'useful' machines
It aims at something much higher. ... it is the idea
and value of human power and human freedom vis-a-vis
nature that ensouled the great centuries of 'inventions
and discoveries'
- by no means just an idea of utility.
It concerns itself with the power drive, its growing
predominance over nature before all other drives. 20
Scheler pointed out that in the feudal period, the
power-drive had been directed at the domination of other
men, but in the modern period, the domination of nature was
the object of the power-drive; he called this modern drive
13
"the will to control nature."- Although this later insight
of Scheler's may seem to mitigate the importance of his
earlier work on modern ressentiment, he insisted that the
will to control nature was firmly grounded in "the new type
of bourgeois humanity, with its new drive structure and its
new ethos."" The will to control nature
_
therefQrej ^
also born of ressentiment, and carried on the revolt of the
slaves
.
Some contemporary thinkers have further developed
Scheler's insight into modernity's drive to dominate nature,
but before turning to this development I must point out
certain similarities between Scheler's perspective on
technological culture and the one to be developed in this
essay. To begin with, there is a structural similarity
between these two perspectives. As I stated earlier, my
essay will focus on the value of technology in the modern
period. Scheler was also primarily concerned with the
distinction in values that set the modern age apart from the
medieval. And Scheler also ultimately connects his
interpretation of the technological age with a longer
historical trend - the slave revolt in morality. I, too,
will eventually make such a connection with a historical
trend.
More important than this structural affinity between
Scheler's perspective and mine, however, is their
substantive similarity. Scheler and I are both heavily
14
indebted to Nietzsche for the conceptual schemes that we
develop. Following up on Nietzsche's insights into the
primacy of values and valuation, Scheler uncovered the
values which underlie the professed neutrality (i.e. value-
freedom) of modern science and technology. And, of course,
the larger historical framework into which Scheler fits the
modern ethos is a Nietzschean one. I, too, take my clues
about the value of technology from Nietzsche, although the
value that I will emphasize is neither the value of utility
nor the domination of nature. I take my lead from
Zarathustra, who said upon his return to men and their
cities
:
I go among this people and keep my eyes open: theyhave become smaller and are becoming ever smaller:
and their doctrine of happiness and virtue is the
'
cause.
For they are modest even in virtue - for they
want ease. But only a modest virtue is compatible
with ease.
It is this desire for ease which will be the primary
focus of this essay. For etymological reasons which will be
discussed in a later chapter, I choose to call the object of
this desire "convenience, 11 rather than ease. In any case,
the main contention of this essay will be that the value of
technology in modernity is centered on technology's ability
to provide convenience. The aim of my essay, however, is
not to lament the smallness or mediocrity of modern men and
their virtues. It is rather to throw some light on, and
thereby loosen, the hold which technology has on modernity.
15
The desire for convenience seems to be an integral part of
that hold, as well as an integral part of the modern self.
The larger historical trend into which I will
ultimately fit my discussion of convenience is also a trend
which Nietzsche traced. While Scheler turned to the first
eSSaY ° f The Genealogy of Morals for his historical
perspective, I will rely on the third essay, in which
Nietzsche outlines the history of the ascetic ideal.
Although a claim that technical culture somehow fits in with
the history of asceticism may seem incomprehensible at this
point, this connection should become clearer once the idea
of convenience has been fleshed out.
One more similarity between Scheler and myself must be
pointed out, and this similarity has to do with the manner
in which we approach the values of the technical age. in
identifying utility, and later, the will to control nature,
as the primary values of this age, Scheler 's aim was to
criticize those values by showing how they emerged from a
certain baseness. In this critical endeavor, Scheler can be
thought of as a genealogist, at least in the sense of genea-
logy expressed by Gilles Deleuze:
Genealogy means both the value of origin and the
origin of values. Genealogy is as opposed to
absolute values as it is to relative or
utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the
differential element of values from which their
value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin
or birth, but also difference or distance in the
origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness,
nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in
the origin. The noble and the vulgar, the high
16
crftical'^ent!- ^ ^ trUly logical and
I must emphasize that the claim being made here is not
that Scheler was a thorough-going genealogist; his attempt
to construct an absolute hierarchy of values belies such a
claim. But in regard to his interpretation of the
underlying value of modernity, Scheler was doing genealogy.
He treated neither utility nor the will to control nature as
the logical outcome of historical progress, or as a value
which was grounded in some fact of human existence. Rather,
these values were regarded as the outcome of certain shifts
in relations of force, as the outcome of a reversal in the
struggle between the noble and the base. In my treatment of
the value of convenience, I too share this genealogical
attitude toward values, which treats them as the signs of a
struggle, and I also attempt to criticize and reevaluate
this particular value. In a sense, Scheler and I offer
complementary genealogies of modern values. The value upon
which Scheler focused - the domination of nature - has been
the value which guides the cutting edge of technology; it is
the value pursued by the leaders of technological progress,
the scientists and technicians. The value of convenience,
on the other hand, is the value of the masses, of those who
are led to consume the products of technical culture. 25 I
will support this claim in the next chapter. And later, I
will also claim that there has been a partial shift in the
17
positions of these complementary values, and that
convenience (in an extended sense of the word) has come to
lead certain aspects of technological innovation. For now,
however, all I want to do is point out the complementarity'
of Scheler's genealogical project and mine.
While this genealogical impulse of Scheler marks a
particular affinity between our perspectives on modernity,
this same impulse distinguishes Scheler from certain others
who have followed up on his insight into the domination of
nature. I have in mind here theorists such as Max
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and William Leiss, all of whom
can be considered critical theorists in the sense first
articulated by Horkheimer. 26 These thinkers coupled
Scheler's insight with the dialectic, thereby eliminating
"the truly genealogical and critical element," or put
differently, the Nietzschean element, of Scheler's thought.
Since Scheler is valuable to me primarily for that
Nietzschean element, I must briefly examine this coupling of
the will to control nature and the dialectic. Such an
examination will reveal the grounds for my avoidance in this
essay, of any dialectical interpretation of the value of
convenience. It will also lay the foundation for the claim
which will be made later, that critical theory, rather than
pulling in the reins on technology, actually spurs it on
into new areas of development. This unintended outcome of
critical theory is not the result of any dialectical tension
18
within the school of thought, or between it and social
reality; it is the result of dialectical thought itself.
Critical theorists such as those mentioned above accept
(tacitly or otherwise) Scheler- s claim that science is not
value-free, but rather serves the value of dominating
nature. 27 But these theorists point out a shortcoming of
Scheler'
s thought: he neglected to take into account the
social context in which such domination is pursued.
Consequently, Scheler remained blind to the fact that under
existing social conditions of injustice and inequality, the
scientific domination of nature results in the ever-
increasing domination of men through, and by, technology.
In the words of William Leiss, "Advances in technology
clearly enhance the power of ruling groups within societies
and in the relations among nations; and as long as there are
wide disparities in the distribution of power among
individuals, social groups, and states, technology will
function as an instrument of domination" 28 - the domination
of men, that is.
It is here that the dialectic is grafted onto Scheler'
s
thought. The will to dominate nature is rendered
contradictory, irrational by this negativity of social
injustice and inequality. And through the elimination, or
negation, of this negative social atmosphere, the will to
dominate nature can be rendered rational, and technology
19
win be able to fulfil! its original gQal Qf ^
freedom and security.
Through the use of the dialectic, therefore, critical
theory has been able to salvage the will to control nature.
The irrational, dangerous trajectory of technology in
modernity stems not from the value of dominating nature, but
from the injustice of advanced industrial society. Critical
thought, consequently, must work toward the elimination of
relations of domination and subordination among men; as
Marcuse put it, this elimination is "the only truly
revolutionary exigency, and the event that would validate
the achievements of industrial civilization." 29 it would
also validate the will to control nature, and the critical
theorists mentioned here do indeed expect that any just
society of the future would have to carry on the conquest of
nature. 30
This salvaging which is accomplished by critical
theory's use of the dialectic is precisely what makes it
unacceptable to me. Instead of carrying out a ruthless
criticism of the bourgeois will to control nature, critical
theory ends up making it acceptable, rational. This reveals
the extent of the dialectic's critical capacities. It is
able to turn things on their heads, transforming the
decadent will to dominate nature into a noble goal to be
pursued into the future, but this dialectic is not capable
of cutting off the head of such a decadent value, and being
done with it. Given the context in which the dialectic ha
emerged in this essay, Gilles Deleuze , s judgement Qf it
seems particularly appropriate.
that expressPs itself in th. , a^Mr ^^'^^^
create new ways of thinking and feeling!31
The underlying ressentiment of the dialectical
treatment of the will to control nature is revealed not on
in its formal properties of negation and reaction, however
It is also evident in the substance of critical theory,
which includes the valorization of the will to control
nature, and a concern for justice, equality, and the
elimination of relations of domination and subordination.
As was indicated above, Scheler identified such concerns,
along with the will to control nature, as modern
manifestations of the slave revolt. So from Scheler's
perspective, at least as it is interpreted here, any
progress or transcendence that is accomplished by the
negative dialectics of critical theory only amounts to a
higher development of the slave revolt and another victory
for the masses.
From my perspective, however, the most objectionable
feature of the dialectic is its "bad conscience" - that is
its inability to forget, to let go of bad memories and
nihilistic values. It is primarily for this reason ^ J
treatment of the value of convenience will not be
dialectical. I will not portray convenience as a certain
negativity which has derailed the rational progress of
science and technology, and which must be negated so that
technical culture can become non-contradictory and capable
of fulfilling its promise (threat). My goal is not to save
technical culture, but to undermine it. I will also not
portray convenience as an inherently noble value which has
itself been sidetracked by some social negativity, such as
economic and political injustice, the elimination of which
would allow convenience to flower in an environment of
reason and freedom. From my perspective, the desire for
convenience is a weed, not a flower, and my objective is to
uproot it.
While the perspective that I am developing may appear
extreme (what with its images of decapitations and
vegicide), and perhaps unreasonable (in its implied belief
that a value which has been carried along and fostered by
modern tradition can actually be uprooted)
, such excesses
seem to me to be justified by those very considerations
which would give rise to these objections. Because it is so
deeply engrained in modern culture, the value of convenience
can only be challenged by an aggressive attack. 32 A
reckless, all-out effort is required just to create the
space from which this value can be challenged.
There are additional considerations which justify the
excesses of this genealogy of convenience, but these have
less to do with the traditional inertia of convenience than
with the broader tradition of liberal individualism. Any
inquiry into values faces resistance from this liberal
tradition, which recognizes at the core of the individual a
private realm which lies beyond the reach of social and
cultural forces." This private realm is one of beliefs,
intentions, desires, and most importantly for this essay,
values. Although liberalism's claim of privacy in this
sphere was challenged by nineteenth century social theorists
such as Hegel and Marx, that claim still exerts enormous
influence on the self-understanding of modern individuals
and is tightly bound up with their claim to freedom. Stuart
Hampshire articulates this influence when he writes, "The
man who is comparatively free in the conduct of his life is
active in the adoption of his own attitudes and of his own
way of life; his decisions and intentions are the best guide
to his future action; and just this is the significance of
calling him free." 34 it is to be expected, therefore, that
an argument such as mine, which claims that a certain value
is not freely chosen by individuals, but is demanded by the
technological order, will be met with a degree of self-
preserving (in a very literal sense) denial.
This liberal resistance to inquiries into values is
compounded in the case of my argument, because that argument
2.
is an invasion of privacy in a second sense, one which is
derived in part from the classical Greek conception of
privacy. For the ancient Greeks, the private realm was not
located within the individual, as a sphere of beliefs,
values, and intentions, but rather, it was located in the
household. My inquiry into the value of convenience will
begin in the modern household, which, I will argue, still
retains elements of the classical conception of privacy. 35
I will begin in the household because it is there that
convenience reigns, and there that the self is shaped by th
demands of the technological order. To put this
differently, it is through the consumption which occurs in
the household that individuals "buy into" technological
culture.
These points will be taken up in the following chapter
The point I am trying to make here, however, is simply that
my inquiry faces certain resistance, given that it is an
invasion of privacy, or a trespass, in a double sense. It
challenges at once the privacy of the individual and the
privacy of the household (although these are not unrelated
spheres)
.
Consequently, the standard of success by which I
evaluate my argument is not to be found in the degree to
which it is accepted, but is rather found in the level of
resistance and denial which the argument evokes. The more
successful such a challenge is to these realms of privacy,
the louder and more vehement the denials should be. While
this point can certainly be interpreted as a bit of
sophistry (i.e. if you disagree with my argument, you have
proven me right), this resistance to the inquiry itself
should ultimately be transferred to the technological order
and the demands it makes. it is this transfer, or shift, in
that which is resisted which is the ultimate criterion of
the success of this essay. For the serious threat posed to
individuals today does not come from arguments which
challenge the privacy of the realm of beliefs, values,
but from unchallenged forces which penetrate that sphere.
The value of convenience is one such force.
The course of this genealogy of convenience begins with
an examination of the modern household, interpreted as the
realm of consumption and as the realm of necessity. My
position on the household, while being heavily influenced by
Hannah Arendt • s The Human Pnnrtif^n, runs counter to
Arendt
-s thought in several ways. I deal with these
differences in the chapter on the household.
This chapter also points out the relation between the
things we consume and the modern attitude toward necessity;
it is in this relation between consumption and necessity
that the importance of convenience emerges. Technological
conveniences, from my perspective, are valuable because they
allow man to overcome, or deny, necessity.
In the third chapter, I examine some contemporary
Marxist perspectives on consumption. These theorists, I
argue, have made important strides beyond structural
Marxism, in that they have expanded their investigations to
include modern consumption patterns. Some have even focused
on the characteristics of the commodities which are consumed
in modernity, an approach which comes very close to my own
investigation into modern attitudes toward technology.
Ultimately, however, these theorists fall short of the
extent to which I would like to nrv infn ™^u r P ¥ l to modern consumption
practices and the value which underlies them. I argue that
even though these Marxist theorists have begun to consider
consumption in their critical examinations of modern
capitalism, they remain tied to the idea that, ultimately,
consumption is determined by capitalist relations of
production. From my perspective, this assumption hinders
these theorists' ability to penetrate the technological
order, to challenge the hold which technology has on
modernity.
In the fourth chapter, I offer a materialist reading of
the consumption practices of the United States, the country
which has been the leader in establishing consumption
standards. In this chapter, I develop certain insights Marx
had concerning the uniqueness of the United States, and
present an interpretation of American consumption practices
which challenges the Marxist reading of these practices, as
presented in the previous chapter. My claim, in this
chapter, is that the availability of land, or space, in the
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United States, presented a very different atmosphere for the
development of capitalism than that found in Europe. The
availability of unsettled land in nineteenth-century America
posed certain threats to capitalist development which were
not found in Europe, and these threats were met, I argue, by
the establishment of certain consumption standards which are
based on the value of convenience.
in the fifth chapter, I move away from the strictly
materialist approach to the value of convenience, and
examine a different dimension of the problem of technology.
My focus here moves away from the spatial conditions of the
United States, and turns to the development of certain
religious ideas, and the effect which they have had on the
formation of modern consumption practices. in this chapter
I examine Max Weber's controversial argument in The
Protestant Ethic
,
and expand that argument with the help of
Nietzsche's insights into Protestantism and asceticism. My
claim in this chapter is that modern consumption practices,
which are based on the value of convenience, are a uniquely
modern form of asceticism.
In the final chapter, I identify this modern asceticism
in the writings of four modern political philosophers:
Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Marcuse. My treatment of these
thinkers is not comprehensive, but instead traces the line
of modern asceticism as it runs through their thought.
Ultimately, my claim is that the fetishistic consumption of
technology in modernity is the latest for™ in whioh man's
conte.pt for the body, and amtiety in ^ ^ Qf
have worked themselves out. Evidence in support of this
claim can be found in the writings of those modern theorists
mentioned above, and in the direction in which some of the
latest technological developments are headed. m its most
extreme form, modern asceticism manifests itself in
Philosphical claims that death must be seen as nothing more
than a technical limit which must be overcome if man is to
be free, and in the scientific attempts to develop computer
technology which will allow the human mind to inhabit the
machine, and thereby become free to leave the planet earth,
and travel among the stars.
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CHAPTER 2
ARENDT, THE HOUSEHOLD, AND CONVENIENCE
in The.Huinai^o^ Hannah Arendt points out the
difference between the classical Greek and the modern
conceptions of privacy. m ancient Greece, the realm of
privacy was not found within the individual or the subject,
as it is for modernity. instead, privacy was recognized as
something inherent in the household. The difference between
these conceptions of privacy was not limited to the location
of the private, however. For the Greeks, the household was
considered private not because it was the realm of beliefs,
desires, and values, but because it was the realm in which
biological necessity prevailed. In the ancient household
occurred the production and consumption which was required
in order to sustain life, 1 and in the performance of this
necessary activity, the Greeks recognized the fundamental
similarity between themselves and other animals. Certain
routines were imposed upon all animals, including the
Greeks, as a consequence of their embodiment. However, the
Greeks distinguished the human from other animals precisely
by its ability to free itself from the routines imposed by
its body, and to undertake meaningful, unnecessary activity.
That is, the Greeks distinguished themselves as humans by
their ability to move beyond the concerns which serve the
maintenance of biological, physical life, and to undertake
inquiries about the ultimate purpose or ends of life . For
Aristotle, the unique thing about humans was not simply
their capacity for rational speech, but it was their
capacity to rationally discuss the proper^ Qf ^ ^
set men apart from other animals.* And it was through ^
discussions, and the attempt to live according to the
knowledge revealed by them, that men became fully human.
in ancient Greece, the freedom from necessity which
provided the opportunity for such discussion was attained by
certain adult males through the practice of slavery and the
rigid differentiation of the sexes. Women and slaves
performed most of the necessary activity in the household,
while free, adult males attained human status through their
participation in the discussions, debates, and decisions of
the polis, the public realm. The Greek household,
therefore, was private in the sense that those whose roles
were limited to performing its necessary activity were
deprived of the opportunity of being fully human. As Arendt
puts it, "In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy,
indicated in the word itself, was all-important; it meant
literally a state of being deprived of something, and even
of the highest and most human of man's capacities." 3
Arendt argues that this privative dimension of privacy
has been lost to modernity, that the private is no longer
the realm of subhuman, slavish activity. On the contrary,
modernity's conception of privacy is closely linked to its
3e
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ideal of freedom. The "sphere of intimacy," as Arendt call
the private realm of modernity/ is a haven, not a hellhol
Arendt-
s perspective on modernity, of course, encompasses
much more than this shift in the status of the private f
the position of unfreedom in ancient Greece to that of
freedom in modernity. she identifies several other
transformations which have occurred alongside this shift.
On of those related transformations which is
particularly important for this essay, and is also
particularly disturbing to Arendt, is the severance of the
ancient link between necessity and the household. The
demands of the body are no longer satisfied within the
private household, but have been swept out into the open.
The activity which is necessary to sustain life is now
performed as social, not private, activity. For Arendt,
"Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence
for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public sig-
nificance and where the activities connected with sheer
survival are permitted to appear in public." 5 in other
words, society is a form of public household. In making
this claim, Arendt is not referring primarily to the
activity of the liberal or socialist state, which provides
certain goods and services to individuals. Rather, it is
the economy that Arendt has in mind when she refers to the
social. It is as participants in the economy, as
jobholders, that modern individuals appear in public. The
Lves
predominant concern for members of mass society lies in
satisfying the demands of the life processes for themseH
and their dependents. 6
"Productive members of society," as
opposed to ancient citizens, are not concerned with the
ultimate ends of human life, but are concerned only with
making a living. This is all there is to the public
activity of the member of society.
Arendt has a certain difficulty with the emergence of
this social realm (which she dates as beginning around the
sixteenth century7
) . it would appear that the source of
this difficulty lies with the effect which the development
of this realm has had on public activity. When the guiding
force in public life is the attainment of the wherewithal to
satisfy the life processes, there is no longer any room or
time left in which to pursue the unnecessary, and thereby
human, goals of the Greek polis. The Greek desire to attain
some measure of immortality through the public presentation
of great works, words, or deeds8 finds no quarter in an age
where mortal, bodily considerations prevail. in such an
age, political life is reduced to bureaucratic
administration, a sort of public housekeeping which tries to
organize social laboring. 9
It seems, however, that there is more to Arendt •
s
dissatisfaction with the modern social realm than its
devaluation of heroic political action. There is something
else about modernity which bothers Arendt, and this is
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indirectly indicated by her treatment of Christianity. A
Arendt points out, the decline of the ancient public realm
began with Socratic philosophy, which identified
contemplative life as superior to an active life in the
poll.." This denigration of public activity was maintained
and developed by Plato, Aristotle, and the stoics, but it
was Christianity, Arendt claims, which transformed the
contemplative, apolitical life of the philosophers into "a
right of all.-" Indeed, Arendt writes that the fall of the
Roman Empire and the diffusion of the Christian gospel of an
eternal afterlife together made any striving for an earthly
immortality futile and unnecessary.
And they succeeded so well in making the vita
activa and the_bios politikos the handmaidin~i ofcontemplation that not even the rise of the
secular in the modern age and the concomitant
reversal of the traditional hierarchy between
action and contemplation sufficed to save from
oblivion the striving for immortality which
originally had been the spring and center of the
vita activa . l<
If Arendt' s only gripe against modernity is its lack of
a sphere of public activity (in the Greek sense), one would
expect that she would find the denial of earthly immortality
- the spring and center of Greek political life - to be the
most significant feature of Christianity. But this is not
the case. Rather, she identifies the revaluation of life
itself as "the most important reversal with which
Christianity had broken into the ancient world." 13 As was
indicated above, the Greeks held biological life and its
demands to be something less than human. Arendt claims that
Christianity reversed that Greek attitude toward physical
life, and elevated life to the level of the sacred.- By
this, Arendt means that Christianity viewed life on earth,
or mortal life, as essential to the attainment of the
eternal life offered to men by Christ. it was only through
life on earth that one could enter heaven. Arendt goes so
far as to claim that according to Christianity, "to stay
alive at all costs had become a holy duty." 15
The difference which Arendt finds between the Greek and
the Christian attitude toward life is revealed by comparing
their different attitudes toward suicide. Arendt points out
that part of the Greek contempt for the slave was based on
his choice of a life of slavery over death. 16 in refusing
to commit suicide rather than live as a slave, the slave was
repulsive to the Greeks. m the situation of one who was
about to be enslaved, the Greeks found death to be a more
noble choice than life. in support of her claim that
Christianity reversed the Greek attitude toward life, Arendt
cites the Christian refusal to bury on blessed ground those
who commit suicide. Those who choose to kill themselves,
instead of continuing to live even the most wretched
existence, cannot enter heaven and are denied eternal life.
Further support for Arendt »s claim can be found in the
Catholic Church's prohibition of abortion, and its recent
opposition to the reproductive techniques that have been
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developed by medical science. Because it is sacred, argues
the church, life should not be artificially created or
ended.
One possible reason why this Christian elevation of
life is more important for Arendt than its denial of earthly
immortality is that this reverent attitude toward life has
become one of the central features of modernity. The
Christian belief in an other-worldly immortality, on the
other hand, has been abandoned. Christianity's
"fundamental
belief in the sacredness of life has survived, and has even
remained completely unshaken by, secularization and the
general decline of the Christian faith." 17 The form which
this reverence for life takes in modernity is, according to
Arendt, the over-arching concern for the production process,
or the economy. it is through the productive activity of
man that the life of the species is preserved. While the
concern for the life of the species, rather than the
individual, is a significant difference between modern
society and the Christian community, the reverence of life
runs through both ages. In this sense, Arendt sees Marx as
an unwitting smuggler of Christian attitudes into modernity.
But the fact that the sacredness of life exerts its
influence on modernity is not a sufficient explanation of
Arendt 's ranking it as the most important effect of
Christianity. There is no reason for treating the longevity
of this influence as an indication of its importance.
Another possible explanation for her ranking can be
found in the detrimental effect which the modern form of the
explicitly claims that society, in which the life of the
species is preserved, continually encroaches upon political
life, further decreasing the possibility for public
action.- But this explanation is also insufficient. For
if the standard for her ranking is the effect which
Christianity has had on public life, it would appear that
the belief in an otherworldly afterlife, which cast into
oblivion the desire for earthly immortality, would be more
important than the revaluation of life.
A more sufficient explanation of Arendt's ranking of
the effects of Christianity is available, but this
explanation is grounded less upon Arendt's explicit concern
with the decline of politics and public life than with an
underlying, muted concern of hers. This concern is for the
loss of the ancient private realm, in and of itself, and not
because of the effect which this loss has had on the public
sphere. Arendt thinks that certain human activities - those
associated with the body and the life processes - should not
be seen, that they should be kept from public view. in
ancient Greece, these activities were hidden in the
household. And the reason why these activities were, and
from Arendt's perspective should be hidden, is that they are
not worthy of public exposure. 19
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To put this differently, there seems to he in Arendf
thought a certain conte.pt for the body and the l ife
processes, a content she recognizes and admires in the
Greeks. The Creeks considered the slave contemptible not
because he hindered public life (indeed, such a public lif
was possible largely because of the slave,
, but because h
displayed a certain baseness in clinging to life above all
else. in his defense of slavery in The^olitics, Aristotle
cites as natural slaves those "whose condition is such that
their function is the use of their bodies and nothing better
can be expected of them. -» For the body is inferior to the
mind, and those whose bodies are stronger than their minds
are inferior to mentally developed and active individuals.
Arendt's ranking of the effects of Christianity, I am
arguing, is similarly based on the attitude that the body
and the life processes are base. By making physical, mortal
life an essential element in the attainment of an eternal
afterlife, Christianity weakened the stigma that the Greeks
had attached to the life processes. 21 Household activity
was no longer considered sub-human, but was raised to the
level of a divinely sanctioned element of human activity.
Given the underlying contempt which I suggest Arendt has for
such activity, it is understandable that she would claim
that the Christian revaluation of life is the most important
reversal accomplished by Christianity; it marked the
beginning of the end of the ancient realm of privacy.
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This contempt for the life processes is what I „as
referring to earlier when I claimed that there is more to
Arendt.
s dissatisfaction with society than her concern for
its lack of heroic public activity. For the emergence of
society, which is the modern form of the sacredness of life
brought about the complete collapse of the ancient private
'
realm. Even during the long reign of Christianity, the
demands of the body were still satisfied within the
household; it was only the status of the household and its
activity which had changed with Christianity. 22 m society,
however, the life processes are no longer hidden within the
household, but occur out in the open, in public. And while
Arendt writes that "it- i<s <=+->--iv-;„~1 ir ls stnking that from the beginning
of history to our own time it has always been the bodily
part of human existence that needed to be hidden in privacy,
all things connected with the necessity of the life process
itself," 23 my claim is that it is disturbing, perhaps
disgusting, to her that this is no longer the case. Such
necessary activity, by its very nature, argues Arendt,
should be hidden from public view.
Before I move on to an examination of some additional
consequences of Arendt
-s contempt for the body, I should
briefly mention and respond to an objection that might be
raised concerning the existence of this contempt. Some
commentators on Arendt »s thought have pointed out the
important role which "natality" plays in her thought. 24 in
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Xh^Human Condition, Arendt claims that " [t ]he miracle that
saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its
normal,
-natural, ruin is ultimately the fact of natality,
in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted." 25
'
While this reference to natality may seem to belie my claim
about Arendt's contempt for the body, in that Arendt places
such great importance on this bodily function, I think that
her use of natality instead supports my claim.
First, the example of natality which Arendt cites is
the birth of Jesus Christ. She could hardly have chosen a
less typical example of human natality. The birth of Christ
was not the result of the sexual union of a man and a woman,
but was instead the result of an "immaculate conception."
Furthermore, Christ did not die the typical death of an
embodied human. He died, and then rose from the dead. The
images of Immaculate Mary, Virgin Mother, and the risen
Christ, are at best, sanitized versions of the human body,
and at worst, they are denials of the body.
More important than Arendt's choice of an example of
natality, however, is the use to which she puts this notion.
The last clause of the previous quote, which concerns "the
faculty of action," reveals the point which Arendt is trying
to make. In the paragraph preceding the one from which the
quote was taken, Arendt discusses the faculty of action.
If left to themselves, human affairs can only
follow the law of mortality, which is the most
certain and the only reliable law of a life spent
between birth and death. It is the faculty of
44
action that interferes with this law because it
dailv'l?^ ^.^xorable automatic course ofly life, which in its turn, as we sawinterrupted and interfered wiih the cycle of thebiological life process. 26
The faculty of action, in other words, interrupts the
daily routine of laboring activity (the inexorable automatic
course of daily life)
,
which is the human response to the
law of mortality. Action, in this sense, is a way of
breaking out of the routines imposed by man's mortality.
Therefore, natality, as the ontological ground in which
action is rooted, should not be interpreted as an Arendtian
celebration or affirmation of the body and the life
processes. On the contrary, as Arendt uses the term,
natality is the source of hope that man can transcend the
limits imposed by his embodiment, and accomplish something
immortal. As such, the concept of natality supports, rather
than weakens, my claim about Arendt 1 s contempt for the body.
Although this contempt for the body is an underlying
theme of The Human Condition, it has a profound influence on
Arendt' s text. Her interpretations of modernity and
Christianity, not to mention her interpretation of classical
Greece, are all shaped by this attitude toward the body.
More to the point, I think that this contempt leads Arendt
to misinterpret each of these cultural periods. From my
perspective, neither Christianity nor modernity holds life
to be as sacred as Arendt claims, nor did the Greeks find
the body to be thoroughly contemptible. In each of these
cases, Arendfs interpretation seems to me skewed by ner
overreaction to the realm of the body and its needs.
Since the primary focus of this essay is the modern,
technological age, Arendt
-s interpretation „<=j.in-erpreratio of modernity is
obviously of concern here, but just as important is Arenas
interpretation of Christianity. This is because our
different perspectives on modernity are greatly influenced
by our different interpretations of Christianity, contrary
to the post-modern infatuation with discontinuity and
rupture, Arendt and I both identify l ines of continuity
between Christianity and modernity, although the lines we
identify are remarkably different.
in emphasizing Christianity's treatment of physical,
biological life as a prerequisite for entrance into the
'
heavenly kingdom, Arendt ignores what might be considered
the other side of the Christian attitude toward life. This
other side, which is grounded in the Old Testament's account
of man's fall from grace, treats the "law of mortality" and
the demands of the life processes as punishment for the
original sin. Initially, God had created for man a garden
in which he would live, and out of the ground of that garden
"the Lord God caused to grow every tree that is pleasing to
the sight and good for food; the tree of life also in the
midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil." 27 of this last tree, the tree of knowledge of
good and evil, man was forbidden to eat. God warned man
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that
-in the day that you eat from it you shall surely
die." 28 It was with the fruit of this tree that the serpent
tempted woman, telling her that "in the day you eat from it
your eyes will be opened, and you will be Uke God, knowing
good and evil." 29
Adam and Eve, of course, ate of this tree, and were
consequently expelled from the garden by God. They did not
immediately die, however, as one might expect from the
warning that God had given them. But the point of the
expulsion was to prohibit man from eating of the tree of
life, and thereby to deny man the possibility of attaining
everlasting life. it was in this sense of losing eternal
life that man died. As God said to Adam upon learning of
the sin, "'Behold, the man has become like one of Us,
knowing good and evil; and now, lest he stretch out his
hand, and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live
forever' - therefore the LORD God sent him out from the
garden of Eden." 30 And to keep him out, God stationed a
band of angels and "the flaming sword which turned every
direction, to guard the way to the tree of life." 31
Man's mortality, therefore, was not part of his
original condition, but was the result of the first sin.
God had not initially forbidden man to eat from the tree of
life, but only forbade that he eat from the tree of
knowledge. It was only after man ignored God's command, and
ate the forbidden fruit, that he was condemned to his mortal
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condition. But there was ,ore to the punishment than the
denial of everlasting life; God also condemned man, in his
mortality, to a life of increased toil and labor.
Before the fall, bodily needs were easily satisfied.
The fruit of the trees satisfied man's hunger and water
flowed throughout the garden to satisfy the thirst of man
and the trees. 32 But after the sin, God said to Adam,
"'Cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat
of it all the days of your life. Both thorns and thistles
it shall grow for you; and you shall eat the plants of the
field; by the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till
you return to the ground.'" 33
Not only did God make it more difficult for man to
satisfy the needs of his body; he also added to those needs.
Before the fall, Adam and Eve had no need for clothes, and
were unaware of their nakedness. After their sin, however,
they were ashamed of their uncovered bodies, and sought to
hide themselves from the view of God. 34 in response to a
need that they did not have before, God fashioned clothes
for Adam and Eve before he expelled them from the garden. 35
There was also a special facet of the punishment, a
particularly cruel one, that God directed towards woman.
Because she succumbed to the serpent's temptation and led
man astray, God said to the woman, '"I will greatly multiply
your pain in childbirth, in pain you shall bring forth
children; yet your desire shau ^ ^^^^ ^ ^
shall rule over you."' 36
I should emphasize that I am not claiming that prior tc
the fall there was no labor, in either the procreative or
the toilsome senses of the word. Arendt forcefully
criticizes those who make such claims, and points out that
the punishment consisted in making labor (in both senses)
more burdensome and painful. 37 I agree with Arendt-
s
interpretation of the Old Testament on this point, at least;
before the original sin, there was some pain in childbirth,
and the fruit trees which God provided did require some
cultivation by man. 38 As is clear from the quote in the
preceding paragraph, the pain of childbirth was multiplied,
not created, as part of the punishment. it may not be as
clear, however, that the shift from man's role as the
cultivator of fruit trees to the producer of grains (the
plants of the field) was also part of the punishment. The
production of grains requires the yearly preparation of the
fields, and the sowing of the seeds, not to mention the
unending struggle to keep the field free from "thorns and
thistles." By comparison, the cultivation of fruit trees
requires little time or attention (especially in Eden)
, and
these trees continue to produce fruit for many years.
But while I agree with Arendt that labor was not
created, just intensified, by the punishment for original
sin, I disagree with her concomitant claim that death, or
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human mortality, was not a result of man's fall from grace,
in support of this last point, Arendt simply states that
•'[n]owhere in the Old Testament is death
-the wages of
sin."' 39 There is no arguing with this; the phrase Arendt
quotes is from Paul's epistle to the Romans (6:23). But
this simple statement of Arendt
-s does little to contradict
the last verses of the third chapter of the Book of Genesis,
some of which were quoted above. On my interpretation, the
point of these verses is that God expelled man from the
garden and blocked his return to the tree of life, so as to
prevent man from eating of this tree, thereby attaining
eternal life. Before he sinned, man could have eaten of
this tree, but not afterward; this was part of the
punishment.
Before it gets lost in this biblical quibbling, the
point which I am tryinq to make here is that, contrary to
Arendt 's claim, the Old Testament did not hold mortal life
and the life processes to be sacred, 40 but instead viewed
human mortality and the burdensome, painful nature of the
life processes as the results of oriqinal sin. This is not
to say that the Old Testament held life and biological
necessity in the same contempt which Arendt found among the
Greeks, but that the Old Testament accepted necessity and
mortality in the spirit of guilt for the primal sin. As
descendants of Adam, all men share in his guilt and
punishment.
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in the New Testament, the figure of Christ comes to
redeem man from this guilt and to offer him salvation. And
while it is true that this redemption was accomplished
precisely by God's becoming man, and by suffering, dying,
and being buried/ 1 there remains in Christianity a certain
ambivalence about mortal life that Arendt misses. On the
one hand, it is only by living according to the example of
Christ's life on earth, and then dying, that one can be
redeemed and attain everlasting life; on the other hand,
death is recognized by Christianity as a punishment for sin.
This ambivalence is expressed quite clearly by Augustine:
Undoubtedly, death is the penalty of all who cometo birth on earth as descendants of the first man;
nevertheless, if the penalty is paid in the name
of justice and piety, it becomes a new birth inheaven. Although death is the punishment of sin,
sometimes it secures for the soul a grace that is
a security against all punishment for sin. 42
As for Arendt 's claim that "to stay alive at all costs
had become a holy duty" 43 under Christianity, the gospels of
Christ's apostles, not to mention the deaths of the martyrs,
clearly refute this claim. According to Mark, Christ
proclaimed to his followers, "'For whoever wishes to save
his life shall lose it; and whoever loses his life for my
sake and the gospel's shall save it.'" 44 John put it even
more emphatically: "'He who loves his life loses it; and he
who hates his life in this world shall keep it to life
eternal. 1 " 45 So much for the sacredness of life which
Arendt finds in Christianity.
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In fairness to Arendt, I should examine a
particular feature of Christianity which appears, at first
glance, to support her interpretation. This feature is the
Christian belief that at the second coming of Christ to
earth, the bodies of the deceased shall be resurrected, and
for those who attain salvation, their bodies will live
forever. This certainly gives the impression that
Christianity does revere the body, but upon closer
examination, it becomes apparent that the resurrected,
immortal body of the saved is not the same body whose
demands the Greeks found slavish. Augustine describes the
resurrected body as follows:
Just imagine how perfectly at peace and how strong
will be the human spirit when there will be no
passion to play the tyrant or conqueror, no
temptation even to test the spirit's strength.
. .
And what a body, too, we shall have, a body
utterly subject to our spirit and one so kept
alive by the spirit that there will be no need of
any other food. For, it will be a spiritual body,
no longer merely animal, one composed, indeed, of
flesh but free from every corruption of the
flesh. 46
Given this image of the resurrected body, Christianity
accomplishes less of a reversal of the Greek attitude toward
life and its demands (as Arendt interprets that attitude)
,
than a sanitization of life. If, indeed, the Greeks
relegated biological necessity to the shadows of the private
realm, Christianity promises to leave behind bodily demands
and routines when the saved individual ascends into heaven.
If Christianity holds life in high esteem, as Arendt claims,
it is not the life of the mortal body that is esteemed, but
the life of the spirit or soul.
in a later chapter this discussion of Christianity will
be continued, although not in the context of a confrontation
with Arendt. But the issues raised in the present
confrontation
- death and burdensome necessity - will also
be central to that later discussion of Christianity.
To return to her interpretation of modernity, Arendt
recognizes in the emergence of modern society a continuation
of Christianity
-s reverent attitude toward physical life.
She argues that the primary concern of society is the
survival of the species, and that the productive activity of
men is organized by society in order to serve that end. As
was the case with Arendt »s interpretation of Christianity,
there is some truth to her claim that the life processes are
highly esteemed in modernity. I think Arendt is accurate
when she points out that members of society are primarily
concerned with "making a living," and that, at least
ideally, society preserves the life of the species. But it
is also the case here that Arendt 's interpretation is
somewhat one-sided, and that she seems oblivious to certain
attitudes and trends which run counter to her claim
concerning the sacredness of life. What I have in mind here
as counter-trends are not the obvious ones, such as the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or the non-military
degradation of the environment, both of which are social
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threats to the survival of the species, and both of which
Arendt was certainly aware. (it is on this point that the
dialecticians would take Arendt to task, emphasizing that
social production in the existing atmosphere of inequality,
exploitation, and injustice, seeks to preserve the life of
one part of the species by putting the rest at risk.)
Rather, I have in mind less obvious attitudes and trends,
ones which are overlooked probably due to their mundane
nature, and to the fact that they occur in what remains of
the private household.
Since Arendt seems to think that there is no private
household in modernity (for Arendt, all that remains of
privacy in modernity is the realm of intimacy, and the
activities of the ancient household are now performed in
society)
,
it is not surprising that she would overlook these
counter-trends. However, there are vestiges of the ancient
and medieval household which have survived in modernity, and
these traces have been infiltrated and organized by modern
technology. An examination of what remains of the household
is therefore in order, both because it will challenge
Arendt' s depiction of modernity, by revealing a certain
modern contempt for the life processes, and because it will
reveal something about the way in which technology has
shaped the modern individual. In fact, the point I will be
trying to make is that the fetishistic attitude toward
technology which characterizes modernity is based on such
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contempt for the life processes. This should make obvious
the tension between Arendfs interpretation of modernity and
mine.
At the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that in
ancient Greece the household was the sphere in which
production and consumption occurred. Even business activity
was considered to be part of household production/ 7 When
Arendt claims that society has emerged as a sort of public
household, she has in mind the productive dimension of
household activity, and there is little doubt that this
dimension has indeed become a social phenomenon. in the
modern societies of the West and the East, productive
activity is no longer organized by various private
households, but by ever-larger corporations (in the West)
and by the state (in the West and the East). And the
productive life of the individuals in both types of
societies is spent not as the member of a household, but as
a worker or employee of an enterprise of much greater
dimensions
.
When one emphasizes the consumptive rather than the
productive activity of the household, however, it seems that
the private household has not been completely lost to
modernity, at least not in the West. This is certainly not
to say that the ancient Greek or the Christian models of the
household have survived intact (or even that there were any
monolithic models for either period) , but only that certain
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elements of the private household are still found in
modernity.
What remains of the household is its role as a center
of economic activity. it is no longer the primary locus of
economic activity, as it was for Greek citizens, and modern
economics, unlike the economics of ancient Greece, is no
longer concerned primarily with the household. But the
household, in an attenuated sense, remains an important site
of economic activity. it is the site where consumption
decisions are made, and where financial resources are
directed and distributed in order that the members of the
household can consume what they need. Even more
importantly, the modern household is the site at which lines
of credit attach themselves to individuals, and where
obligations are incurred for the sake of consumption. While
all this economic activity may be peripheral to the modern
science of economics, marketing, the new science of the
household, surely recognizes its importance.
In this capacity as the center of consumptive activity,
the modern household takes various forms. The procreative
dimension of the household has diminished in modernity, and
motives other than the raising of children are often the
impetus for forming household associations. Single-parent
households have also become more common, and of course, the
possibility remains for households of single individuals.
What is central to the idea of a modern household is not
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that individuals of certain statuses have joined together,
but that there exists some source of wealth or credit which
is used to satisfy the consumption demands of the household.
In this sense, a single person, a gay couple, a group of
individuals who share certain living expenses, are all
examples of households. Heterosexual sex and children are
no longer at the heart of the modern household, at least as
I am using the term.
It is not just this consumptive activity which ties
modern households to their counterparts in previous epochs;
there is also present in modern households that element of
necessity which played such an important role in defining
the ancient household. And as was the case in the ancient
household, necessity directs much of the consumptive
activity of the modern household. Of course, this is not to
say that the content of necessity has remained the same over
the centuries. While there is a certain set of needs, such
as those for food, clothing, and shelter, which has remained
necessary from ancient times to the present, necessity
encompasses much more today than it did in the past. In
fact, the content of necessity tends to continually expand
in modernity, especially in capitalist societies, as what
were once luxury items become necessities. For example,
refrigerators and automobiles were once considered luxury
items, but changes in the distribution of food, the neglect
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of public transportation, and shifts in the location of
workplaces and housing have made such items necessary/8
Compared to the relatively limited needs of the
ancient, by which I mean pre-modern, household, many modern
needs hardly seem necessary, at not least in the narrow
sense in which something necessary is indispensable for
life. Life could certainly be sustained without automobiles
or refrigerators. But one must beware of making distinc-
tions such as real versus apparent needs, biological versus
cultural needs, or even needs versus wants. While there
undoubtedly is some truth to such distinctions, and in
certain contexts they may be helpful (e.g when one is trying
to budget one's income), for the purposes of this essay such
distinctions must be avoided because they conceal some
important points.
The first of these points is made by Herbert Marcuse in
a different context, where he stretches the meaning of
"biological needs" to include culturally or socially
generated needs. To quote Marcuse:
I use the term "biological""and "biology" not in
the sense of the scientific disciplines, but in
order to designate the process and the dimension
in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and
aspirations become vital needs which, if not
satisfied, would cause dysfunction of the organism.
Conversely, socially induced needs and aspirations
may result in a more pleasurable organic behavior.
If biological needs are defined as those which
must be satisfied and for which no adequate
substitute can be provided, certain cultural needs
can "sink down" into the biology of man. 49
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Distinctions such as those listed in the preceding
paragraph, therefore, obscure the fact that certain needs,
despite their social origins, can become so deeply ingrained
in the lives of individuals that they are as necessary or as
real as any other need.
Another point, one which is crucial to this essay, is
also obscured by distinctions such as those mentioned above.
Those distinctions, in making such a clear, unequivocal
break between ancient needs and those which have emerged
more recently, hide an important similarity that exists
between ancient and modern necessity. This similarity is
that modern necessity, despite its comparatively expansive
nature, is grounded in the body, quite like ancient
necessity. Of course I am not claiming that these types of
necessity are identical in their relation to the body; they
are significantly different. But to distinguish modern
needs as artificial, unreal, or even unnecessary (in the
narrow sense) misses the difference I have in mind, and it
also conceals modern necessity's relation to the body. A
more subtle, ambiguous, and undoubtedly debatable
distinction is required here.
The distinction I would like to make between ancient
and modern necessity is that ancient necessity was primarily
concerned with satisfying the demands of the body, while
modern necessity is largely focused on overcoming limits
which are imposed by the body. By demands of the body, I
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nd
have in mind needs such as those for food, clothing, a
shelter
- the needs which were identified by the rejected
distinctions above as real, biological, or natural. And by
limits of the body, I mean certain features of embodiment
which are perceived as inconveniences, obstacles, or
annoyances. Both these demands and limits will be discussed
shortly, but first I must point out the difference between
this demand/limit distinction and those others.
In identifying ancient needs as demands of the body, I
am not trying to grant these particular needs a special,
foundational status. The point in distinguishing the
demands of the body from the limits which are imposed by it
is not to set those demands apart as something irreducible
or unavoidable, or to set them up as the measure of all
other needs. In those distinctions I have rejected,
however, such hierarchizing is usually the aim of the
distinction. The point I am making is simply that the
necessary activity of the ancient household revolved
primarily around satisfying the demands which the body makes
for food, clothing, shelter, water, and so on, and that this
is no longer the case in the modern household. A brief
examination of the ancient Greek household will not only
help to illustrate this point, but it will also point out
another consequence of Arendt's aversion to the body.
In Xenophon's Oeconomicus
. the activity of the Greek
household is portrayed during the course of a Socratic
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dialogue concerning the principles of household organization
and management. According to that portrayal, the activity
which the wife supervised occurred within the shelter of the
dwelling, and was comprised of "the rearing of newborn
children ... the making of bread from the crop ... the
working of clothes from wool." 50 she did not have to
perform these tasks herself, but it was her responsibility
to oversee the labor of the servants who performed them. it
was also her responsibility to maintain order in the house
by seeing to it that all tools and implements were returned
to their proper place after being used, 51 and that all
provisions were stored properly and consumed at a rate which
would ensure that they would not be prematurely depleted. 52
The wife was also supposed to look after the health of the
slaves. 53
It would seem, then, that Arendt was accurate in
depicting the Greek housewife as one who was occupied
primarily in the realm of the body. But according to the
Oeconomicus
.
the husband was not as removed from the
household and necessity as Arendt would have one think.
Ischomachus, whom Socrates had questioned concerning the
principles of economics, answered not only by recounting for
Socrates the manner in which he educated and trained his
wife for her role as supervisor of indoor activities, but he
also discussed at much greater length his role as supervisor
of the household activities which occurred outside the
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dwelling. Primary among these outdoor activities was
farming, and this was true not only in the case of
ischomachus. Despite the developments which were made in
various trades and crafts, classical Greece was
predominantly an agricultural civilization. it has been
estimated that during the fifth century B.C., nearly half of
Athens' population lived in the countryside and worked the
soil. 5* it was the responsibility of the husbands of these
country households to produce at least enough olives, figs,
and grapes to satisfy the demands of the household, and if
possible to produce a surplus which could be sold. 55 Grains
were also a staple of the Greek diet, but Greek households
were only able to produce one-quarter of the amount
consumed. 56
In ancient Greece, successful harvests depended on a
great deal of attention and diligence on the part of the
husband. The poor soil and arid climate of Greece required
that fields be fortified and replenished frequently, and
that an extensive irrigation system be developed and
maintained. 57 As was the case with the indoor activity,
most of these agricultural tasks were performed by slaves,
but the successful farmer was an active overseer. Given
Arendt's interpretation of classical Greece, one would
expect that these agricultural obligations would have been
resented by the husbands as an imposition on their freedom,
but this is not the case. In fact, Socrates declares in the
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Oeconomicus
,
that "the pursuit of farming seems to be at the
same time some soft pleasure, an increase of the household,
and a training of the bodies so that they can do whatever
befits a free man.- 58 And it was not just the training of
the body which made farming conducive to a good citizenry;
because of their careful attention to the soil, Socrates
expected husbands to be eager to defend the countryside
against foreign aggression. 59
It appears, then, that the attitude of the Greek
citizen toward the household and necessity was not as harsh
as Arendt portrayed it, and that the "gulf that the ancients
had to cross daily to transcend the narrow realm of the
household and 'rise' into the realm of politics" 60 was not
so wide. The household activity of farming, at least, seems
to bridge the gap between the household and the polis. On
the one hand, farming was dictated by physical necessity,
but on the other, it prepared men for political life, and
thereby improved and strengthened, as opposed to simply made
possible, that political life. Other household activities
of the husbands, which Socrates lumps together as
"mechanical arts," were not so beneficial to political life.
Crafts and trades, such as metal forging, potting, and
cobbling, were considered inferior forms of economic, or
household, activity. Not only did such activity ruin the
bodies of the participants, by requiring them to remain
seated indoors for long periods of time or to work close to
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a fire, but it also deprived them of "leisure to join in the
concerns of friends and of the city.- 61 For these reasons,
Socrates claims that such mechanics are "reputed to be bad
friends as well as bad defenders of their fatherlands." 62
Nonetheless, citizens did participate in these mechanical
arts, although not to the extent that metics, the resident
aliens, did. 63 And when citizens did perform these arts, it
was not simply as overseers; the owners of the various
workshops of classical Greece often worked alongside the
slaves and workmen. 64
While the development of such crafts and trades may
appear to indicate that the business activity of ancient
Greece had moved beyond the demands of the body, this is not
entirely true. 65 While activities such as mining, gilding,
instrument-making (flute and lyre), and weapon-making (sword
and shield) were not directed by the demands of the body,
many of the other mechanical arts were. The fuller and the
cobbler were responding to the need for clothing; the potter
provided utensils which made possible the transportation and
storage of liquids such as olive oil, wine, and water; the
carpenter and woodcutter provided shelter from the elements.
Of course, the products of these craftsmen were not purely
utilitarian. Athenian pottery, for example, was frequently
graced by the black-figures of the vase-painters, and some
pottery was never intended to store anything but was purely
ornamental. 66 Nevertheless, a significant amount of the
lens
.
was
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manufacturing activity of classical rr00.0* C G eece was undertaken in
response to the demands of the body.
This prevalence of bodily demands can even be
recognized in the extensive trading activity of Ath
This trade was not primarily in manufactured goods, but
instead an agricultural exchange. The principal export of
Athens was olive oil, a product of the husband, not the
artisan. 67 During this period, olive oil was used not only
as a food, but was also used as a fuel and a source of
light. 68 The export of olive oil, and to a lesser extent
wine and manufactured goods, was used primarily to acquire
grain
- usually corn - which was shipped back to Athens. 69
The maintenance of certain sources of imported grain, and
the control of the routes by which such grain made its way
to Athens, were a constant concern of the Athenians, and a
crucial determinant of their imperial strategies. 70 in
fact, it was in a battle to maintain the vital flow of grain
from the Black Sea region that Athens lost the Peloponnesian
War. In the battle of Aegospotami, the final battle of the
war, the Athenians lost the vast majority of their fleet and
control of the grain trade through the Hellespont. They
were then quickly starved into surrender. 71
The demands of the body, therefore were of central
importance in classical Greece, and were not as shaded and
hidden as Arendt makes it seem. The demand for food even
played an important role in the public, political activity
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of Athens. mdeed, it appears that classical Greece was not
completely free of the "social housekeeping., which Arendt
identified as a distinctively modern phenomenon. since my
primary concern here, however, is not to challenge Arendt.
s
interpretation of classical Greek political life, but to
distinguish ancient and modern necessity, it is the
necessary activity of the private sphere, the household,
which must be emphasized. In the household of ancient
Greece, the demands of the body held sway from the indoor
routines of cooking, cleaning, and child-rearing to the
agricultural practices of the husband; they were even an
important factor in the development of some trades and
crafts. Therefore, a great deal of time was spent in
classical Greece responding to the demands of the body, and
this time was spent not just by women and slaves, but by
free men as well.
In contrast, members of the modern household spend much
less of their time in the service of the body's demands.
Those demands are still satisfied by the household, but no
longer through the time-consuming performance of certain
reproductive tasks. 72 Rather, through the consumption of
technological apparatuses, or the products of such
apparatuses, the modern household quickly satisfies the
demands of the body.
Food, clothing, and shelter are no longer produced by
the household, but are only consumed there. The production
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of these and other73 necessities takes place in the
"public/private hybrid- which Arendt called society. while
technology has certainly been crucial to the formation and
development of this social production process, and that
production process has in turn been an important influence
on the modern self, the concern of this essay lies not with
the value which technology has for men as members of this
production process, but with the value which technology has
for consumers. in their productive activity, men often feel
to be constrained in their relation to technology; they
think of themselves as slaves to the machines; 74 in order to
work, they have no choice but to use the newest
technological developments. But in the consumption which
occurs in the household, men tend to think of themselves as
unconstrained consumers. In their consumption choices, men
are no longer the slaves of technology, but choose to use or
not use technology freely. Because I think that this
liberal notion of the sovereign consumer obscures one of the
important ways in which technology shapes the modern self,
(see p. 19 of Chapter 1) , I will focus on the household
consumption, rather than production, of certain
technological apparatuses. Later in the essay I will
respond to those who would criticize this emphasis on
consumption rather than production.
As an example of the way in which technology is
consumed in the modern household, consider the case of a
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bodily demand which loomed so large for the Greeks - the
demand for food. Unlike the Greeks, members of the modern
household do not spend most of their time involved in the
production, preservation, and preparation of food. Instead,
the modern tendency is to buy food that is already prepared,
refrigerate it at home until its ready to be eaten, and then
to use one of the various forms of instant heat to cook it.
Not only is the food consumed in the modern household, but
things like refrigerators and microwave ovens are also
consumed in the satisfaction of the body's demand for food.
And one can, of course, extend this list to include the
various agricultural and transportation technologies which
are indirectly consumed along with the food itself. In a
following chapter I will examine the development of some
household technologies, many of which are focused on the
demands of the body, so for now let this example suffice. I
just want to point out here that the modern household
consumes a wide array of technological products and
apparatuses in order to quickly and easily satisfy the
demands of the body.
It is no accident that I have used the issue of time to
distinguish the ancient and the modern households, just as
it is no accident that I have used terms like save, consume,
and spend to discuss the issue of time. Such economic terms
are appropriate to a discussion of temporality because the
issue of time is central to the activity of the household.
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in the ancient household, it was important that they way in
which time was spent be properly organized and managed; it
was through such careful attention to time that the
satisfaction of the body's demands could be ensured. 75 The
modern household, however, is less concerned with satisfying
the demands of the body than it is with satisfying them
quickly. The demands of the body are no longer thought of
as requiring careful attention and proper planning, but are
seen instead as inconveniences, in that they limit or
interfere with the use of time. The value of technology, I
am arguing, lies in its ability to mitigate such
inconvenience
.
This modern attitude toward the demands of the body is
part of what I was referring to above as limits which are
imposed by the body. When such bodily demands are seen
primarily as something which impinges upon one's time, they
become limits to be overcome, rather than demands to be
satisfied. But as I indicated when I first introduced it,
the demand/limit distinction is not unequivocal or
unambiguous, and it does not neatly distinguish ancient and
modern necessity. This is especially true in regard to the
temporal limits of the body. As Arendt pointed out, the
ancient Greeks were also concerned with saving time from the
demands of the body. Instead of technological apparatuses,
slavery and rigid sex roles were the means by which Greek
citizens were able to free up some of their time for public
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activity. As I tried to show in my discussion of the Greek
household, however, husbands also spent a great deal of time
actively responding to the demands of the body, and this
time was not considered wasted or ill-spent. Aristotle's
contempt for the body and its demands does not appear to
have been shared by the citizen farmers who comprised the
largest part of the Athenian population. In fact, some
scholars now argue that many Greeks found public, not
private, activity to be distasteful or degrading. 76 in any
case, the Greeks did not treat the demands of the body
solely, or even primarily, as limits which had to be
overcome
.
The difference between ancient and modern necessity is
not restricted to their different attitudes toward the
demands of the body, however. The limits of the body
include more than just those temporal limits which are
imposed by the demands of the body. Rather, modern
necessity finds in the body an array of limits, some of
which are not so much temporal as they are spatial. As
embodied beings, men exist in a world in which other things,
including other persons, are dispersed in a spatial field.
To put this differently, the body of the human delimits a
given space, and other things - things other than the self -
are at a distance. Overcoming this distance, by moving
either persons or things, is a concern for men as embodied
beings
.
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This need to move men and things, which I will call the
need for conveyance, is certainly not a uniquely modern
need. The Greeks, after all, were excellent sailors and
were able to establish an empire and import grains over
great distances. And before them, the Egyptians had moved
large blocks of stone to the sites of the pyramids and then
put them into place. 77 But while these ancient
civilizations were indeed concerned with the need for
conveyance, this need held a subsidiary or derivative status
for them. By this I mean that the need for conveyance was
important for ancient civilizations inasmuch as distance was
hindrance to the satisfaction of other needs. The Greeks'
sailing prowess, for example, was largely a response to
their need for grain. And in the case of the Egyptian
pyramids, the need to erect an immortal monument to the
Pharaohs was the impetus for the marvelous movements
accomplished by that civilization.
In modernity, however, distance is no longer treated as
an environmental feature of embodiment; rather, distance is
another limit which is imposed upon men by their bodies.
The need for conveyance - the need to overcome the spatial
limit of distance - is a primary need in modernity. No
longer is conveyance merely a question of man's ability to
move what needs to be moved to where it needs to be;
movement today is necessary in and of itself, and any
impediment to movement is an obstacle to be overcome or
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assaulted by technology. 78 Air travel i c a „ u •fti s an obvious example
of the use of technology to overcome one of the chief
impediments to movement - gravity. Another example is
telecommunications, which allows the conveyance of
information over great distances almost instantaneously.
Other examples of modern technological conveyance will be
examined in a later chapter.
This attitude toward distance as a spatial limit which
is imposed by the body is exacerbated by the modern attitude
toward temporal limits. A whole group of needs has emerged
around the point where the concern for saving time merges
with the disdain for the limit of distance. As soon as a
spatial barrier has been overcome, a new set of temporal
limits emerges around this achievement. Again take as an
example man's ability to overcome gravity and fly from place
to place. Once this breakthrough was attained, it became
necessary not only to fly wherever man wanted (i.e. to
overcome all spatial barriers to flight)
, but it also became
necessary to fly as frequently and as fast as man needed.
The time that is spent travelling is considered an
inconvenience, and must be continually lessened by
technological developments.
The need for speed, both in conveyance and in man's
ability to satisfy the demands of the body, is a hallmark of
modern necessity. 79 The need for speed also helps to
explain the continually expanding range of modern necessity.
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Unlike purely spatial limits, as soon as a speed limit is
overcome, another limit is simultaneously established. The
need to do things and get places as quickly as possible is a
need that can never be satisfied. Every advance imposes a
new obstacle, and creates the need for a more refined, or a
new form of, technology.
The point of this discussion of modern necessity is to
reveal that despite its expansive, and apparently non-
biological nature, modern necessity, like ancient necessity,
is based upon the body. However, the modern attitude toward
the body, as it is reflected in the consumptive activity of
the household, is guite different from the ancient Greek
attitude toward the body. While the Greeks thought that the
satisfaction of bodily demands required careful attention
and planning throughout the household, modernity treats the
body instead as the source of limits and barriers which are
imposed upon men. What these limits require is not planning
and attention, but the consumption of various technological
devices which allow men to avoid or overcome such limits.
The value which technology has for the modern
household, therefore, lies in technology's ability to
mitigate the effect of the bodily limits. The word I choose
to express this value is convenience. The appropriateness
of this choice is indicated, in part, by the simple fact
that the various technological apparatuses which are
consumed by the household are often called "modern
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conveniences." items such as automobiles, dishwashers, and
telephones are conveniences in the sense that they make life
easier or more comfortable. A more important indication of
the appropriateness of the word convenience, however, is
that this sense of the word - in which convenience means
ease and comfort - is a uniquely modern sense.
The noun convenience and the adjective convenient are
Latin in origin. 80 Convenience is an adaptation of
convenientia, which means "meeting together, agreement,
accord, harmony, conformity, suitableness, fitness." The
adjective convenient is based on the present participle of
the verb convenire, which means "to come together, meet,
unite, agree, fit suit." Prior to the seventeenth century,
the meanings of the English words remained quite close to
these Latin roots. Something could be described as
convenient, or as a convenience, if it was in accordance or
agreement with something such as nature or "the facts," or
if it was suitable or appropriate to a given situation or
circumstance, or if it was morally appropriate. These pre-
seventeenth century meanings, however, are now considered
obsolete
.
The modern meaning of convenience is "the quality of
being personally convenient; ease or absence of trouble in
use or action; material advantage or absence of
disadvantage; commodity, personal comfort; saving of
trouble." And the current sense of convenient is
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"personally suitable or well-adapted to one's easy action or
performance of functions; favourable to one's comfort, easy
condition, or the saving of trouble; commodious."
The difference between the obsolete and the current
meanings of these words lies not just in the modern addition
of the sense of ease and comfort, but also in the fact that
what remains of the older meanings' sense of suitability has
shifted and narrowed. Convenience is no longer a matter of
the suitability of something to the facts, nature, or a
moral code; suitability in the modern meaning of convenience
refers back to the person, the self. Something is a
convenience or is convenient in the modern sense of these
words if it is suitable to personal comfort or ease. This
shift in the reference of convenience corresponds to the
change in attitude toward the body which occurred around the
same time. The attitude toward the body as the source of
burdensome limits is reflected, however obliquely, by the
modern meaning of convenience. After the seventeenth
century, something is a convenience if it is suitable to the
modern task of overcoming the limits which are imposed by
the body.
Another etymological shift must also be noted here.
The word comfort, which is central to the modern meaning of
convenience, underwent a corresponding change in meaning,
although it appears that this occurred perhaps as early as
the fifteenth century. 81 Prior to that point, the principal
meanings of cohort, in either its verb or substantive for,
were centered upon strength and support. To comfort, or be
a comfort, meant to support, strengthen, or bolster, in
either a physical or mental sense. During this period,
there also was a sense of comfort as the removal or absence
of pain or discomfort, but this sense was limited to mental
distress. it was not until the fifteenth century that the
verb comfort included the sense of removing physical pain or
discomfort. And the substantive sense of comfort, as "a
state of physical and material well-being, with freedom from
pain and trouble, and satisfaction of bodily needs," was not
widespread until the nineteenth century. And it is in this
later, bodily sense that the word comfort is used in the
definition of convenience.
These etymological shifts, of course, are hardly
conclusive proof of any change in attitude toward the body;
indeed, it is doubtful that such a change could ever be
conclusively proven. But the changes in the meanings of
convenience and comfort are valuable as linguistic traces of
that other change. In some of the chapters which follow, I
will examine other inconclusive forms of evidence, such as
developments of certain technological apparatuses of the
modern household, as well as the development of religious
ideas and doctrines.
Before moving on to these other areas, however, a final
thought on Hannah Arendt must be offered. After all, it may
appear that I have gone out of my way to challenge ^ oniy
her interpretation of modernity, but her interpretation of
classical Greece and Christianity as well. The point of
challenging Arendt
• s various interpretations, however, was
to reveal that despite her reputation as an unswerving
critic of modernity, she did harbor a particularly modern
trait or tendency. This trait, of course, is that attitude
toward the body which I have cited as a distinctive feature
of modernity. While Arendt did not celebrate the
technological progress of modernity, and did not appear
concerned with the various limits of the body, she did tend
to treat the body as a hindrance or inconvenience to public
life, and I am including here Arendt
' s public life as a
writer. Throughout The Human Condition, Arendt assiduously
avoids, if she does not exactly overcome, the body. In her
interpretation of ancient Greece, Christianity, and
modernity, Arendt displays a certain unwillingness to spend,
or waste, time examining the private, bodily realm.
While Arendt would have argued that her attitude toward
the body was influenced by the Greeks, and was therefore
diametrically opposed to anything modern, I tried to show in
my discussion of ancient necessity that the public and
private were not as distinct as Arendt liked to believe, and
that the demands of the body played a significant role in
both the public and private realms of ancient Greece.
Arendt" s aversion to the body, I am suggesting, kept her
focused on Aristotle's derogatory claims about the body,
necessity, and privacy, and kept her from looking more
closely at the necessary activity of Greece.
This same attitude toward the body prevented Arendt
from noticing the essential ambivalence of Christianity's
attitude toward the body and the life processes. By making
the suffering, toil, and eventual death of mortals essential
to the attainment of an otherworldly immortality,
Christianity sanctified mortal life, according to Arendt.
However, this interpretation completely overlooks the
connection between guilt and the body in Christianity.
While the mortal body is essential to the eternal life of
the soul and the resurrected body, mortality and burdensome
labor are themselves the punishment for sin. Mortal life,
therefore, is not simply sacred; it is at once a source of
hope and a source of guilt. For Arendt, however, the mere
association of the life of the body with immortality could
be nothing other than the disastrous sanctification of life,
and it was this disaster which Arendt found to be the most
consequential accomplishment of Christianity.
Of course, it is the influence of this attitude toward
the body on Arendt »s interpretation of modernity which is
most important for this essay. Her aversion to the body
causes her to focus on the quasi-public, or social,
production of necessities in modernity. But even here, she
is so repulsed by the public display of base necessity that
7and
s
She
nd
she interprets it as modernity's reverence for Ufe
never closely examines what necessities are actually
produced in modernity. And that same
Arendt from looking more close! v uy ly into what remains of the
private household, a more-details« etailed examination of the
household and modern necessity, however repulsive, might
have revealed to Arendt the extent to which modernity i
closer to her Greek ideal than was even Greece itself,
might have realized that far from sanctifying the body a
the life processes, modernity is distinguished by the
ability of the masses to free themselves from the limits of
the body, through the ravenous consumption of technology.
The trajectory of modernity is to render everyone free not
only from the limits which are imposed by the body, but even
from the body itself. (I will get to m- poinfc^
later.
)
The interpretation of The Human Condition which I have
offered here is, of course, highly ironic. For Arendt and I
begin from similar concerns. in the "Prologue" of Tj!e_Jiuman
Condition
,
Arendt discusses the space-age attitude toward
the earth as "a prison for men's bodies," and the attempt by
scientists to create life in a test tube. I share this
concern about the direction, or trajectory, of modern
technology. And while Arendt claims that no answer to these
"preoccupations and perplexities" is offered in her text,
she does suspect that these phenomena are grounded in a
desire to escape the human condition. « j agree with Arendt
on this much, but from my perspective, "the very
quintessence of the human condition" is not the earth, as
Arendt claims, but the body. The irony, therefore, il that
Arendt'
s treatment of the body as something which should
properly be hidden in private, appears to me as a non-
technological, but nevertheless modern, attempt to escape
the human condition. And Arendt- s inability to come to
grips with the body publicly, in her writing, only serves to
obscure the hold which technology has on modernity.
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CHAPTER 3
ST PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMPTION
in the last chapter, I mentioned in passing that
Arendt recognized Marx as a unwitting saggier of Christian
ideas. By this remark, I meant that Arendt saw in Marx's
concern for the social dimension of the production process
and his appreciation for the develops of these social
forces, a modern form of Christianity's reverence for life.
I
,
too, am troubled by this Marxist emphasis on production,
but for very different reasons than Arendt. What concernsM 13 n0t that thls f°cus ™ Production deflects attention
away from the loss in modernity of any public sphere in
which action might occur (although it does do that) ; rather,
the Marxist pre-occupation with the capitalist production
process disturbs me because it diverts critical attention
away from the consumptive activity of the modern household.
In this sense, I see an effective similarity between Arendt
and the Marxists from whom she sought to distance herself -
both obscure an important way in which technology shapes
modernity. And while I am aware that this criticism would
bear more directly on Arendt than on Marxists, since she is
concerned more with the effects of technological development
than with economic exploitation, I nonetheless think that my
point has some bearing on current Marxist thought. Even if
the primary task of Marxist thought is to uncover and
eliminate economic injustice and exploitation, there is no
doubt that the tenacity of capitalism in the late twentieth
century is bound up with the technological fetishism of
modernity. it is no longer enough to point out that the
capitalistic production and exchange of things as
commodities conceals the productive relations among men;
that is, thought which would challenge capitalism today can
no longer remain satisfied with Marx's revelation of the
"secret" of commodity fetishism.' In the latest stage of
capitalism, the character of the commodities themselves must
be closely examined, along with the needs which the
consumption of those commodities satisfies. For the
technological character of the commodities consumed in late
capitalism harbors a secret of its own, a secret which may
help explain not only the dominance of technology, but also
the resiliency of advanced capitalism.
In making this claim that Marxist interpretations
of modernity over-emphasize the production process and
neglect the realm of consumption, I am aware that
significant steps in the opposite direction were taken by
several Marxist theorists in the 1970's. In fact, it is
especially those theorists whom I have in mind when I make
this claim. Before I examine some of those steps away from
the rigidity of structuralist Marxism, I should point out
that the claim I am making here applies less to Marx than it
does to Marxists. Writing in England in the nineteenth
is on
le
century, during the period ^ which ^ ^ ^
Production process were being mechan i Zed, „arx . s focu
the nature of the production process is hardly
exceptional. And even so, Mar.-s appreciation for th
transforation of consumption „hich was required by
capitalist relations of production is a significant, if
neglected, element of his thought. After my examination Qf
some recent Marxist thought on consumption, 1 will examine
in more detail Merx's treatment of the transformation o,
consumption, and trv to hr^^ *-ua y bridge the gap between Marx and that
recent thought.
The first of the three Marxist texts I will examine
13 ^^^^^ by Edmond Preteceille
and Jean-Pierre Terrail. This is a collection of four
essays, three of which were originally published in French
in 1977, while the fourth was published in 1985. m the
first essay, entitled "Commodity Fetishism and the ideal of
Needs," Terrail indicates what may be considered a very
Plausible explanation for the Marxist aversion to any
protracted examination of needs and consumption.
The concept of need is inherent in thevulgar realism of bourgeois ideology
.
it is always by reference to the obvious
nature of needs, taken to be the very
essence of human existence, thatjustifications of the individual's rightto appropriate - and thus to alienatethrough sale - his own person and goods,
are explained; indeed, the whole structure
of economic liberalism is the work outfrom this pr^misP. The free expression ofthe needs of the free worker in the
Despite this bourgeois aura which surrounds the
-sue of needs and consumption, and the risK one runs of
reinforcing bourgeois ideology by merely raising this i ssue
Preteceiile and Terrail insist that " [t] he guestion of needl
is at the heart of social conflict."' Making the same point
I made above concerning Marx, they recognize that " [P] erhaps
in the nineteenth century Marx might have had a point" in
claiming that the question of needs was out of date, "but
growth, opening the way to abundance, had swept all that
aside."' Therefore, as the title of their text suggests,
Preteceiile and Terrail face squarely up to this issue.
To avoid the dangers which attend any discussion of
needs and consumption, Preteceiile and Terrail employ two
safeguards which keep them from implicitly endorsing any
version of liberalism's sovereign consumer, the source of
all needs. The first of these safeguards is a recognition
of the historicity of the consuming subject and its needs. 6
The bourgeois notion of the sovereign consumer completely
neglects the historical specificity of that consumer, and
does not recognize that the idea of the free consumer in the
market place is something which emerged in the course of
history. 7 Furthermore, the neglect of the historicity of
consumption and needs obscures the way in which the needs of
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the consumer continue to be influenced by historical
developments. By paying close attention to the historical
forces which shape the modern consumer, Preteceille and
Terrail lessen the risk of falling back into the bourgeois
idealism of the consuming subject.
But a concern for history, by itself, is not enough
to prevent a lapse into vulgarity. Preteceille and Terrail
point out that since the end of the nineteenth century,
bourgeois thought has tried to come to grips with its
ahistorical tendency by recognizing the influence which
social developments have on needs and consumption. 8 While
the idea of a "consumer society," the upshot of this re-
thinking of consumption, does take into account the
historicity of needs, it still remains objectionable to
Preteceille and Terrail. This is because it retains another
element of bourgeois thought - the relegation of production
to a merely instrumental role vis-a-vis consumption.
From the bourgeois perspective, the production
process exists only as an instrument which satisfies the
needs of the realm of consumption. It makes little
difference to Preteceille and Terrail whether that
consumptive realm is perceived as isolated individuals or as
a consumer society. In either case, "[t]he logic of
consumption appears as the primary, determining, autonomous
moment, while productive labour is reduced to a simple
instrument for provisioning the market." 9
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To avoid falling into this flawed logic,
Preteceille and Terrail rely on a second safeguard: the
rejection of any "autonomisation of the spheres of
consumption and need" in relation to the sphere of
production, and the reversal of "the order determination
between production and consumption established by vulgar
economics." 10 it is nnto an autonomous sphere of consumption
and needs which determine the production process, but the
production process which ultimately determines consumption
and needs.
" [T ]he determination of needs, like their
satisfaction, is only a moment in the same process of social
production. This can only be understood in one way: the
needs that production satisfies are the needs of production
itself, the demands of its reproduction." 11 And the
production process not only produces needs, but consumers as
well, "well-defined social agents,
. . . historical forms of
individuality made up of a whole body of inclinations and
capacities
. . .
"
12
There is, of course, nothing new here. Taken
together, these two safeguards amount to no more than the
historical materialism Marx outlined in Grundrissa . 13 so
instead of distinguishing these safeguards, I might have
simply written that their historical materialist approach to
the issue of needs and consumption keeps Preteceille and
Terrail from sliding into what they call a "substantialism"
of the needs of consumers. However, the point in breaking
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up these elements of historical materialism (which I am sure
is a capital offense in some circles) is to pose the
question whether both of these elements are necessary to
prevent an examination of needs and consumption, and the
values which influence them, from falling into bourgeois
idealism. It seems to me that an awareness of the
historicity of the consumer and its needs is essential to
this preventative purpose. But it also seems that the
insistence that production is always the dominant historical
force, that consumption and needs are, in the last instance,
determined by the mode of production, has become a hindrance
to understanding the development of needs under the advanced
capitalism of modernity. Perhaps, like the autonomous
individual of bourgeois economic thought, this aspect of
Marx's thought is a historically specific idea which has
come to obscure some recent developments. (Could it be
anything but a historically specific idea?) Preteceille and
Terrail seem to approach this point of view when they claim
that:
A proper insistence on the determining
character of the social relations of
production has overshadowed not only the
necessary analysis of the specific
structure of modes of consumption, but
also an analysis of the relations between
the two spheres, which has been reduced to
a single, mechanistic determination.
Today, the crisis and the social movements
that have developed within it emphasize
these deficiencies, and demand a new
theoretical effort to go beyond such over-
simplification. 14
en
a
But in the end, Preteceille and Terrail, in their attempt fc
move beyond an over-simplified view of ^ ^
Production and consumption, remain anchored to Marx's ide
of the ultimate dominance of production. 15
Before briefly examining the progress Preteceille
and Terrail have made in their "new theoretical effort," I
should emphasize that when I suggest that it might be time
to move beyond this particular element of Marxist doctrine,
I am certainly not advocating a reversal of the Marxist
position, which would restore consumption and needs to the
determinant position they held in bourgeois economics; in
each of the preceding chapters I indicated that the
"sovereign consumer" is a major obstacle to understanding
the hold which technology has on modernity. Nor am I
arguing that material conditions are no longer important fo
an investigation of modern needs; in fact, I am eventually
going to claim that the Marxist pre-occupation with
production has caused some thinkers to ignore other
important material considerations. The claim I am making
here is just that an analysis of the most recent
developments of needs must consider influences other than,
or rather, alongside of, the capitalist production process.
The foregone conclusion that needs are always a function of
the production process seems to me to be as misleading as
the bourgeois alternative that is supposed to counter.
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To get back to Preteceille and Terrains analysis
of needs, their progress beyond an over-simplified view of
production-consumption relations lies in their recognition
that a given mode of production can generate needs which in
turn effect, and can even challenge, that mode of
production. This uneven, or skewed, reciprocity between
production and consumption is possible because even though
the mode of production is the dominant force in any complex
social structure
- or "structure in dominance," to borrow
Althusser's phrase 16
- the mode of production itself is not
monolithic. Rather, there are two distinct elements in a
mode of production: the forces of production, which
correspond to the productive capacity of a given society,
and the relations of production, which comprise the
organization of that society. 17 Social needs emerge when
the reproduction of both the forces and the relations of
production becomes problematic, or contradictory.
Preteceille and Terrail go so far as to claim that it is
"impossible to consider the historicity of needs without
referring them to the logic of the mode of production as a
contradictory union between relations of production and
productive forces." 18
An example which Preteceille and Terrail use to
illustrate this point is the English Factory Acts. 19 In the
middle third of the nineteenth century, productive forces
were greatly increased by the mechanization of various
productive activities. Under the existing relations of
production, however, in which laborers had no choice but to
work for the wages, during the hours, and under the
conditions which were determined by each individual
employer, the increased productivity which was supplied by
mechanization soon came to threaten the reproduction of the
mode of production itself. m order for the owners of the
mechanized operations to recoup the value which they
expended in acquiring this machinery, they had to extend the
working day to the limit of human capability. it was
imperative that the capitalists recover this value before
mechanical innovations made their newly purchased equipment
obsolete or comparatively inefficient. 20 By increasing the
number of hours worked in a day, the owners were able to
increase their daily share of surplus-value, and thereby
quickly recover the value of their increased outlay of fixed
capital
.
Under this mode of production, the labor force was
eventually exhausted as workers were pushed to their limit
and then replaced when used up. The reproduction of the
forces of production, however, requires a supply of labor
power which is able to reproduce itself over a long length
of time. This contradiction between the forces of
production, which were enhanced by the introduction of
machinery, and the relations of production, which allowed
the unlimited extraction of surplus-value in order to pay
for this machinery, threatened the mode of production
itself, and the need arose for some limitations on the
length of the working day. so although the demand for such
legislation was first articulated by the laboring class, in
opposition to the class of owners, it seems clear that the
need that was to be satisfied by the Factory Acts was
ultimately a need of the mode of production. That groups of
capitalists ultimately began to call for such restrictions
would seem to bear this out. 21
The legislative regulation of the relations of
production, however, did not simply make possible the
reproduction of the forces of production. Rather, passage
and enforcement of the Factory Acts "contributed to the
rapid introduction of mechanization, and gave impetus
everywhere to the acceleration of technical developments and
the intensification of labour." 22 By restricting the number
of hours that could be worked in a day, the Factory Acts
also restricted the amount of surplus-value that owners
could appropriate daily. This restriction on the
accumulation of surplus-value made it necessary to increase
the productivity of the forces of production even further.
More powerful engines, faster machines, and a more
disciplined, routinized work force would allow the owners to
increase the amount of value produced per hour, thereby
offsetting the stifling effect which the Factory Acts had on
the accumulation of profits. 23 This intensification of the
>r a
inces
labor process, in its turn, produces anew the need fo
shortening of the workday, which requires further adva
in the forces of production, and so on.
The interplay between the mode of production and
the needs which it generates is well-illustrated by this
example of the Factory Acts; the need for some limitations
on the length of the workday brought about changes in the
forces of production. Preteceille and Terrail find in this
interplay between needs, or consumption, and production a
source of hope for the eventual dissolution of the capi-
talist mode of production. The needs which are generated by
the contradiction between the forces and relations of
production drive the mode of production to higher stages of
development, and the needs which have emerged thus far in
the latter half of the twentieth century may require the
elimination of capitalistic relations of production
themselves. 24 They cite as examples the recently
articulated needs for:
a slower pace of work
. . . better
conditions of work,
. . . better living
conditions in order to reduce fatigue
outside work
. . . diminution of
travelling time and an increase of
comfort, better housing, leisure
facilities, holidays ... an improvement
in the health system, the development of
preventive care,
. . . antipollution
measures ... a change in the content of
the work, the application of technical
progress to the benefit of living labour
and the development of skills for all . .
.
job security and the right to work for
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all [and ultimately,] some sort of socialcontrol by the workers themselves. 25
Cl
Needs such as those listed above pose a challenge
to capitalistic relations of production because they can not
be readily satisfied through individual, private ownership
and appropriation of commodities. Rather, these needs
require for their satisfaction a "socialization of
consumption." By this, Preteceille and Terrail do not mean
the absolute elimination of private ownership and
appropriation, but the transcendence of this form of
consumption "at the point where it becomes an obstacle to
reproduction and the development of productive forces."" 26
Where the working class is unable to attain what it needs to
reproduce its labor power, whether these needs are for
adequate housing or increased leisure time, collective
consumption facilities are emerging to satisfy these needs.
Since Preteceille and Terrail focus on this sort of need,
and recognize the tendency toward socialized consumption, it
is not surprising that they call not just for the
satisfaction of the existing needs of the working class, but
also "for the expansion, development and transformation of
those needs themselves. Breaking up capitalist hegemony
entails an explosion of needs
. . .
"
27
To an American in the 1980' s, this tendency towards
socialized consumption may appear outdated, and Preteceille
and Terrail' s confidence in the revolutionary potential of
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the proliferation of needs may seem unfounded. But
Preteceilie and Terrail are not oblivious to the possibility
that some of the social needs they identified might be
satisfied through individual, private consumption, or that
increases in the private consumption of commodities might
deflect attention from those social needs altogether
are they unaware that there is a counter-tendency to the
socialization of consumption which strives to "privatize"
those collective consumption facilities which have already
been established. 29 On the contraryL" , they recognize that
through
"the private character of commodity
consumption
. . . capital imposespractices (and the values implicit in
Sarii^S reinforce its ideological andpract cal dominance; the objects of
consumption can be seen as representing somany ideological messages, which have
underlying them as many constraints
leading to competitive individualism, tothe depoliticisation, fragmentation and
opposition of the dominated classes." 30(Parenthesis in original.)
Despite this recognition of the counter-
revolutionary potential of private consumption, Preteceilie
and Terrail never closely examine the "ideological messages"
or implicit values which are conveyed by objects and
practices of consumption. They point out the danger which
such private consumption presents to their socialist
objectives, and then quickly return to the promise of social
needs. This can be explained in part by the fact that
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Preteceille and Terrail take as their model of a
capitalistic society France, not the United states. As tney
point out in some statistical detail, France in the late
1970.
s
was far-removed from the "myth" of American consumer
society.- In France
, the threat from pr . vate consumptiQn
may be weaker than in the United States. Another element of
an explanation can be found in Preteceille and Terrail-
s
dialectical perspective. For them, there is an
inevitability to the development of social needs, an
inevitability which is grounded in the contradictions of the
capitalist mode of production and their dialectical
resolution. "In the long run," claim Preteceille and
Terrail, "consumption practices cannot avoid, and will in
fact be less and less able to avoid, the class
confrontations which owe their meaning and bearing to the
logic of relations of production." 32 Just as "free market"
relations of production had to give way in the face of the
working class need for state regulation of the labor
process, so too will the exploitative relations of late
capitalistic production, along with its individualistic
consumption, have to give way to the social needs which are
produced by that mode of consumption. There is no stopping
the force of the dialectic.
In any case, there is little doubt that private
consumption practices and the objects of consumption can be
interpreted along the lines of Preteceille and Terrail'
s
argument. Michel Aglietta, in A^heori^^itaUst
Sedation, does just that. Although Aglietta. s text does
not focus primarily on developments in consumption and
needs, but instead offers a much broader view of late
capitalism than Preteceille and Terrains CapiUlis^
Consumption and NPPds, it nonetheless makes important
strides in understanding the way in which technology has
infiltrated the modern household.
I should mention at the outset of this discussion
of Aglietta another important difference between his work
and that of Preteceille and Terrail. As indicated by the
subtitle of his text - The Us ExperiPnr. - Aglietta takes as
his model of late capitalistic society the United States,
not France. He explains this choice in his introduction:
"the particular selection of the United States is designed
to highlight the general tendencies of capitalism in the
20th century. The USA, in effect, experienced a capitalist
revolution from the Civil War onwards." 33 The outcome of
this revolution, claims Aglietta, was the establishment of
"the most adequate structural forms for perpetuating
capitalist relations of production that the class struggle
has yet created anywhere." 34
One of the main features of this capitalistic
revolution was the development of a "social norm of
consumption," but what Aglietta is referring to by this norm
is not the potentially revolutionary social needs which
Preteceille ana Terrail identified
. Qn ^ ^
social no™ of consumption is one » in whicn individual
ownership of commodities governed the concrete practices of
consumption. In his discussion Qf
focuses on the obj ects or comities which are consul by
individuals in the modern household. And coming even closer
to the perspective I a, developing in this essay, he also
stresses that the evolution of the social norm of
consumption of the United states =° ur "was governed by the
replacement of direct activity at home by time-saving
equipment," 36 which I would call conveniences.
According to Aglietta's Marxist perspective, of
course, the development of this norm of consumption is
ultimately an effect of the production process. it
comprises one part of what he, borrowing and developing
Gramsci's term, calls Fordism. This is the term which
Aglietta and Gramsci use to describe the "semi-
autonomisation" of the labor process which occurred in early
twentieth-century America. This development of the
production process can be explained in the terms of the
previous example of the English Factory Acts.
Through that example, it was shown how the
mechanization of the labor process led to the workers' need
for a shortening of the workday, and how the satisfaction of
this need led to further intensification and mechanization
of the workplace. Although the eight-hour day was not
established by the United st»fr==1ates
' government until 1938
various American labor unions h»n kS ad been
"^ggUng since the1840 s, Wlth uneven success to shorten fche wQrMay 3? ^
alongside these e fforts to alleviate the strain of the
mechanized production processP , American workers were also
able to restrict the outout of fha fp t t process from within
Because American labor unions of the nineteenth century were
generally craft unions, the workers were able to retain
their Knowledge of the various labor processes, and use this
Knowledge to exert some resistance to capital's attempts to
speed up the pace of production.* This resistance, of
course, limited the owners- ability to guickly recover the
value of the machinery in which they had invested, and in
America as in England, these owners sought to increase the
rate at which they accumulated profits by further
intensifying and mechanizing the production process.
The first American attempt to intensify the
production process, which occurred around the turn of the
century, goes by the name of "scientific management," or
Taylorism, after Frederic Winslow Taylor, forerunner in the
field. Briefly, Taylorism sought to rationalize the labor
process by gathering from workers all knowledge and infor-
mation concerning that process, and making such knowledge
the exclusive domain of managers. These managers could then
reorganize the production process according to that
knowledge, with the intention of eliminating all waste of
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time and motion. 39 Fordism, named after Henry Ford, further
developed these intensification techniques of Taylorism, and
combined them with innovations in mechanization, i.e. the
continuous assembly-line. with the semi-automatic assembly-
line, management was able to control and synchronize the
entire production process; as Aglietta puts it, "The
individual worker thus lost all control over his work
rhythm. ... In this mode of organization workers are
unable to put up any individual resistance to the imposition
of the output norm, since job autonomy has been totally
abolished. " A0
In his essay "Americanism and Fordism," Antonio
Gramsci pointed out that Fordism not only "rationalized" the
productive activity of the assembly-line workers, but it
also sought to control their activity outside of the
workplace. The regularity of this new phase of production
required that workers' performances be consistent all day
long, from day to day. The industrialists' attempt to
prohibit the consumption of alcohol and their exhortations
against sexual licentiousness served "the purpose of
preserving, outside of work, a certain psycho-physical
equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the
worker, exhausted by the new method of production." 41 The
prohibitions of both the consumption of alcohol by the
workers, and the consumption of the workers by excessive
sexual activity, were required by the assembly-line.
While Gramsci emphasized this prohibitory element
of Fordism, Aglietta points Qut another ^
relation to consumption. The demands of the assembly-i ine
required not only that certain consumptive activity be
prohibited, hut also that other forms of consumption take
Place. By eliminating any lulls or gaps in the working day
Fordism made it necessary that all recuperation or
rejuvenation of the work force take place outside of work.
To quote Aglietta:
in%h2
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Sed exhausti°n of labour-powerthe labour process had to be entirelvrepaired outside the workplace, resoectinathe new time constraint of a stric? 9
separation between working and non-workingnours.
. . individual commodity
consumption is the form of consumptionthat permits the most effective
recuperation from physical and nervous
l^T* ln ! comPact sPace of time withinthe day, and at a single place, the
nome
.
The needs of modern workers for various time- and
labor-saving commodities
- the social norm of consumption -
can clearly be interpreted as needs of the production
process. High-speed assembly-line production requires such
consumption in order to reproduce a stable labor force. But
there is also another sense in which this consumption norm
is needed by the production process. The continuous
consumption of commodities by the workers enables capital to
overcome the disjuncture which had often occurred between
that section of the production process which produced the
means of production, such ;> = ».„v.jn as machinery (Department I), and
that section which produced the means of consumption, such
as household appliances (Department H)
. Prior to ^
emergence of Pordism, developments in Department I were
sporadic and uneven, and each new development in the means
of production was character! 7^ k„m r ized by a massive increase in
fixed capital expenditures, which was followed by a
depression in such capital formation. The reason for this
depression in capital formation was that the exchange of
consumer items in Department II did not Keep pace with the
productive activity in Department I, and therefore the
demand for the new means of production by Department II was
not great enough to permit the firms in Department I to
recover the value of their fixed-capital investments/3 of
course, the outcome of this disjuncture between Departments
I and II goes beyond the rate of capital formation;
"Factories are closed, clusters of productive forces
abandoned, while means of production are destroyed on a
massive scale right across society."" This whole cycle
begins again with the development of new techniques of
production. 45
With the emergence of the social norm of
consumption under Fordism, however, this cyclical pattern of
capital formation was to a great extent eliminated. The
steady consumption of soon-to-be improved commodities made
it possible for the means of production to be depreciated
and eventually replaced in a gradual, stable manner. As
Aglietta describes this important effect cf the social norra
of consumption:
aSalft^r
e
^
al faCt is that thequalitative transformation of the forcesof production has become a permanentprocess, instead of being chicly
alalTT/ int° °ne sP^ific phase of the
7a IL ?ccul™lation. This change is dueto the interaction of the two departmentsof production; each now providesP?he o?her
Zht\£S mar^ets as ^ey combine to lowerthe value and diversify the commodities ofmass consumption. Obsolescence becomesgeneralized and permanent. 46
The significance of Fordism, therefore, lies in
this integration of consumption and production. The
continuous consumption of various conveniences by the work
force provides capital not only with a stable, well-rested
supply of labor power, but it also allows the two main
sectors of the economy to synchronize their productive
activity. This situation is what Aglietta referred to as
"the most adequate structural form for perpetuating
capitalist relations of production." But Fordism, which
came into full bloom after World War II, eventually ran up
against some limits in the late i960 's, and the nature of
these limits brings Aglietta 's analysis close to that of
Preteceille and Terrail.
The private, individualistic consumption which
flourished under Fordism in the United States, required a
corresponding expansion of the role of the state as the
the
o
n
s
guarantor of the continuity of ™
-iftm • Pt10n * Und- Fordism,it s ill remained essential to limit fh° ilIni the consequences of
capitalist insecurity ony °" ""P10*""* and on the formation ofn-xvuta* wages, so as not to break the continuity of
consumption process, and in order to enable tne worKers^
»eet the financial cedents contracted with the
acquisition of their consumer goods. This implied
legislative arrangements, a homogenization and socialistic
of wages, and the establishment of social insurance fund
against the temporary loss of direct wages."" A pension
system for retired workers was also required in order to
maintain the consumptive activity of this significant
segment of the population.
While the satisfaction cf these "social needs" was
prcvided to a great extent by the state, in the form of the
New Deal, some cf these needs were met wholly, or in part,
by the development of private pension funds and insurance
plans. Private pension funds, which were usually developed
through labor's collective bargaining with management,
supplemented the public system of Social Security. Private
medical insurance has been the primary response in the
United States to the need not only to pay medical expenses,
but also to provide income during recuperation. Aglietta
points out how these private responses to social needs
strengthen the position of capital, since the enormous
amount of value that is accumulated in these private plans
.s
.sm in
is administered by capital itself." While this point i,
important for understanding the strength of capital!,
America, as well as the current pressure to "privatize.,
public responses to social needs, the existence of such
private responses has not allowed Fordism to avert its
crisis.
Whether the social needs which underlie the Fordist
nor* of consumption are satisfied publicly or privately, the
cost of such "socialized consumption" is ultimately paid out
of the surplus value which is available to capitalists. if
these programs and services are provided by employers as
part of a collective bargaining agreement, the cost amounts
to indirect wages paid to the workers. if these services
are provided by the state, the cost either "inflates direct
wages, and the increase is taken back in the form of income
tax. or else it is levied on profit in various different
forms. in either case, there is a restriction on relative
surplus-value and consequently an obstacle to the law of
accumulation. " 49
Furthermore, the cost of these various
preconditions of the social norm of consumption tends to
increase as the semi-automatic production process
progresses. This is because the mechanized production
process is unsuitable to the provision of these collective
goods and services. The savings that capital is able to
extract from labor-costs by using the assembly-line are
unavailable in the area of collective services, and the
provision of these services becomes comparatively expensive
as costs in commodity-production decline. 50
The increasing costs of collective consumption are
not a problem as long as capital continues to increase the
rate at which it is able to extract profits from the
mechanized production process. Eventually, however, that
rate of accumulation or profit reaches its limit. as
workers begin to resist managements' attempts to increase
productivity through the further fragmentation and
mechanization of the production process. Aglietta
identifies the mid-1960 's as the point at which labor's
resistance began to halt the decline in real wage costs that
had been achieved by Fordism. 51 At this point, the costs of
social consumption are no longer offset by increasing
profits, and those costs become an unbearable burden for
capital. From Aglietta «s perspective, therefore, "[i]t is
not surprising
. . . that the crisis of Fordist work
organization should at the same time have been the occasion
for a general drive of the capitalist class to curtail
social expenditures, and have ushered in a period of
retrenchment in public finances." 52
Ultimately, Aglietta' s analysis leads him to a
position that appears close to that of Preteceille and
Terrail. His conclusion that under the Fordist production
process, " [t]he socialization of consumption becomes a
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decisive terrain and battle-ground of the #
echoes Preteceille and Terrain claim that
needs is at the heart of social conflict."" But there ,
an important difference; for Aglietta, who focuses on th
united States, sociali Zed consumption and social needs are
the preconditions of a nrwafQ •r priv te, individualized norm of
consumption, whereas for Preteceille and Terrail, who focus
on France, such needs are a radical alternative to private
consumption. This is not to say that Aglietta does not
recognize the potential challenge which social needs can
pose to capitalism; it is ii,=tm, jus that the realization of this
potential will reguire a direct, sustained critigue of the
individualized consumption practices of late capitalism.
Aglietta
-s specificity in regard to individualized
consumption provides a good starting point for such a
critique. He claims that the consumption norm which emerged
in twentieth-century American capitalism "is governed by two
commodities: the standardized housing that is the privileged
site of individual consumption; and the automohi 1o as the
means of transport compatible with the separation of home
and workplace." 55 These two commodities are obviously
important to the perspective I am developing here, inasmuch
as the automobile, alongside its function as a means of
transportation between home and work, is also the source of
a great variety of consumed convenience; the same can be
said of the standardized house, with its array of time and
labor-saving devices. i wiii ref„*.« *.n turn to this point of
contact between Aglietta. s and my perspective, but first :
nust very briefly examine the wor* of one other contemporary
Marxist, Ernest Mandel
.
Handel's l^^tan^, i ike Aglietta. s text, is
an elaborate examination of the advanced for, of capitalism
And his analysis of modern consumption, l ike Aglietta. s,
comprises only a part of the broad scope of his work. so
when I focus on Handel's thoughts on consumption, I must
^ Clear that 1 have
-
pretension of presenting a
thorough summation of La^e_Ca^italism
. The same can be
said, of course, for my treatment of Aglietta's text.
On the issue of modern consumption and needs,
Mandel can be read as taking a step back from the work of
Preteceille, Terrail, and Aglietta. He does not go as far
as these other writers in recognizing the influence which
the needs of consumers can have in the development of
capitalism. Whereas Preteceille, Terrail, and Aglietta
ascribe to the needs of workers an important, although non-
decisive, role in explaining the proliferation and
diversification of the commodities consumed in modernity,
Mandel retreats toward the more orthodox Marxist position
which underplays the role of such needs.
This is not to say that Mandel is oblivious to the
new needs of workers under the semi-automatic, industrial
production process. Indeed, he points out that "the
on
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But
substantial increase in the i„f„„^m intensity of labour makes ahigher level of consumption necessary
( among other things
setter c^aHty food, greater meat consuInption> ^ ^
^
labour power is to be reconstituted at aU- and that „ theincrease extension of capitalist conurbations lengthens
the circulation time between home and work to such an extent
that time-saving consumer goods likewise become a conditi
for the actual reconstitution of this labour power."
these needs of the workers are ,nc relatively unimportant for
Mandel-s explanation of the diversification of consumption
in modernity, and he does not develop this issue of needs
Much beyond the level of the above guotes. He simply notes
that such needs are part of an explanation of " [t ]he
differentiation of the monetarily effective demand of the
proletariat in the industrialized countries,"" and leaves
it at that.
As a Marxist, of course, Mandel identifies the
capitalist production process as the ultimate source of any
developments in needs and consumption. But here too his
argument differs from that of the other Marxists I have
examined. it is not that the semi-automatic production
process, with its new strains and pressures for workers, has
brought about needs for new commodities. The development of
various time- and labor-saving commodities arises not from
the needs of workers (which are ultimately determined by the
production process)
,
but rather from the need of capital to
s" s
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find new areas in which to extract profits. From Mandel
perspective, "the basic halmark (sic) of late capitalism" i
"the phenomenon of oyer^tcamtalization or non-invested
surplus capitals." 58 As he explains this phenomenon:
As long as 'capital 1 was relatively
scarce, it normally concentrated on thedirect production of surplus-value in thetraditional domains of commodity
production. But if capital is gradually
accumulated in increasingly abundant
quantities, and a substantial part of
social capital no longer achieves
valorization at all, the new mass of
capital will penetrate more and more into
areas which are non-productive in the
sense that they do not create surplus-
value, where it will displace private
labor and small enterprise just as
inexorably as it did in industrial
production 200 or 100 years before. 59
It was as a result of the pressure of this
uninvested surplus capital that various time-consuming
household tasks, along with services which were provided by
household laborers, were commodified, if I may use this
term. "The housemaid, private cook and private tailor do
not produce any surplus-value," 60 nor does the housewife,
who cooks, cleans, and sews for her family. 61 But vacuum
cleaners, pre-cooked and preserved foods, sewing-machines,
ready-made clothes, etc. are all commodities which expand
the range of exchange, and are produced under the
capitalistic wage relation. In other words, such time- and
labor-saving commodities are a source of profits which
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exists beyond "the traditional domains of commodity
production.
"
Mandel's explanation of the expansion and
differentiation of consumption, in comparison to those other
Marxist accounts examined above, does not appear to be
particularly helpful in providing an understanding of the
way in which technology has shaped modern needs and
consumption. From his perspective, the need for various
technological apparatuses in the household is really just a
modern form of capital's need for surplus-value; the needs
of consumers are of minimal explanatory value. Nonetheless,
Mandel's analysis of modern consumption practices does touch
upon an issue that is important for understanding the hold
which technology has on modernity. Mandel points out that
in order for the consumption of the labor-force to become
diversified, it is necessary that there be a decrease in the
portion of laborers' income spent on what he calls the
"'pure' means of subsistence." When the "purely
physiological" element of workers' consumption decreases in
value, then the "historically and socially determined"
element can increase. 62 The distinction Mandel makes here,
of course, is of the sort that I am trying to avoid in this
essay (see Ch. 2, pp. 57-9), so to recast his point in the
terms I introduced in the previous chapter, in order for
workers to overcome the limits of the body through the
consumption of modern conveniences, they must be able to
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satisfy the demands of the body with only a small part of
their wages.
When I introduced this demand/limit distinction, I
used the example of ancient Greek agriculture to illustrate
the demands of the body, and Mandel is also referring
principally to food when he uses the term "pure means of
subsistence." In late capitalistic societies, a smaller
percentage of income is spent on food than in early (i.e.
competitive) capitalistic, or pre-capitalistic societies.
This is because " the age of late capitalism ... has
characterized by an even greater increase in labour
productivity in agriculture than in industry ." 63 The
"industrialization of agriculture," as Mandel puts it, is
another consequence of the "over-capitalization" which
characterizes late capitalism. Agriculture is one of those
areas into which excess capital flows in its search for
profits
.
The increased productivity which was achieved
through the mechanization of agriculture has led not only to
a decline in the prices of agricultural commodities, but
also to a decrease in the number of agricultural workers. 64
So in both these senses (the amount of hourly wages spent
for agricultural commodities and the amount of labor hours
directly spent in agriculture), Mandel' s analysis seems to
agree with my earlier claim that modernity is characterized
by the relatively small amount of time that it spends
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satisfying the demands of the body, or at least the body's
demand for food (see Ch. 2, pp. 29-31).
As I pointed out above, the two consumer items
which Aglietta cites as the governing commodities of the
modern consumption norm (i.e. standardized housing and the
automobile) also fit well with my interpretation of modern
consumption practices. By "standardized housing," Aglietta
is referring to the prefabricated suburban dwelling, which
is built to receive the various appliances which have
reduced domestic labor. 65 Electricity is available
throughout this house, for lighting, as well as for cooking
and cleaning appliances. Water, for cooking or cleaning, is
available on demand, as is heat. And sewage disappears in a
flush. Such housing, like modern agricultural practices, is
geared toward overcoming the limits which the demands of the
body place upon the use of time, or the temporal limits of
the body.
The automobile, on the other hand, allows men to
overcome what I earlier described as the spatial dimension
of bodily limits (see Ch.2,pp. 32-4). In the previous
chapter, I used the airplane as an example of a tech-
nological device which allows people to overcome these
spatial limits, largely because air travel clearly portrays
the close connection between spatial and temporal limits, in
the need for ever-faster flights. But Aglietta 's example of
the automobile has its own particular virtues; the
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production of automobiles is the model of Fordist production
techniques, and the automobile is more clearly a consumer
item than is the airplane. And more and more, the
automobile is coming to reflect the connection between
temporal and spatial limits of the body. I have in mind
here the "drive-thru windows" of fast-food restaurants, and
the tendency to extend such facilities to banks, liquor
stores, grocery stores, etc. In these situations, the
automobile allows people to overcome the limit of distance
as well as save time in various daily routines.
But if these Marxist accounts of modern consumption
end up so close to the perspective I am trying to establish,
why have I set them up as a hindrance to an understanding of
modern technology? Why spend the first part of this chapter
criticizing the Marxist emphasis on production, when writers
like Aglietta and Mandel ultimately identify certain
features of modern consumption which are important to my
perspective? The reason I have been critical of these
Marxists is that their pre-occupation with the capitalist
production process results in a certain narrowness in the
historical and material dimensions of their perspective.
Early in this chapter I distinguished these two elements of
historical materialism, and indicated that Preteceille and
Terrail employ them as safeguards to keep their analysis of
modern consumption from falling back into the idealism of
bourgeois economic thought. I made this distinction in
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order to question the Marxist doctrine that the ultimate
historical determinant is the production process (the
materialist dimension), and to suggest that this doctrine
may have become a hindrance to understanding modern
technological consumption, if not late capitalism itself.
At this point, I can further specify that early criticism.
When Aglietta and Mandel identify modern
consumption practices, which revolve around cheap and
readily available agricultural commodities, automobiles, and
technologically organized housing, they have in mind changes
which occurred primarily after the Second World War. The
great advances in agricultural productivity, which caused
food prices to decline, thereby freeing up the income of
workers for more diversified consumption, occurred in this
period, according to Mandel. 66 And the social norm of
consumption, which is central to Aglietta' s analysis of
Fordism, emerged in the 192 O's, but flourished after the
war.
67
From my perspective, however, the important shifts
in consumption practices occurred much earlier, as early as
the eighteenth century, and are not simply the effects of
developments in production techniques. The intensification
of consumption which characterized the 1950 's can be
explained, in part, by twentieth century developments of the
production process, and Aglietta 's and Mandel' s analysis are
helpful in that regard. But when it comes to the features
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of the actual commodities which are consumed, one's analysis
has to expand beyond the twentieth century. Conveniences in
agriculture, transportation, and other household activities
were developed, produced, and consumed in the nineteenth
century, as will be seen shortly. But it is not only the
historical dimension of the Marxist interpretation of modern
consumption which must be expanded; the materialist dimen-
sion must be expanded as well.
The materialism of Marxist analysis is limited to
the capitalist production process. Most Marxists are
unaware of any other material considerations which may be
helpful in understanding certain features of modernity.
What I have in mind, at this point, as such an other
material consideration, is the vast amount of unsettled land
that was available in America throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. (Another material consideration, also
overlooked by Marxists, will be examined in a later
chapter.) This spatial condition, I will argue in the next
chapter, played an important role in the development of the
consumption pattern or norm which has been identified with
the United States, and has spread throughout much of the
world. So although I do not ascribe ultimate determinance
of consumptive activity to the production process, my
approach is nonetheless materialistic, inasmuch as land and
space are material considerations. I will now examine this
neglected material condition.
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I should also mention that Preteceille and Terraildespite their emphasis on the public satisfaction of socialneeds concur with me on this point; they maintain that thehousehold remains the concrete unit of consumption. SeePreteceille and Terrail, p. 74. And Aglietta can also be
enlisted in support of my position. See Aglietta, p. 159Despite this criticism, Mandel does make someimportant points about the changing status of the familyAs women abandon the role of housewife and join the laborforce as wage-earners, capital loses a source of unpaidlabor which was essential to the reproduction of labor
power. But capital gains more than it loses in this
situation. As women work outside the home, the consumption
of commodities and services which are provided by capital
must increase in order for labor power to be reproduced.
Furthermore, as wage-earners, these women add to the
surplus-labor which capital can accumulate. See Mandel, pp.392-3. The fact that women are paid significantly less than
men is another benefit which accrues to capital from the
changing status of the traditional family. For a discussion
of women's wages as "supplementary wages," see Aglietta, pp.
171-3.
62. Mandel, pp. 390-1.
63 . Ibid.
, p. 378
.
64 . Ibid.
, p. 381
65. Aglietta, p. 160.
66. Mandel, pp. 378-9.
67. Aglietta, p. 158.
CHAPTER 4
A MATERIALIST CRITIQUE OF MARXISM
In fairness to Aglietta, I must mention at the outset
that he does discuss the American frontier experience in A
Theory of Capitalist Regulation, but for him the ideological
value of the frontier is predominant. To guote Aglietta:
The frontier principle was more than is implied
simply by its literal content, in other words the
mere domestication of a geographical space. It
was rather an ideological principle expressing the
ability of the American nation to polarizeindividual activity in a direction of progress.
Indeed the industrial bourgeoisie was later able
to get the whole of the nation to accept the
technological trans-formations induced by relative
surplus-value by presenting these as the building
of a 'new frontier'. 1
There is, of course, no doubt that the "frontier principle"
has served this ideological purpose, and continues to serve
it as the United States races, and may perhaps cooperate,
with the Soviet Union to colonize outer-space. But there is
a material dimension of the American frontier which is
worthy of attention. Aglietta does not totally ignore this
dimension, but for him the abundance of land in the United
States "enormously favored" the creation of a surplus of
agricultural commodities, one of the preconditions for
capitalist industrial production. 2 So from Aglietta 's
perspective, the frontier, in both its ideological and
material dimensions, served the development of capitalism in
America
.
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My interpretation of the American frontier is quite
different than Aglietta's. To begin with, I emphasize the
material dimension of the frontier, the "mere domestication
of a geographical space." Furthermore, I view the frontier
not as a boon, but a threat to capitalism, at least
initially. Ironically, this non-Marxist perspective is
supported by certain insights of Marx himself. The eighth
and final part of the first volume of Capital , concerning
"The So-Called Primitive Accumulation," is described by
Aglietta as "decisive," 3 and I would agree, although
apparently for different reasons. (Aglietta does not expand
on this point.) In this section of Capital
. Marx examines
the manner in which feudal society was transformed by and
for the forces of capital. His concern lies less with the
eclipse of restrictive feudal relationships, which bourgeois
theorists emphasize
r than with changes in material
conditions. In order for capitalism to flourish, a supply
of laborers was needed which was "free" not only from the
obligations of serfdom, but also, and more importantly, free
from any attachment to the land. Marx stresses this point:
In the history of primitive accumulation, all
revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers
for the capitalist class in course of formation;
but, above all, those moments when great masses of
men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their
means of subsistence, and hurled as free and
'unattached' proletarians on the labour market.
The expropriation of the agricultural producer,
the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the
whole process.
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This is the point I was referring to in the beginning
of the previous chapter, when I claimed that there exists in
Marx's thought an often overlooked appreciation for the
transformation in consumption practices which accompany
capitalism. The expropriation of the peasant from the land
destroys the peasant's ability to produce for household
consumption; the peasant is torn from the means of subsis-
tence, not just means of production. Marx recognizes that
this process of expropriation took different forms in
different countries, but he identifies the enclosure of the
commons in England as the classic form. 5
The enclosure of the English commons began in the
fifteenth century, but became widespread during the
eighteenth. 6 Prior to enclosure, the peasant who owned or
rented a cottage on a manor enjoyed several rights of common
which included the right to grow strips or rows of crops in
the arable fields of the manor. On the remaining land of
the manor, called the waste, commoners had the right to
pasture as much livestock as was required to cultivate their
strips, cut hay for winter feeding of the livestock, collect
timber for building and repairing agricultural implements,
cut peat or turf for fuel, and if there were streams and
ponds on the waste, to catch fish. These and other rights
of common were defined by, and limited to, the needs of the
household. These rights were also frequently exercised by
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squatters who lived on or near the manor, but had no
legitimate claim for such exercise. 7
With the enclosure of the common arable and waste lands
came the extinction of the various rights of common, and the
extinction of the small farmers who were able to satisfy the
needs of their households through their own productive
activity. As compensation for the loss of these rights,
commoners were given a small parcel of land as an element of
the act of enclosure. 8 But these small plots were
insufficient to provide for the needs of the household, and
often the costs of ditching and fencing the allotment (which
were also required by the acts of enclosure) were so high
that the owner had no choice but to sell the land to a
larger landowner, and join the ranks of agricultural or
manufacturing laborers. 9 Enclosure also had the effect of
rendering the laboring class completely dependent on the
wage relationship with the employer, thereby making laborers
more docile and regular. As one proponent of enclosure put
it at the end of the eighteenth century: "'The use of common
land by labourers operates upon the mind as a sort of
independence'. When the commons are enclosed 'the labourers
will work every day in the year, their children will be put
out to labour early', and 'that subordination of the lower
ranks of society which in the present times is so much
wanted, would be thereby considerably secured.'" 10
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in contrast to this situation in England, which was
crucial to Marx's understanding of capitalism's development,
the United States had vast amounts of unsettled land
throughout the nineteenth century. As English peasants were
forced off the land, and lost the ability to provide for
their needs on their own, Americans were moving West and
bringing virgin forest, and eventually the prairie, under
cultivation. This difference, and the important
consequences of it, were not totally lost on Marx . in the
last chapter of volume 1 of Capital
. "The Modern Theory of
Colonization," he discusses this difference. In 1866 Marx
claimed that, "speaking economically," the United States
belongs to the category of "real Colonies, virgin soils,
colonized by free immigrants." 11 What Marx finds
interesting about such colonies is that they give the lie to
arguments of bourgeois political economists.
Such economists, claims Marx, confuse "on principle two
very different kinds of private property, of which one rests
on the producers' own labour, the other on the employment of
the labour of others." 12 In interpreting the capitalist
economies of Western Europe, the political economist
"applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a
pre-capitalistic world" - that is, one where producers own
the means and the products of their labor - and forget that
capital, which is based on the labor of others, "not only is
the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on
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its tomb only." 13 This confusion is cleared up for the
political economists once they confront the situation in the
colonies
.
In the colonies, the fundamental antagonism between
pre-capitalistic property and capital becomes obvious, as
the ideological foundations of capitalism come to be
experienced as reality. The availability of unsettled land
provided laborers with an alternative to the wage relation,
thereby making the relation between employers and laborers
more truly a contract, since workers were free to refrain
from entering into it. And the bourgeois conception that
property rights are grounded in the natural right
individuals have in their bodies and the labor of their
bodies, 14 becomes a reality as laborers abandon the wage-
relation and cultivate their own property for themselves.
The effects of this unfortunate concordance between ideology
and reality, at least as viewed from the perspective of
capital, are described by Marx as follows:
This constant transformation of the wage-labourers
into independent producers, who work for
themselves instead of the capitalistic gentry,
reacts in its turn very perversely on the
conditions of the labour market. Not only does
the degree of exploitation of the wage-labourer
remain indecently low. The wage-labourer loses
into the bargain, along with the relation of
dependence, also the sentiment of dependence on
the abstemious capitalist. 15
In this chapter on modern colonization, Marx cites E.G.
Wakefield's England and America , which bemoans the fact that
136
in colonies with an abundance of land, »'[t]he supply of
labour is always, not only small, but uncertain.'" 16
Marx, of course, did not overestimate the threat which
open space posed to capitalism, and he undoubtedly
understood that capital was up to this challenge. He noted
Wakefield's plan for "systematic colonization," whereby land
prices would be raised to a point at which wage-laborers
would have to save for years to be able to afford a
sufficient piece of property, and the surplus funds from
these land sales would then be used by the government of the
colony to import replacement laborers from Europe. 17 But in
the case of the United States, Marx recognized that such a
scheme was being rendered unnecessary by several
developments. The successive waves of immigrants provided
eastern industry with a reserve of dependent laborers; the
government's debt f-om the Civil War would call for heavy
taxation; and capital was being increasingly consolidated in
mining and railroad companies. All of this indicated to
Marx that "[t]he great republic" had "ceased to be the
promised land for emigrant labourers." 18
Marx, however, did not note the irony, in the case of
the American colony, of plans such as Wakefield's. In 1862,
five years before the publication of the first volume of
Capital , the government of the United States began to give
away 160-acre homesteads to settlers who lived on and
improved the land for five years. Obviously, the passage of
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the Homestead Act did not mark the victory of a peasant
economy over capitalism, so how can this free-land policy be
explained? it may be tempting to say of this what Marx said
of the British attempts to legally restrict the enclosure of
the commons and retain small agricultural plots for
cottagers (i.e. laws of tillage): those who supported such
laws had not yet come to realize that the wealth of the
nation and the poverty of the people were complementary. 19
Perhaps the generous American land policy of the later
nineteenth century was similarly anomalous; Congress had not
yet caught on to this principle of modern statecraft, and so
was not using its vast holdings of land to increase the
national wealth (i.e. capital).
There are problems with such an explanation, however.
First, given this explanation, one would expect the federal
government to have learned its lesson quickly in the face of
its enormous Civil War debt, and begun to sell, not give-
away, the public domain. But this was not the case, and the
Homestead Act remained in effect throughout the nineteenth
and into the twentieth century. Secondly, this explanation
does not account for the fact that the government had
already learned this lesson about the national wealth in the
eighteenth century, and had initiated a program for selling
public land in order to pay the Revolutionary War debt. 20
So the Homestead Act can not be dismissed simply as a
mistake made by an inexperienced government. On the
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contrary, the Homestead Act marks the culmination of a long
trend in the land policy of the United States away from its
conservative beginnings as a means for raising revenue,
toward its more democratic role as promoter and protector of
family farms. So the question remains, how could a nation
which was emerging as the leader in industrial capitalism,
afford to give away land to small homesteaders? How could a
country with an expanding capitalist economy undertake a
policy of promoting that form of property which was the
antithesis of capital, and, according to Marx, upon whose
tomb only capital grows?
The answer I would like to offer to these questions is
that the threat which was posed to capitalism in America by
the vast amount of unsettled land (unsettled, at least, by
white men) had been largely eliminated by the 1860's. The
manner in which the threat of American space was neutralized
provides insights into the later development of capitalism
in America, especially in regard to the American standard of
consumption. My claim is that the American fetish for
technological conveniences can be understood, in part, as an
outcome of the subjugation of American space. To support
this claim, it is necessary to discuss not only American
developments in transportation and farm machinery, but
American land policy as well. But to begin with, I must be
a little more specific about the nature of the threat.
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The problem posed by America's vast amount of unsettled
land was felt even in the pre-revolutionary period, although
not so much as a threat to the labor supply, as a threat to
the lives of frontier settlers. White settlers continually
encroached upon territory that the colonial assemblies and
the British crown recognized as belonging to the Indians.
In an attempt to quell this practice, a practice which
engendered much hostility among the Indian population,
George in, in the Proclamation of 1763, forbade his
subjects from settling west of the Appalachian mountains. 21
But this measure, along with the various attempts by
colonial governments to restrict the settlement of
unoccupied land, were of no avail. In 1768, for example,
the assembly of Pennsylvania passed an act which required
settlers on the forbidden land to remove upon penalty of
death; but by 1775, there were between 25,000 and 30,000
settlers beyond the Appalachians. 22
Even within the colonies themselves, settlers were
quick to establish homesteads on unoccupied land that had
been granted to certain proprietors by the crown. 23 The
proprietors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and the
Carol inas sought to extract from these settlers a form of
feudal obligation known as quitrent, which was a single
payment made in lieu of all other feudal obligations.
However, these attempts to bridle the clearers and
cultivators of the virgin forests along the Atlantic
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seaboard were unsuccessful, and were often met with open
revolt. 24
This practice of settling on unoccupied land, which
eventually came to be known as squatting, continued after
the American Revolution, and squatters had as little respect
for the authority of the government of the United States as
they had for the British crown, at least when it came to
attempts to restrict their settlement on unoccupied land.
After the Revolutionary War, several states eventually ceded
to the federal government the large tracts of land that had
been granted to them by the British Crown. 25 As I mentioned
above, the Continental Congress sought to relieve the
federal government's war debt through the sale of these
lands. In one of the first and most important acts of the
Continental Congress, an ordinance was passed in 1785 which
established a program for selling the land northwest of the
Ohio River, which had been ceded to the federal government
by Virginia in 1784. To deal with the problem of squatters,
who had settled on the most promising land in this
territory, 26 the ordinance granted the Secretary of War the
authority to use federal troops to remove these
trespassers. 27
This policy of removing squatters by force was largely
ineffectual, due both to the overwhelming number of
squatters who settled illegally on government and Indian
land, and to the tenacity of the squatters, who often
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returned to rebuild their destroyed homesteads after the
troops had left. 28 Nevertheless, the policy of removing
squatters from government land remained in effect until 1841
(with some important exceptions which will be mentioned
shortly)
.
And federal troops were obligated to remove
American trespassers from Indian land according to the terms
of the various nineteenth century treaties between Indian
tribes and the government of the United States. 29 (The
military campaigns against the various Indian tribes, as
well as the larger environment of duplicity in which
relations with the Indians were carried out by the United
States' government, are beyond the scope of this essay.
This should not be understood as an apology for the genocide
which underpins the formation and expansion of the United
States. It is just that my concern here lies with the
subjugation of independent white settlers, and the role that
subjugation played in shaping the typically American
attitude toward technology and convenience.)
Although the military response to the problem of
squatters was a failure, other elements of the Ordinance of
1785 were ultimately more successful in undermining the
threat posed by open space to the formation of capital. It
must be emphasized here that the problem or threat of
unsettled land was not simply that squatters might establish
claims without paying for them; even if the government was
able to exact payment from every family to settle on the
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public domain, there was still the problem of independent
homesteaders who would be beyond the control of capital.
Prohibiting free settlement on the public domain, in the
sense of non-payment, was just part of the problem; the
freedom which could be attained through the lawful purchase
of land was the more far-reaching threat. The response to
this facet of the threat of space is more varied and subtle
than the violent treatment of squatters, and it is also more
closely related to the theme of this essay.
To begin with, the Continental Congress thought it
necessary to regulate the pattern of settlement as it moved
westward, and toward this end, the Ordinance of 1785
required that the land in a given area be surveyed before
being offered for sale. 30 And the particular surveying
system which was adopted by the Continental Congress further
indicates its serious concern for controlling the westward
movement of settlers. According to this surveying system,
the vastness of American space was to be dissected into
equally sized squares in parallel rows. Starting from the
point where the Ohio River crossed the Pennsylvania border,
a line was to be surveyed due west. Similar base lines were
to be established every six miles south of this line, up to
the border of the Ohio. These parallel base lines were in
turn crossed by north-south meridians, which were also drawn
at six mile intervals. Each six-mile by six-mile square
which was formed by these intersecting lines was a
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"township,
»
and these were further subdivided into 36 one-
square mile "sections, of 640 acres each. 31
The first survey accomplished under this system was to
consist of seven north-south rows of townships, called
"ranges," running south from the original east-west base
line, down to the Ohio River. Once the survey was complete,
the land was to be sold either by township or section, that
is, either in 36 square-mile or 1 square-mile lots. 32 By
limiting sales to surveyed land only, and by requiring that
entire townships or sections be bought, the government
sought to reap the full value of its land holdings. Once a
surveyed area had largely been sold, the surveying of a new
region would proceed. This system allowed the government to
ensure that all land was developed, not just the most
desirable land. 33 The constitutional government which was
created in 1789, retained this system of land survey and
sale, and used it to regulate the settlement of the various
lands which were purchased by, or ceded to, that government.
The rectilinear system of land surveying stands in
sharp contrast to the less "rational" survey system which
prevailed in southern states like Kentucky and Virginia,
where feudal impulses were strongest. 34 Under that pre-
modern system, settlers were free to chose the most
desirable unclaimed land, and to survey it in a haphazard
manner which relied on natural, and therefore changeable,
landmarks, such as streams and trees. Aside from the
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boundary quarrels that such a loose arrangement generated
among settlers, it also had the disadvantage, from a modern
perspective, of allowing certain areas to remain
"unimproved," or undeveloped. The presence of such "waste-
was one of the obstacles which England faced in its
modernization, and the enclosure movement was, in part, a
response to this problem. Swamps, marshes, and other
"useless" lands were reclaimed through the enclosure process
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and were then
used for either pasture or crop cultivation. 35 The survey
system employed by the United States prevented the
accumulation of such waste land in the first place, by
setting everything in order before legal settlement was
permitted. 36 This American attempt to set its space in
order, to establish a grid of borders, displays a tendency
that has often been cited as a birthmark of modernity.
However, this point cannot be developed here, given the
Marxist context of this chapter. 37
To return to the more narrow examination of American
space, the survey and sale system adopted in the Ordinance
of 1785 helped not only to ensure that all land was
developed, but in conjunction with a restrictive pricing
mechanism, it also helped to undermine the threat of
independent homesteaders. As I mentioned above, the
surveyed land was sold either in townships, to speculators,
or in sections, to homesteaders and speculators; nothing
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smaller than a 640 acre section could be purchased from the
government. The price per acre for these surveyed parcels
was to be established by competitive bidding at auction, but
the minimum price per acre was set at one dollar. So even
for the least desirable section in a surveyed area, the
homesteader would have to pay a minimum of 640 dollars, plus
a surveying fee of 1 dollar per section. 38
The price of l dollar per acre may today appear to be a
very generous gesture on behalf of the government toward
settlers, but state-owned lands were being sold at that time
for significantly lower prices. 39 So at the outset, the
government of the American "colony" had developed a land
regulation system which, at least in its pricing mechanism,
closely resembled the price-fixing plan suggested by
Wakefield. Prices were raised to a level which prevented
the widespread settlement of newly surveyed land by
individual homesteading families. The 641 dollar minimum
price placed homesteading beyond the means of many, 40 and
speculators could easily raise the price level beyond the
means of other would-be settlers during the auction. 41
It was not just the price which prevented many from
acquiring homesteads - the minimum purchase size was also a
deterrent. Those who had earlier settled the Appalachian
Plateau, just west of the Carolinas and Virginia, usually
established very small clearings of 4 to 5 acres, on which
they planted the food that would feed their family. The
size of these farms increased gradually over the years, as
the family did, and might occasionally reach a size of 400
acres. 42 But after 1785, any settler who legally purchased
a homestead from the government had to begin with 64 0 acres.
This is not to say that all of the purchase had to be
cleared and planted immediately, but since the settler also
had to pay at least 641 dollars for the land, which was
quite likely borrowed at interest, there was some pressure
to clear the land quickly and produce surpluses in order to
repay the investment or loan which had been undertaken. Of
course smaller homesteads could be purchased from
speculators, but at a significantly higher price than the
government minimum.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the early pace of land
sales in the Northwest Territory was not very brisk/3 This
was due in part, no doubt, to the resistance which the
Indians offered to white settlement, but the land policy
established by the Continental Congress in 1785 was also a
hindrance, at least to the small homesteaders. In 1796 the
policy was revised so that it would be easier to acquire a
homestead, but this was not accomplished by lowering the
minimum sale size or the minimum price per acre; on the
contrary, the minimum size was maintained at a full section,
and the minimum price was doubled to 2 dollars per acre.
What made it easier for the individual homesteader to buy
land was the introduction of a credit system which allowed
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the settler to pay for the land over a four year period/4
But with the full-section minimum, this policy still favored
the speculator over the homesteader. It was not until 1800,
when the minimum size was reduced to a half-section (320
acres) and the credit system was refined, that land sales to
homesteaders flourished. 45 The relatively easy terms of
credit required a five percent initial payment (32 dollars
at a minimum)
,
twenty-five percent payment after forty days,
and another quarter payment at the end of the second, third,
and fourth years. The rate of interest on the balance was
six percent. 6 In 18 04, the qovernment reduced the minimum
size to a quarter-section, making it even easier for
settlers to acquire their homestead on credit. 47
While the availability of credit for land sales is
often interpreted as a government concession to the small
homesteaders, who otherwise would not have been able to buy
land, this policy can also be read as a subtle way of
undermininq the threat which independent farmers posed to
the American economy. Under the terms of the Land Act of
1800, small homesteads did multiply, but the owners of these
lands were debtors to the federal government. These farmers
had little choice but to produce cash crops which could feed
the urban population, so that they would be able to make the
payments on their land. Self-sufficient farming was not a
possibility for these debtor farmers; they had to become
engaged in the capitalist exchange economy, as both
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suppliers of foodstuffs and consumers of industrially
manufactured items, which they no longer had time to produce
for themselves. (Of course, the availability of such
manufactured items and the ability to sell crops for cash
depended on crucial developments in transportation. My
focus here, however, is on the way space was brought to
order, or subdued, by American land policy. I will get to
the way people and things were set in motion, or how the
limit of distance was overcome, later.)
The emergence of government sponsored credit at the end
of the eighteenth century is a significant development,
since credit has become one of the primary features of
contemporary consumption. Both Aglietta and Mandel indicate
the important role which credit plays in fostering the
current mode of consumption. But both of these theorists
treat widespread consumption on credit as a twentieth -
century phenomenon. From their perspectives, consumer
credit becomes an important feature of capitalism only when
the intensification of the production process in the 1920' s
demanded the close integration of production and
consumption. The point I want to stress is that buying on
credit was an important phenomenon at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, in regard to land purchases. As one
land historian put it, credit was "the very life blood of
the West." 49 From my perspective, the government's
extension of credit to settlers was a way of undermining the
ao
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threat which the vast amount of unsettled land posed to
capitalism in the United States. Credit emerged not as
development of late capitalism, but as capital's response t
a material condition other than the capitalist production
process. (Even if one ignores the spatial situation in the
United States, as do Aglietta and Mandel, and focuses only
on durable goods other than land, credit still was important
by the middle of the nineteenth century. I will get to this
point shortly.)
There appears, therefore, to have been a shift in the
land policy of the United States between the Ordinance of
1785 and the Land Acts of 1800 and 1804. The initial policy
tried both to restrict the settlement of the public domain
(by prohibiting squatting and evicting squatters, by
requiring that surveys of entire regions be complete before
sales could begin, and by establishing a prohibitively large
minimum lot size)
, and to maximize the revenue generated by
land sales (by selling the public domain at auction, and by
establishing a minimum price of one dollar per acre, and
then doubling it)
. In 1800 however, the restrictive
character of the land seemed to give way to government
efforts to promote settlement. The reduction in minimum lot
size from 640 to 320 to 160 acres, plus the provision of
credit, sparked a surge in land sales. 50 Not only did the
land policies of the early nineteenth century foster, rather
than restrict, settlement, but they did so at the expense of
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the other purpose of the original policies - the raising of
revenue for the federal government. In fact, the liberal
credit terms of the Land Act of 1800, which remained in
effect until 1820, caused an explosion in the debt owed to
the federal government, very little of which was actually
repaid. By 1819, the government had sold land worth 44
million dollars, but had received payment for only about
half of that, and at that point, the situation seemed only
to be getting worse. Between 1815 and 1819, the amount owed
to the government ballooned from 3 million to 17 million
dollars, and the government had to repeatedly pass relief
legislation for its many debtors, and extend the terms of
their payments. 51
The combination of easy credit and widespread
speculation in land led to a continuing inflation of land
prices. In 1819, this bubble burst and a panic ensued. As
a consequence, the government abolished its credit system in
1820, and required that all future land sales were to be
paid for in cash at the time of purchase. 52 Although the
abolition of credit did make it harder for the settler to
acquire land, the minimum price and size requirements were
both reduced, from 2 to 1.25 dollars per acre, and from 160
to 80 acres. 53 So despite the tremendous debt owed to the
federal government, land policies continued to move away
from their original, conservative form toward what appears
to be a more populist model.
It was not simply the credit system of 1800 which
undermined the profitability of government land sales,
however. From the outset, the practice of selling land by
public auction had been manipulated by speculators to their
own advantage. Before credit was offered in 1796, the land
policies favored speculators who were willing and
financially able to pay for townships and full sections at
the minimum price. These large holdings would then be
subdivided and sold for a profit. But these speculators,
who at that point could only be challenged at auction by
other wealthy speculators, often made arrangements before
auctions, whereby they would determine who would buy what
piece of property, and then agree not to bid against one
another. The result of this collusion, of course, was that
prior to the introduction of credit, land prices were not
raised much above the minimum at auction. 54 So even before
the credit explosion of the first two decades of the
nineteenth century, the federal government was not receiving
the revenue expected from its land sales.
Speculators were also able to frustrate governmental
attempts to encourage the settlement of the land by
homesteaders, inasmuch as the speculators were able to take
advantage of every land policy revision in that direction.
The reductions in the minimum price and size, along with the
availability of credit, could be taken advantage of by the
speculator as well as the settler. Speculators could still
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outbid homesteaders, and after making the small down-
payment, sell the land for a profit, and then default on the
debt to the government. 55 Alternately, they could outbid
competitors, but then forfeit the land shortly after the
sale, unbeknown to competing bidders. The speculator could
then buy the land again after the auction closed, but at the
minimum price, according to the usual practice for disposing
of sections which were not sold during the bidding. 56
With the abolition of the credit system, homesteaders
lost whatever little advantage they had gained against the
speculator, and land sales to homesteaders dwindled in the
182 O's. This is not to say that settlement dwindled,
however. Squatters settled on the public domain, in the
hope that they would be able to afford their 80 acre claim
when the surveys were completed and the auctions held. 57
These squatters, of course, were easily victimized by
speculators, who would often agree, for a fee, to refrain
from bidding against the settlers. The squatter might get
his land at the minimum price, but only after paying off the
threatening speculators. 58 And if the speculator wanted the
land, not just a pay-off, he could easily outbid the settler
and take the homestead.
Another method commonly used by speculators to
undermine the independence of squatters, was to lend them
money for the purchase of their claims, at exorbitant
interest rates, of course. Such lending, claims one
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historian, "proved to be one of the most lucrative business
opportunities on the frontier." 59 Here too, the speculator
skirted the law, but in this case he was avoiding state and
territorial laws against usury, not federal land laws.
While the usury laws limited interest to 10 or 12 percent,
speculators entered the squatter's claim in the name of the
speculator, and bonded the squatter to pay a specified
amount by a specified date, in order to receive the title.
Through this technique, the speculators were able to collect
interest at rates as high as 100 percent. 60
So although the United States' land policies in the
early nineteenth century appear to have been moving in the
opposite direction from Wakefield's plan for "systematic
colonization," the effect of these policies was the same.
Land prices, directly or indirectly, were raised to a level
which made it difficult for independent homesteaders to
acquire property. The profit from this policy, however,
went not to the government, as Wakefield had suggested, but
to private speculators. In either case, the threat of an
independent agricultural population was undermined.
In order to avoid painting too pathetic a picture of
the vulnerable, hapless squatter, I must mention that as
squatting increased in the 1820 's and thereafter, squatters
did learn the lessons which were presented by the practices
of the hated speculators. They adopted the speculators'
technique of uniting in an organization which would allow
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them to prevent land prices from rising at auction. These
"claim clubs- or "claim associations," as they have come to
be known, sprang up throughout the frontier. 61 Besides
making arrangements to prevent competitive bidding among
themselves, the squatters also had to prevent speculators
from bidding at all. They did this by a show, and often an
act, of force at the auction. The register of the club did
all of the members' bidding, and any other bidders, be they
speculators or non-member settlers, were quickly stifled by
the club-wielding membership. 62 Where claim clubs were
established, therefore, auctions were a sham, just as they
were where speculators organized themselves, and land prices
were held down to the established minimum. 63
And to avoid painting too noble a picture of these
organized squatters, I must also point out that many members
of the claim clubs were not merely protecting their right to
that with which they had mixed their labor, to paraphrase
Locke. Often squatters were speculators themselves. By
acquiring de facto title to their claim through the claim
club, those squatters who were unable or unwilling to pay
for their land, even at the minimum price, could sell their
title to another before the auction. The purchaser of such
a title, of course, also had to buy the land again at the
auction. The profits which squatters made from such sales
could be used to buy a smaller piece of land, or it could be
saved, and the process repeated in other unsettled areas,
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eventually allowing the squatter to save enough to buy a
sizeable, desirable homestead. 64 And these speculating
squatters sometimes claimed tracts of land which were larger
than the amount they could cultivate, and used the force of
the claim club to keep other squatters off their extensive
holdings, 65 So much for the noble squatter.
In any case, the primary target of the claim clubs was
not other settlers, but wealthy speculators. But after
183 0, the squatters were no longer on their own in their
struggle against speculators. Throughout the decade of the
1830 's, Congress repeatedly passed Pre-emption Acts, which
allowed those who had settled on the public domain, and had
made specified improvements on the land, to buy up to 160
acres of such land at the minimum price of 1.25 dollars per
66acre. As a result of these acts, settlers no longer had
to vie with the speculators at auction, and were no longer
susceptible to their extortive tactics. 67
The Pre-emption Acts of the 1840' s applied only to land
that had already been improved prior to the act. In other
words, these acts were retrospective, and in a sense, they
forgave past transgressions by those who illegally settled
on public land. In 1841, however, Congress passed a Pre-
emption Act which was prospective. This act extended the
terms of the earlier acts to all those who would settle and
improve the public domain. Squatting was no longer
illegal. 69 The government finally seemed to recognize that
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the squatters had some right to the land which they had
improved.
This right, of course, was not the pre-capitalist
property right which was espoused by political economists
like Locke (see note 12). By the pre-emption process,
squatters only gained the right to buy the land they
improved through their labor. But in 1862, with the passage
of the Homestead Act, something very close to that pre-
capitalist property right was established. Under the terms
of this act, any man at least twenty-one years of age, the
head of a household of any age, or a widow, could gain title
to any surveyed public land, up to 160 acres, which they
lived on and improved for a five year period. 70 Through
their labor on the land (or the labor of someone in their
hire, as Locke intended), settlers gained a property right
in that land. As I wrote at the outset of this discussion
of American space, there is an element of irony in the
passage of the Homestead Act at the very moment when
industrial capitalism was expanding in the United States.
There is such irony, at least, if one takes Marx's thought
into account. 71 But at this point in my discussion, the
irony has already begun to dispel.
As has already been noted, in the development of
American land policy from 1785 to 1862, the shift from its
conservative origin to its populist conclusion was
accompanied at every turn by widespread speculation. Every
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policy revision which favored the small homesteader was
turned by the speculator to his own advantage. The
reductions in price and size limits and the provision of
credit all helped the speculator as well as the settler.
And the Pre-emption Acts, which forgave and ultimately
legalized squatting, were fraudulently abused by speculators
(see note 72). Even the Homestead Act was a boon to
speculators. According to the terms of the Act, a settler
could commute the five year residence requirement after six
months, upon payment of 1.25 dollars per acre. After 1880,
speculators began to fraudulently take advantage of this
provision to increase their land holdings. 72 since
speculators had been able all along to acquire vast holdings
of desirable land, or alternately, to extort money from
settlers, it is not that surprising that the United States
could afford in the middle decades of the nineteenth century
to legalize squatting, and then to give land away. The best
farm land was largely owned or occupied by 1862, and most of
the remainder of the public domain was unfit for
agriculture. 73 If a settler wanted good farm land, he still
had to pay the speculator's price.
But aside from the wiles of speculators, there were
other forces operating in the first two-thirds of the
nineteenth century which helped to undermine the threat of
American space. Consideration of these forces will help to
further dispel the irony surrounding the development of
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American land policy, and will also shed some light on the
blindspots of those Marxists whom I discussed earlier.
These other forces also bear more directly on my argument
about convenience than does the problem of speculation. I
have already touched on one of these forces in my discussion
of Mandel's Late Capitalism. I am referring here to the
"industrialization of agriculture," which Mandel treats as a
feature of the advanced capitalism of the twentieth century
(see Chapter 3, p. 117). To reiterate Mandel
-s point, the
industrialization of agriculture was a result of over-
capitalization; agriculture was one of the areas into which
surplus profits flowed after the "traditional domains of
commodity production" were thoroughly industrialized (see
Chapter 3, pp. 114-6).
The point I want to make is that the industrialization
of agriculture, or perhaps mechanization is a better term,
occurred in the nineteenth century, and was actually well-
established by the time the Homestead Act was passed.
Furthermore, I read this mechanization not as the result of
advanced developments in capitalism, but, as I read American
land policy, as an attempt to undermine the threat of
unsettled space. In fact, the mechanization of agriculture
is closely bound up with the restrictions which were imposed
by land policy.
As I mentioned above, the minimum lot sizes established
by the various land acts, along with the minimum prices, had
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an effect on the way in which the land was settled. Those
who sought to legally settle on the public domain in the
nineteenth century could not afford to clear and cultivate
the land at the pace which was common in the eighteenth
century. A small clearing which provided food for the
family could no longer be gradually expanded, so that after
several years it could produce commercially. 74 if a settler
purchased land from the government, he had to buy at least
the minimum acreage at the minimum price. He could buy a
smaller homestead from a speculator, but at a much higher
price. In either case, he most likely bought on credit,
either from the government or the speculator, and had to
begin making payment soon thereafter. It was imperative
that the settler clear and plant as much land as possible as
quickly as possible. The objective of such settlers was not
so much to produce food to satisfy the demands of the
family's bodies, as it was to produce surpluses which could
be used to pay off land debts. Farming had become less the
satisfaction of a demand of the body, than the practice of
overcoming limits which hinder the production of food as a
commodity.
The first limit to be overcome was the clearing of the
land, and in almost every area of the country, the axe was
essential to this task. 75 If it was not needed to clear the
enormous trees of the virgin forests, it was needed to
produce the implements which would be used to farm the land,
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and to construct fences and buildings. Consequently, the
axe underwent a complete transformation in America. The
broadaxe, which had remained unchanged for centuries in
Europe, was made broader and straighter in the blade,
heavier in the head, and lighter and more flexible in the
handle. Felling trees was accomplished much more quickly
and with less effort by the American, or Kentucky, axe than
by its European predecessor. 76 Various other types of axes
were also developed, each capable of accomplishing its
particular task, for example, bark-stripping or rail-
splitting, in the quickest and easiest manner. These
various tools had reached standardized form by the mid-
nineteenth century, and were being mass-produced. 77
Although the technical development of the axe appears to be
quite modest, it does reflect the early form of the American
tendency to produce the most convenient tool for the task at
hand. And these axes were convenient not just in the pre-
modern sense of being appropriate to the task; they also
were designed to promote the ease and comfort of the user,
and were therefore convenient in the modern sense of this
word as well. (See Ch. 2, pp. 73-4 for the discussion of
these two senses of convenience.)
The other tool which was essential to clearing the land
was the plow. Well into the nineteenth century, this tool
was produced by the farmer himself, and was made of wood. 78
The problem with wooden plows, of course, was that they
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often needed to be repaired, especially in areas with heavy
soil, and in the prairies, where the wooden share, or
cutting prong, was no match for the extremely thick sod.
With the changes in land settlement that occurred in the
nineteenth century, the settler could ill-afford to spend
time refashioning and replacing the broken or worn-out parts
of his plow. Around the turn of the century, attempts were
made at constructing plows out of cast-iron, and by 1819,
plows with durable, replaceable iron parts were being
produced commercially. 79 By 1850, tens of thousands of
plows, of over one hundred different varieties, were being
produced each year in cities such as Worcester,
Massachusetts and Pittsburgh. 80 And in the 1850 's John
Deere was successfully producing plows made of cast steel,
which were strong enough to handle the prairie sod without
needing frequent repair, and smooth enough so that the soil
no longer had to be periodically scraped from the plow, as
was the case with iron plows. 81
As a result of these technical developments of the
plow, settlers were able to clear much larger areas much
more quickly than with the wooden model. Siegfried Giedion,
in noting the contrast between the settlement of the plains
of Europe and Asia and those of North America, raises the
point which I would like to stress.
Other great plains had been brought under the
plow. But the opening of the Russian plains and
of the vast tracts of China extended over
centuries. Compared to these the development of
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the Middle West took place within a few decadesalmost by elimination of the time factor 82 (mvemphasis) 1 y
This concern for eliminating the time factor, or
overcoming the limits on time imposed by the task of
clearing the land, arose in part, from the way in which the
space of America was dissected and sold to settlers. And,
of course, it was not just the clearing of the land which
had to speeded up. The planting of seeds and the harvesting
of crops had to be guickened as well, if the settler was
going to be able to take full advantage of his holding, and
be able to pay off his land debt. By 1860, many devices had
been developed to guicken the various facets of crop
production, and were in widespread use. Most of these
developments were centered on wheat, the primary commercial
crop of the mid-West. 83 The other important crop was corn,
which was the principal grain consumed by the farm
household, including the livestock. 84
Seed drills, which uniformly plant and cover seeds,
were first developed in England in the eighteenth century, 85
but they attained a workable, efficient form in the United
States between 1840 and I860. 86 The use of seed drills,
which were drawn along by horses, not only accelerated the
seeding process, but made it more uniform. Hand-cranked
broadcast seeders had already been developed, and while
these were faster than sowing by hand, they still scattered
the seed in every direction. While such broadcasting may
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have been acceptable for wheat seed, it was not for corn,
which had to be weeded, or cultivated, periodically. Drills
planted the seeds in straight rows with uniform spacing,
which allowed the farmer to cultivate the soil between rows
of corn with a horse-drawn hoe, which again was much faster
than hoeing by hand. in any case, by 1860, most wheat and
much corn was planted by the seed drill, 87 which cost around
125 dollars. 88
Another very important development in farm machinery
also occurred about the same time that the seed drill was
being perfected. The traditional method of harvesting wheat
was to cut it by hand using a sickle or a cradle, the latter
being larger and more cumbersome, but also faster, than the
sickle. With a sickle, a farmer could harvest one-half to
three-quarters of an acre in a day, and with a cradle, two
to three acres could be cut. 89 Unlike other crops, such as
corn, wheat has to be harvested within a narrow space of
time. As long as farmers had to rely on hand tools for
harvesting, their income from wheat was severely limited,
and any extension depended on an uncertain and expensive
supply of migratory labor to help at harvest. Wakefield's
lament about the labor supply in colonies (see pp. 13 5-6)
applied to farmers as well as industrialists. 90
In 1834, however, Cyrus McCormick patented a mechanical
reaper, which was able to harvest up to twelve acres in a
day, with the assistance of two workers - a two-fold
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improvement over the cradle. 91 while other reapers had been
patented before Mccormick's, both in the United States and
England, his was the first to gain widespread use. After
years of contracting other firms to build the reapers, in
1848 Mccormick opened a main plant in Chicago. 92 He began
with thirty-three employees, and in 1849 had one hundred
twenty. In light of Aglietta's and Mandel • s emphasis on the
production process of the twentieth century, it is
interesting to note that Mccormick's factory had features
which are usually considered twentieth-century innovations.
The Chicago factory had a central source of power - a steam
engine - which drove fourteen or fifteen machines, such as
metal lathes, and the material was moved on a rail system.
After this factory burned in 1851, a new factory was built
which had a conveyor system and used automatic-feed
machinery. 93
But in regard to farm practices, Mccormick's reaper,
and the thirty or so competitors which emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century, revolutionized the production of grain.
A mechanized rake was added, which performed the task of
raking the cut wheat off of the reaper and laying it in a
row on the ground. 94 This addition doubled the efficiency
of the reaper, since one of the two laborers had previously
performed that task. By 1869, around 80,000 such reapers
had been sold, and the average price was 125 dollars. 95 In
1864, 70,000 reapers were produced, but even more could have
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been sold. 96 The widespread use of the mechanical reaper
was a major reason, along with increased land sales under
the Pre-emption Act, for the seventy-two percent increase in
wheat production which occurred in the United States in the
1850»s. 97
By 1880, the harvesting of wheat had been completely
mechanized, as the last time-consuming task involved in
wheat production was brought up to the pace required by
nineteenth century American agriculture. The binding of the
grain into bundles, or sheaves, in which it would dry, had
been traditionally performed by hand, of course, as the
grain lay on the ground. Around 1870, a conveyor was added
to the reaper which carried the cut grain up to a table,
where the wheat could be bound, still by hand. 98 But the
binder no longer had to walk through the field, picking up
the fallen grain. The continuously fed binding table
allowed the binder to perform his task as the grain was
brought to him. In 1880, a commercially viable mechanized
binder was developed, eliminating the many hours which had
been spent in binding. 99 By 1880, therefore, a single
farmer could harvest his wheat and bind it into sheaves, by
simply driving across the fields his horse-drawn reaper,
upon which he sat.
The threshing of wheat had also been mechanized by the
mid-nineteenth century. Horses on treadmills were first
used to drive the threshing machines, but after the Civil
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War, steam engines gradually replaced the horse tread as the
motive force. 100 These machines were capable of threshing
thirty bushels of wheat per hour, compared to the seven
bushels that could be threshed in an hour by a man swinging
a flail, the traditional method. 101 The cost of a threshing
machine, including the horse tread, was 230 dollars in 1839,
but dropped to 175 dollars by 1851. 102
Along with these various mechanical innovations in the
production of wheat, came a wide array of devices and
implements which accelerated the accomplishment of all other
agricultural tasks. Horse-drawn grass cutters, for making
hay, were perfected in the 1850 's, and horse-drawn rakes,
tedders, and forks, all used for haying operations, were
also available. Machines were also developed for
harvesting, shelling, and crushing corn, pressing cheese,
...
.
Without continuing this list or going into any further
detail, there is little doubt that by the time the federal
government began giving land to settlers in 1862,
agricultural practices in the United States had been
thoroughly transformed. There are three features of this
transformation which I want to stress.
First, the various farm tasks which had traditionally
been performed by the farm family and hired hands, had come
to be treated as impositions on the use of time. Every task
upon which time had to be spent became an obstacle to be
overcome through technological ingenuity and animal power,
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the latter which would eventually be replaced by steam, and
then gasoline, engines. in other words, farming had become
convenient, in the modern sense which I outlined in the
second chapter. The production of food, as a means of
satisfying a demand of the body, was transformed into an
array of limits to be overcome through technology.
This is not to claim that all American farming prior to
the mechanization which occurred in the nineteenth century
was simply self-subsistent farming, concerned only with the
bodily demands of the household. But those farmers who
first settled west of the Appalachian mountains in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ahead of the
surveys and land auctions, produced agricultural items
primarily for household consumption. In the course of the
nineteenth century, however, as American space became
increasingly ordered according to the United States' land
policies, farmers came to be less concerned with producing
for household consumption than with production for commerce.
In the twentieth century, this shift has been carried to the
point where farmers produce only cash crops and purchase
their household foodstuffs from a grocery. But what I
really want to stress here is not the subsistence/commercial
distinction, as much as the demand/limit shift.
Of course, the situation of the nineteenth century farm
household, in regard to limits, is not the same as that of
the modern household which I described in the second
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chapter. Overcoming temporal limits in the production of
food for commerce, is not the same as overcoming limits
imposed by the preparation and consumption of food in the
household. There is a difference between the nineteenth
century farmer's purchase of a reaper, which speeds up
production, and the modern household's purchase of a
microwave oven and frozen foods, which accelerate
consumption. But this leads to the second point that I want
to stress: the quickening of agricultural production in the
nineteenth century was accomplished by turning the farmer,
the traditional producer, into a consumer of technology. To
put this in Marxist terms, the production of food became, in
the nineteenth century, a Department II enterprise, which
produced commodities for mass consumption, while consuming
the means of production produced in Department I. By 1860,
the production of farm implements and machinery (Department
I agricultural production) had grown to be one of the top
ten industries in the country. 103 Farmers had become not
just commercial producers, but commercial consumers as well.
Aglietta and Mandel both point out, in regard to late
or advanced capitalism, that the integration of these two
departments, along with the integration of individual
consumers and Department I, depends to a large extent on the
availability of credit. This holds true for the
integration, or subduction, of independent farmers into the
capitalist economy of the nineteenth century as well, and
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this is the third point I want to emphasize. The threat
posed to capitalism by the vast amount of unsettled space,
which might have allowed farmers to gain some independence
from capitalist relations of production, was undermined
largely by the extension of credit. First, credit was
extended by both the government (1800-20) and private
lenders, to the settlers who sought land upon which they
could establish a homestead. Then in order to pay back his
land debt, the farmer had to buy machinery which would speed
up production to the point where he could quickly bring all
of his land into commercial use. The purchase of Department
I products was, like the purchase of land, accomplished on
credit
.
Cyrus Mccormick, who had developed the first
commercially successful reapers, as well as a highly
mechanized process to produce them, was also an innovator in
marketing the new machines. He introduced the practice of
selling farm machinery on credit, and in 1856, two-thirds of
his sales were made in this manner. 104 To keep pace with
Mccormick's sales, his competitors had to follow suit and
offer credit to their customers. But even where credit was
not available from the producers themselves, banks and other
private lending agents were willing to loan the farmer the
money needed to purchase machinery. 105
This is hardly surprising, given the prices of the
various machines which have already been mentioned. Reapers
and seed drills were around 125 dollars apiece in 1850, and
a threshing machine was about 175 dollars. in comparison,
the 160 acre parcel purchased by the settler in 1850, under
the terms of the Pre-emption Act of 1841, would have cost
200 dollars. An investment in the new farm machinery was,
on the same scale as the investment in the land itself.
By the mid-nineteenth century, therefore, farming had
been transformed not just into a primarily commercial
endeavor, but into a commercial endeavor which reguired the
consumption of expensive time- and labor-saving technology.
There was no danger posed to capitalism in 1862, when the
federal government began to give land to settlers free of
charge. Even if these settlers were not burdened by the
land debts which weighed on their predecessors, their
commercial success depended on their ability to produce
crops as cheaply as those farmers who used the new
machinery. If the settler wanted to sell even a small
amount of his total output, he had to be able to keep the
cost of production down to a competitive level, and this
meant employing the new technology. 106
This discussion of nineteenth-century agricultural
technology may seem irrelevant to an understanding of the
techno-fetishism of the late twentieth century, since in
technologically advanced countries, relatively few people
are engaged in agricultural activity. But that is the
peculiar nature of agricultural technology; the more
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successful this technology was in freeing up the time
involved in the production of food, the less visible and
prevalent this technology became, as fewer people were
required to spend their time in agricultural production.
Nevertheless, the nineteenth-century advances in
agricultural technology are important for understanding the
role which convenience plays in modern techno-fetishism. it
was the success of agricultural technology in reducing the
time which had to be spent in agricultural production which
enabled technology to further establish itself in the modern
household. it did this in two related ways.
First, the increased productivity which was provided by
agricultural machinery allowed a greater proportion of
laborers to become employed in other industrial enterprises,
many of which produced items which were consumed by
households (i.e. Department II enterprises). Many of these
consumer items which emerged throughout the nineteenth
century were conveniences. This leads to a second way in
which the proliferation of farm machinery fostered further
technological consumption; the consumption of various
technological apparatuses which quickened and lightened the
many tasks and chores of a large farm, helped to groom, or
train, individuals for the consumption of other time- and
labor-saving devices which were not strictly agricultural.
In other words, advances in agricultural technology, along
with a land distribution system which fostered the
consumption of that technology, promoted - but did not cause
-
the production and consumption of other forms of household
technology.
I must stress here that the role which I ascribe to
farm technology in the development of modernity's techno-
fetishism, is not a determinate one; there are no iron
chains of causality or necessitation here. I am not
claiming that the industrial production and consumption
which have characterized the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were possible only because of technological
breakthroughs in agriculture, nor am I saying that the
blooming industrialism in nineteenth-century America
required the mechanization of agriculture. I am claiming
only that the mechanization of agriculture and non-agri-
cultural industrialization under capitalism were
complementary, and I refuse to reduce either one to a simple
effect of the other. But most importantly, I want to add a
third element into this blend - the problem of American
space. The mechanization of agriculture actually began in
England, among the commercial farmers who owned the land
that had been removed from common use. But it was in the
United States that this mechanization became most fully
developed. In England there was plenty of cheap
agricultural labor among that class that had been "torn from
the soil," as Marx put it. In the United States, however,
there was plenty of space, at least in the first half of the
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nineteenth century, upon which settlers could produce for
their own benefit. The mechanization of agriculture, I am
arguing, helped to undermine that threat, while preparing a
foundation for American techno-fetishism.
The restrictive, regulatory land policies adopted by
the United States' government, and the mechanization of
agriculture, are two closely related elements of
capitalism's response to the problem of American space.
Although this chapter has turned out to be rather long,
there is a third element of this response which must be
examined. I have alluded to this dimension earlier, when I
discussed the commercialization of agriculture, and pointed
out that such commerce depended upon developments in
transportation. But the point I want to make about
transportation is not that commercial farming required, or
was made possible only because of, an elaborate
transportation network and rapid means of transportation,
which facilitated the movement of food and industrial
products. In fact, it is not the movement of things which I
want to primarily stress, but the movement of people. So
far, I have presented the problem of American space as a
threat posed by independent settlers who produce for
themselves, not capital. But there is more to the problem
of space than this alone. Not just settlement, but movement
itself presents a problem for capitalism, although Marx did
• . 107
not pay much attention to this.
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Paul Virilio, whom I have already mentioned in a
endnote to an earlier chapter (see Ch. 2, note 79), is a
writer who has paid attention to the way in which movement,
especially mass movement, has been used and regulated by
capital and the state. 108 m broad terms, Virilio claims
that modernity has been characterized by a shift in
political and economic authority's use of the movement of
the masses. Prior to the nineteenth century, writes
Virilio,
society was founded on the brake. Means of
furthering speed were very scant. ... In
general, up until the nineteenth century, there
was no production of speed. They could produce
brakes by means of ramparts, the law, rules,
interdictions, etc. They could brake using all
kinds of obstacles. 109
Then, however, occurred the revolution, characterized
in so many ways by so many writers, which ushered in
modernity. From Virilio' s perspective, the significance of
this revolution was not that industrialization introduced
mass-production, or that liberal democracy permitted mass-
politics, but that speed production became possible. "And
so they can pass from the age of brakes to the age of the
accelerator. In other words, power will be invested in
acceleration itself." 110 Given his unique perspective,
Virilio describes the revolution which opened up the modern
period not as an industrial or democratic revolution, but as
a "dromocratic" one. To quote him once again: "In fact,
there was no 'industrial revolution,' but only a
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'dromocratic revolution'; there is no democracy, only
dromocracy; there is no strategy, only dromology
.
The point of Virilio's substitutions, which are based
on the Greek dromos, meaning running, or race, course, is to
emphasize the revolution in movement which characterizes
modernity. While I am not going to defend Virilio's
hyperbolic claim that there was no industrial or democratic
revolution, I do want to develop his claim about dromocracy.
The affinity I have with Virilio centers on his insight that
the freedom to move, an achievement of modernity, has become
an obligation to move. 112 As I mentioned in that earlier
endnote, Virilio focuses primarily on military developments,
not on the realm of consumption, and it is in military
matters that he notes the obligation to move. However, he
does mention the importance of the American automobile for
the dromocratic revolution, and, like Aglietta, he
recognizes that the mass-production of the automobile was
capable of transforming consumption practices. 113 But even
when Virilio does consider the consumption of movement,
again, like Aglietta, he neglects those developments in
transportation which preceded the mass-production and
consumption of the automobile. These developments in
transportation technology, along with the concurrent
developments in farm technology, helped to undermine the
threat of American space and prepare the way for techno-
fetishism, in this case the consumption of technologies of
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speed. The brief description of American transportation
developments which I will now offer should make this last
claim clear, while extending Virilio's unique perspective a
little further into the realm of consumption.
The first westward movement of American settlers away
from the Atlantic coast was accomplished by following the
example and routes of the indigenous population. Narrow
footpaths, called traces, connected the various navigable
streams and lakes. Settlers walked along these traces, and
used pack animals (either oxen, mules, or horses) to carry
their household supplies. 114 When they reached a waterway
that led toward their destination, they would purchase,
rent, or construct a canoe made from a large log, into which
they would pack all their possessions. 115 In those areas
which could be reached by travelling up the Connecticut and
Hudson Rivers, sailing vessels were used to bring the
settlers' supplies close to their new home, but the settlers
themselves and their livestock followed the traces through
the forest. 116 It was in this manner that Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania were settled in
the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, after the
Revolution, the movement of settlers into New York and
Pennsylvania, and beyond to the public domain in the Ohio
River Valley, began to increase. 117 As these settlers
established themselves in the new area, they also widened
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and cleared the land routes over which the indigenous
population had earlier travelled, turning the traces into
pack trails. 118 These pack trails became arteries for
commerce as well as the westward movement of settlers. The
movement along these trails was at first slow and
unpredictable. Blown-down trees, washouts, and floods were
obstacles which could emerge unexpectedly on any journey
along these trails.
But while these routes were frequently obstructed by
the effects of the weather, they were, on the other hand,
free of any effective political obstructions, such as the
settlement laws of eighteenth-century England (see note
107)
.
While it is true that George III did prohibit
American colonists from moving beyond the Appalachian
mountains (see p. 139), and the United States' government
prohibited movement into unsurveyed areas of the public
domain (see pp. 140-2) , these attempts at restricting
westward movement were ineffectual, due to the vast and
unorganized space of America. Trappers, miners, squatters,
and legitimate settlers were able, notwithstanding natural
obstacles, to move freely along those trails which had been
etched into the land over the years. But toward the end of
the eighteenth century, this unregulated westward movement
began to be set in order, just as the land itself was being
set in order through rectilinear surveys. This regulation,
however, did not take the form of a prohibition or restric-
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tion of movement, but an acceleration. By making travel
along these routes more convenient, that is, easier and
faster, such travel was also brought under control and
integrated into the established order.
The manner in which this regulation of movement was
initiated was the granting of turnpike charters by state
governments to private companies. 119 These companies would
improve existing routes by grading and draining them, and
replacing their dirt surface with gravel, which was
sometimes placed on a firm bed of larger stones. 120 These
roads were more resistant to the ravages of rain than were
dirt roads. In particularly wet areas, corduroy roads were
built by laying logs tightly together, perpendicular to the
flow of traffic. Charters were also granted for the
construction and operation of bridges and ferries. 121 As a
result of these improvements, the various pack trails
leading west from New England into Pennsylvania and New
York, as well as those connecting the commercial centers of
these states, were transformed into roads over which wheeled
vehicles, such as stage coaches and wagons, could travel.
One of the first and most successful of these turnpikes
was the one connecting Lancaster and Philadelphia in
Pennsylvania, which was completed in 17 9 4 . 122 It was over
this route that the Conestoga wagons established their
reputation as the most efficient means available for
transporting goods overland. These large, sturdy, wide-
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wheeled wagons were developed around Lancaster in the middle
of the eighteenth century, and were essential to the
settlement of the public domain. These wagons, or
facsimiles, were the ones used in the wagon trains which
brought settlers into the West, and were the prevalent means
of land transportation until the middle of the nineteenth
century
.
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It was not until the turn of the century, however, that
these horse-drawn wagons were able to travel beyond the
Appalachian mountains. The Wilderness Road (originally
known as Boone's Trace, after Daniel Boone, who first marked
its course in 1774-5) was the primary land route into the
Northwest Territory during the eighteenth century. But it
was not until 1795, when the Kentucky legislature passed an
act requiring that improvements be made in the trail, that
it became suitable for wagon travel. 124 But even then, the
Wilderness Road was not constructed out of gravel and stone,
but remained a dirt road. 125
The project of establishing a "macadamized" road
through the Appalachian mountains was undertaken early in
the nineteenth century by the federal government.
Construction of the National, or Cumberland, Road began in
18 08, and it was completed from Cumberland, Maryland to
Wheeling, Virginia, on the Ohio River, in 1818. 126 The road
was eventually extended, as originally planned, through the
state of Ohio and into what would become the state of
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Illinois. 127 Eventually, the federal government relinquished
its interest in the road, and turned it over to the control
of the states through which it passed. 128 Nevertheless, it
remained, until the middle of the century, the main artery
through which western settlers, as well as their commercial
products, had to move. 129
Alongside this massive public transportation project,
many private turnpikes were constructed in Ohio, under
charters issued by the state. The state government
frequently invested in these projects, 130 alongside private
stockholders of the companies. And the federal government
still was involved in financing these improvements, although
indirectly, through its land policy. Since the admission of
Ohio to the union in 1803, three percent of all sales of
public lands went to the states in which the sales occurred,
and this money was earmarked for development of roads (and
eventually canals). 131
This first step in improving transportation, or
facilitating movement, in the territory of the United
States, appears to lie somewhere between Virilio's
characterization of the modern and pre-modern eras. The new
techniques of road construction greatly increased the speed
of movement throughout the frontier, by allowing wheeled
vehicles to cross terrain that had been previously suited
only to slow-moving pack animals. Whereas pack-trains could
cover twenty-five miles in a day, 1 stage coaches could
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travel much farther in the same period, moving at a rate of
6 to 8 miles per hour. 133
But this acceleration was accomplished with the
simultaneous obstruction of movement, a characteristic of
the pre-modern period. On the National Road, »[a]t average
distances of 15 miles toll-houses were erected and 'strong
iron gates hung to massive iron posts were established to
enforce the payment of toll in cases of necessity."' 134 on
some of the private turnpikes, toll-gates were established
every 4 or 5 miles. 135 it is as though the acceleration
provided by the stone and gravel roads was both an advantage
and a threat to the existing order. The westward movement
of settlers still had to be restricted, and the settlers'
connection with the capitalist economy reinforced
periodically by the payment of tolls throughout their
journey. (Of course, the largest portion of the tolls
collected was provided by commercial traffic, but my concern
here lies primarily with the way in which transportation
improvements helped to control and regulate the movement of
the settlers themselves. Once the settlers had established
homesteads, their commercial activity, which was intensified
by land policies, was indeed regulated by the turnpikes; but
in this discussion of transportation, I want to emphasize
how the movement of people was regulated.)
Along with the above improvements in land travel,
various developments in water travel also occurred around
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the turn of the century. The usual eighteenth-century
method of travelling by water into America's unsettled land,
was by flatboat. When settlers finally reached the Ohio
River, either by wagon on the Wilderness Road, or by pack-
train along one of the several routes through the
Appalachian mountains, they usually built their own
flatboat, in which they would continue their journey. 136
These large boats, which ranged from twenty to sixty feet in
length, and ten to twenty feet in width, carried the family
of settlers and all their household possessions, including
livestock, downstream with the current. The settlers often
spent weeks on these floating barnyards. 137 Since these
boats were incapable of travelling upstream, they were
usually dismantled once their destination on the river was
reached. 138
For travelling upstream, a different type of boat was
developed, one which had a v-shaped hull, at the point of
which was attached a wooden keel, which ran the length of
the boat. The keel protected the boat in case it ran
aground and also allowed the boat to remain stable when
headed upstream, as it displaced the current. These
keelboats were propelled upstream by several different
methods, all of which relied on manpower. In weak currents,
the boats could be rowed. In somewhat stronger currents,
poles were used to propel the boat upstream; crew members
placed one end of their pole on the river bottom, and then
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walked along the deck toward the back of the boat, pushing
the boat upstream as they walked. Another method used in
strong currents was to attach a long rope to the boat, and
then walk along the bank of the river, pulling the boat
along. Sometimes such ropes were tied to trees upstream,
and the crew would then pull themselves and the boat up to
that point. 139 in any of these cases, upstream travel was
very arduous and time-consuming. It took one month to float
downstream from Pittsburgh to New Orleans, but it took four
months, and a crew of four to twelve, to return by
keelboat. 140 Consequently, that movement of settlers into
the frontier region which was accomplished by water was,
during the eighteenth century, primarily headed downstream.
This situation changed with the introduction of
steamboats onto the Western rivers. In 1811, the New
Orleans
.
a steamboat built by Livingston and Fulton's
Company, set off from Pittsburgh to New Orleans. Upon
reaching Louisville, where the flow of the Ohio was broken
by a series of falls, the New Orleans had to wait for the
water level to rise. During this wait, the boat travelled
back upstream to Cincinnati, demonstrating its ability to
move quickly against the current of the Ohio River.
(Steamboats had already been operating on the rivers of the
East, such as the Hudson, but their ability to handle the
larger, more treacherous rivers of the West had been in
doubt. 142 ) In 1815, another boat which was owned by the
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Livingston and Fulton company, the Enterprise
,
steamed its
way from New Orleans to Louisville in twenty-five days, but
under unusually favorable conditions. 143 The same trip by
keelboat would have taken around three months. 144 m 1817,
Henry Shreve's Washington completed a round-trip from
Louisville to New Orleans in forty-one days, under normal
conditions, demonstrating the feasibility of regular
steamboat travel up the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers into the
Northwest Territory. 145
After this point, steam navigation on these two rivers
greatly expanded. In 1817, there were seventeen steamboats
on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. By 1820, there were
sixty-nine, and by 1855, seven hundred twenty-seven
steamboats were plying the waters of these two rivers and
all of their major tributaries. 146 And the speed of these
boats increased as the number of them did. In the round-
trip made by the Washington in 1817, twenty-five of the
forty-one days were spent going upstream from New Orleans to
Louisville. By 1820, that upstream trip could be made in
ten or eleven days, and by 1853, it was possible to make it
in less than five days. 147 The steamboat, more than the
turnpike, is a clear example of the speed and acceleration
which Virilio stresses in his interpretation of modernity.
These boats attained speeds of 10 miles per hour on the
Western rivers, and even faster speeds in the East.
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While these boats were primarily used for transporting
commercial goods up and down the river, they were
nevertheless crucial to the movement of settlers into the
Mississippi Valley. By the 1850 's, the boats were large
enough to carry 300 to 400 deck passengers, many of whom
were immigrants moving into the public lands of the
Mississippi region. 149 But while the development of the
steamboat provides a good example of the acceleration of the
movement of settlers, there was a certain weakness to the
steamboat, in regard to its ability to regulate that
movement
.
Unlike the turnpikes, which could thoroughly regulate
movement along their route, through the use of toll-gates,
steamboats were unable to completely control the movement
along the rivers. Along the turnpikes, even those
travellers who provided their own means of conveyance, and
avoided using the stage-coach and freight companies to move
themselves and their belongings, still could not avoid
paying the tolls. 150 But on the rivers, settlers could build
or purchase a flatboat or keelboat and move themselves
independently from, although more slowly than, the steamboat
companies. In fact, the number of flatboats on the
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers reached its peak during the late
1840' s, when steamboats were spreading out into all the
tributaries of the mid-West. 151 For despite the development
of steamboats, the rivers remained uncontrollable, natural
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routes for transportation. Their banks offered many points
from which flatboats and keelboats could be launched and
landed, and it was impossible to charge these vessels for
their movement along the river. However, the other major
development in nineteenth-century water transportation - the
construction of canals - overcame this and other problems
posed by unruly rivers.
Between 1817 and 1845 in the United States, the
construction of canals was carried on at a frantic pace. In
1816 there were barely 100 miles of canals in the country,
but by 1840 there were over 3300 miles. 152 Many of the
canals which were built in this period, as well as the pre-
1917 period, were designed to overcome a particular obstacle
in a river, usually a falls. 153 in fact, in 1828 one such
canal was built around the falls in the Ohio River at
Louisville, making it possible for steamboats to travel from
the Mississippi to the upper reaches of the Ohio River. 15A
In these instances, the canals overcame the hazards posed by
a particularly steep pitch in the course of the river by
establishing an alternative waterway, one which contained a
series of locks. These locks would gradually float boats up
or down the dangerous incline, eliminating one of the chief
impediments to river travel.
But other canals were built not to overcome obstacles
in rivers, but to create waterways where none had been
before. Such canals were often built to connect two water
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routes, such as an inland and a tidewater river. These
canals were actually artificial rivers, constructed where a
river would have been beneficial to commerce. Canals of this
sort were constructed around eastern commercial centers in
the first four decades of the nineteenth century, but they
were not widely used to transport travellers. 155 in 1817,
however, the state of New York began construction on the
Erie Canal, which upon completion in 1824, connected Lake
Erie with the Hudson River. Although the Erie Canal was an
important commercial link between the Great Lakes and the
Atlantic Ocean, via the Hudson River, it was also the first
canal which was widely used for the transportation of
people. 156 The canal carried settlers not only to the
largely settled territory along its three hundred sixty-four
mile course across the state of New York, 157 but it also
served as a major transportation route for settlers heading
for the Ohio River Valley. 158
The success of the Erie Canal caused Pennsylvania to
undertake construction of a competing canal route from the
East to the public domain of the West. This canal was even
longer than the Erie, at three hundred ninety-five miles, 159
and it also faced an additional obstacle. The route of the
canal from the Susquehanna to the Ohio River ran directly
across the Allegheny Mountains. In order to cross these
mountains, a series of inclined planes were constructed on
each side of the mountain range, and tracks were laid on
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these planes. Stationary engines pulled passenger and
freight cars up one side and lowered them down the other,
and eventually these engines moved sections of specially
built canal boats over the mountains. 160 The Pennsylvania
Canal was begun in 1826 and completed in 1834, and cost over
10 million dollars. However, it was never as successful as
the Erie Canal. This was partly due to the portage
railroad, which was a bottleneck in the canal route, and
partly the result of railroad competition. 161 Nevertheless,
the Pennsylvania, or Main Line, Canal, as it was often
called, stands as testimony to the faith which Pennsylvania
had in the benefits which would be provided by a canal route
into the public domain.
Although travel through the canal was not as fast as
travel by river steamboat (canal boats averaged speeds of
three to four miles per hour162 ) , the canals did, like the
steamboat, eliminate much of the toil and trouble associated
with upstream travel. With their system of locks, the
canals practically eliminated the current that one would
normally face when travelling from a lower to a higher point
by water. And in the canals, there was no need to exert
human power against even the minimized current; the boats
were pulled along by horses or mules which walked along the
towpaths that lined each side of the canal.
Another feature of the canals, one which may have
helped convince New York and Pennsylvania to expend so much
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on their construction, was that they were, in a sense, like
turnpikes of water. The banks of the canals, unlike those
of the rivers, did not provide easy, unregulated access to
the water. And the many locks on the canals (84 on the
Erie; 174 on the Pennsylvania) were, like the toll-gates on
turnpikes, stations at which payment could be exacted from
those travellers who were moving themselves in their own
boats, independently from the private freight and passenger
businesses which developed on the canals. For those who
booked passage with one of the canal businesses the tolls
were included in the fares which were charged.
As I have already mentioned, the Erie and Pennsylvania
Canals were financed by the states through which they ran.
It will be recalled that it was during this period - the
1820 's - that the federal government began to curtail its
direct involvement in the settlement of the public domain.
(In 1820, the federal credit system for land purchases was
abolished, see p. 150, and in 1829, the federal government
began to relinquish control of the National Road to the
various states through which it passed, see p. 180.) But in
the construction of canals the federal government developed
a new method for promoting the settlement of American space,
a method which was to become crucial in the construction of
railroads.
In order to encourage the construction of canals in the
territory which the federal government had put up for sale,
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land grants were given to the young states which had been
established there. Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, the states
of the Northwest Territory, all received from the federal
government not only the right of ways upon which to
construct certain canals, but also half of the land for five
miles on each side of these canals. The other half of the
land was retained by the federal government, the land being
divided into odd- and even-numbered sections (640 acre lots)
and distributed on an even/odd basis between the state and
federal governments. Odd-numbered sections belonged to the
states, and even-numbered ones belonged to the federal
government. The states could then sell their sections and
use the revenue to finance the construction of the canals,
or they could grant this land to private companies, who
could then sell the land for the same purpose, and for a
profit as well. And to ensure that the federal government
would not lose money on this arrangement, the minimum price
of its land in these grant areas was doubled to 2.50 dollars
per acre, making up for the revenue lost on the land given
to the states, 163 while raising the value of the land which
was granted.
The period of canal construction was rather short-
lived, however, because developments in rail transportation
around the middle of the nineteenth century overshadowed all
other forms of transportation. Railroad vehicles, when
driven by steam engines (not horses, as they originally
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were 1"), offered the possibility of very rapid trans-
portation. The passenger trains of 1850 were able to travel
at around 25 miles per hour. 165 Furthermore, railroads, like
canals and turnpikes, were not restricted to any natural
course, such as a river. But unlike the canals and
turnpikes, which allowed independently owned boats and
wagons to travel their routes (for a price, of course), the
railroad, with its steam locomotives, precluded such
independent movement. 166 To travel by rail meant to travel
on the terms, over the route, and at the rate of speed
established by the railroad companies. More than any of the
other forms of transportation which have thus far been
examined, the railroad exemplifies the acceleration and
speed which characterize modernity, as well as the
regulatory dimension of this rapid movement.
It is also with the railroad that the close relation
among developments in transportation technology, the land
policies of the United States, and the reification of
American capitalism becomes undeniably apparent. As was the
case with the federal land grants for canals, the first land
grants for railroad construction were given to states, not
entrepreneurs. But the scope of the railroad land grants
was, from the start, beyond that of the canal grants. In
1850, Congress granted to the states of Illinois,
Mississippi, and Alabama, for the construction of the
Illinois Central Railroad, the odd-numbered sections of the
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land six miles on each side of the route. This amounted to
a grant of more than 2.5 million acres. 167 Throughout the
1850 «s, similar grants were given to various states,
totaling around 18 million acres. 168 But these land grants,
many of which were given for the construction of local
railroads, were only a precursor to the much larger and more
significant grants given for the construction of
transcontinental lines.
The transcontinental land grants - the first of which
occurred in 1861, the year before the passage of the
Homestead Act - were not only longer than the grants of the
1850' s, but they were wider as well. The initial grant of
this sort was given for the construction of the Union
Pacific Railroad, and was comprised of the odd-numbered
sections of a twenty-mile wide tract of land along the
route. This single grant amounted to around 12 million
acres. 169 The grant made to the Northern Pacific, the last
of the transcontinental grants, was more than double that of
the Union Pacific. For the part of its route that traversed
existing states, the Northern Pacific was granted half of
the sections of a forty-mile tract, and in the territories,
the tract was doubled to eighty miles. This grant amounted
to over 47 million acres. 170
Aside from size, there was another important difference
between the grants of the 1850' s and the transcontinental
land grants; the latter were given directly to the railroad
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companies, not to the states through which the tracks would
pass. All told, about 90 million acres of land were granted
to such private corporations by the federal government. 171
The railroad companies, therefore were not just in the
transportation business; they were also the largest land
companies in the nation. The railroads controlled to a
great extent both the movement across and the settlement of
American space. The railroad companies not only carried
settlers into the frontier regions of the United States;
they also sold homesteads to those settlers.
In fact, the transcontinental railroad companies
actively sought colonists for the settlement of the western
territory, and had large forces of agents in Europe. These
agents would induce members of the peasant and lower-middle
classes of Europe to immigrate, but not for the purpose of
swelling the labor force of the eastern United States (as
one would expect according to Wakefield's plan for
systematic colonization), but to become western farmers. 172
Not only did these agents spread the word about the
opportunities available in the mid-western United States;
they often offered reduced train fares to settlers, or
allowed them to deduct the price of their fare from the
price of any land they purchased from the railroad
173company
.
And once the settler reached the western territory, the
railroad companies made it relatively easy to acquire land
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within the grant area. Forty acre lots were often sold to
settlers, and at prices which were not extremely higher than
the 2.50 dollar per acre price at which government land in
the grant area could be pre-empted. 174 The railroad
companies also extended lenient credit terms to the
settlers, and some companies required only interest (usually
around 6 percent) to be paid for the first years after
settlement. 175
The lenient land sale policies of the railroad
companies can be explained in part by the passage of the
Homestead Act. Free land was available outside the grant
area as well as within, and this limited the price that the
railroad companies could demand for their land. But it must
be recalled that much of the best agricultural land had
already been claimed by 1862 (see p. 157). Furthermore,
agriculture had been mechanized and commercialized by this
time, and farmers could not afford to settle on land twenty
or forty miles from the railroads. So the effect of the
Homestead Act on land prices should not be overemphasized.
There were other factors which help to explain the eagerness
with which the railroads disposed of their land.
One of these factors has to do with the hermetic nature
of rail travel itself. As I mentioned above, railroads not
only moved people and things more quickly than any other
existing form of transportation, but they moved them in a
highly regulated manner. Unlike the other forms of travel
195
o
rm
which have been examined, railroads allowed no independent
movement, so once the settlers were established, any
commercial activity which they undertook was completely
dependent on the railroads. In order to sell their produce,
farmers not only had to save time in the fields through the
use of farm machinery, but they had to get their goods to
market as quickly as possible, through the use of trains.
The lenient land terms offered by the railroad companies can
be interpreted, therefore, as a railroad company decision t
sell its land quickly and cheaply, rather than hold out for
a hiqher price, so as to quickly begin reaping the long-te
profits which it could extract through its transportation
monopoly
.
Of course, the railroad monopolies were challenged in
the last decades of the nineteenth century by the concerted
efforts of farmers (e.g. the Patrons of Husbandry, or the
Grange, and the Populist Movement)
. But even when the
farmers were successful in resisting these monopolies (e.g.
in getting states to regulate the railroad's management of
grain elevators 176 ) , such achievements, just like the
Homestead Act, can be viewed not so much as victories of the
farmers over capital, as the death throes of the
agricultural challenge to capital. These late nineteenth
century agricultural movements would not be as successful as
their predecessors, the claim clubs, were in their
resistance to land speculators. In the time that had lapsed
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a certain amount of order had been imposed upon American
space, and an important dimension of that order, I am
arguing, was the regulation of movement which was
accomplished through technological developments in
transportation. Through the consumption of this
transportation technology, homesteaders took their place in
this order. Although it may appear that I have overplayed
the regulatory dimension of acceleration or speed, a brief
summary which juxtaposes developments in land policy and
transportation technology will lend some indirect support
for my claims.
When the government of the United States first acquired
its vast land holdings, squatters were moving into these
territories by means of pack trains and flatboats, and were
clearing and cultivating small homesteads in the most
desirable areas. The government's response to this
unregulated westward movement and settlement was the
adoption of restrictive land policies. Military force was
used to evict squatters from government land, and the
homesteads were destroyed. Settlement could only occur,
according to the land policy of the government, after the
land had been officially surveyed into square townships and
sections, and the settler purchased at least a full section
at auction. The restrictive nature of this policy becomes
obvious when one considers that in 1785, when this policy
was first adopted, none of the farm machinery discussed
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above was available to the settler. The 640 acre mini
was eight times the minimum purchase of the 1820 's, when
durable plows with replaceable iron parts were speeding up
the process of clearing the land. The original minimum of
640 acres, along with the minimum price requirement,
prevented widespread legal settlement by small homesteaders.
But throughout the first two decades or the nineteenth
century, the federal government relaxed the restrictions on
settlement which were imposed by the Ordinance of 1785. The
minimum purchase size was gradually reduced throughout this
period, until it reached the low of 80 acres in 1820, and
the government offered easy credit terms to settlers during
these years. it was also during this period that the
Wilderness Road and the National Road had made it possible
for wagons and stage coaches to pass through the Appalachian
Mountains, and steamboats were well-established on the
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers by 1820.
The decade of the 1820 's saw the opening of the Erie
and Pennsylvania Canals, and in 1830 the first American
passenger railroad was opened (see n. 164) . In regard to
land policy, 1830 also marks several important developments,
with the Pre-emption Acts of the 1830' s, the federal
government reversed its long-standing position on squatters'
rights, and allowed many squatters to buy the land on which
they had settled. The government also reversed, at this
point, its practice of establishing minimum lot sizes.
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While these minimums had been decreasing throughout the
first decades of the nineteenth century, with the Pre-
emption Acts the government began establishing maximum size
limits. A settler no longer had to buy at least a specified
number of acres; he could now buy no more than 160 acres
(see p. 155). I read this shift as another indication that
the threat of American space had largely been overcome.
Farmers were by this time so caught up in the existing
order, that it was safe to promote their settlement on
public land in large numbers. The maximum size limit would
enable even more people to settle within the order that was
being established in America.
1861-2 is the other important date at which changes
occurred in land policy and transportation development. As
I just mentioned, it was in 1861 that the first
transcontinental land grant was given to the Union Pacific
Railroad company by the federal government, marking the
clear convergence of transportation development and land
policy. And 1862 is the date when the government finally
began to give land to homesteaders. Of course, I read these
events as a phase of the confrontation between capital and
American space. Between 1785 and 1862, a shift occurred in
the manner in which the problem of space was handled by
American capitalism. In 1785, when movement across the
public domain was uncontrollable, land policies were used to
restrict settlement on the public domain. Once movement was
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thoroughly regulated, by the railroad monopolies and their
extensive land holdings, land policy no longer had to serve
its original restrictive function. since settlers had been
transformed from independent, hence dangerous, producers, to
consumers of technological conveniences, the threat of
American space was overcome, and land could safely be given
to those who labored upon it.
This reading is further supported, I believe, by the
manner in which the Homestead Act was applied in the
railroad grant areas. In these areas, where the railroads
held virtually complete sway, the government tried to
increase the number of settlers even more than it did in
other areas of the public domain. The Homestead Act was
applied to the government-owned sections in these grant
areas, so settlers could get their land for free, but the
maximum size limit was reduced to 80 acres, 177 allowing even
more people to settle in these "safe" zones. And to ensure
that these areas were indeed rendered safe by the railroad
companies, the government usually suspended settlement in
any area that was under consideration as a route for the
tracks, as earlier it had prohibited settlement in
unsurveyed areas. Vast areas were withheld from
homesteading until the railroads had set things in order. 178
After the railroad companies had decided on the location of
the tracks, not to mention the townsites, junctions, etc.,
it was safe to bring in settlers. In those cases where
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squatters interfered with the establishment of railroads in
the grant areas, the government quickly reverted to its
original, direct approach to the squatter problem - it used
military force to eliminate this threat to order. 179
What I have tried to indicate in this rather long
chapter, is one dimension of a genealogy of modern
consumption, or rather, a genealogy of convenience, the
value which underlies that consumption. Although this
dimension is concerned with material conditions, it is one
that is over-looked by Marxists, even those Marxists who
have begun to look at consumption patterns. It is a
dimension which is clearly related to the re-enforcement of
capitalist relations of production, but it does not reduce
to those relations of production. Rather, the consumption
of farm and transportation technology, which blossomed in
nineteenth-century America, resulted, in part, from
capitalism's coming to grips with the danger or threat or
American space.
One outcome of this confrontation between capitalism
and open space was that space was transformed from a threat
to capitalism, into a limit for consumers. The vast amount
of unsettled land in America posed a threat to capitalism,
in that independent producers could have settled that land
and escaped from the capitalist economy, or at least inter-
acted with that economy with some degree of autonomy. But
through the land policies I examined in this chapter, in
201
conjunction with developments in agricultural machinery,
farming was transformed from a largely self-sufficient
activity into a primarily commercial endeavor. The
production of food came to require the consumption of ever-
increasing amounts of time- and labor-saving technology, or
convenience. Recalling the distinction I made in the
preceding chapter, the time spent producing food changed
from a demand of the body, to a limit of the body. And all
this had largely occurred by I860, long before the period of
over-capitalization which Mandel identifies as the condition
which permitted/demanded the industrialization of
agriculture (see pp. 25-6)
.
On another front, the movement across American space
was also brought under control in the nineteenth century.
Old, slow travel routes and methods, such as pack trails and
flatboats, were supplanted by faster, and more tightly
controlled, means of movement. American space was
transformed from a possibility for freedom, for escape, into
distance, another limit of the body to be overcome through
the consumption of technology. And as I mentioned earlier,
when the need to overcome distance is combined with the need
to save time from bodily necessity, an endless series of
limits develops. New technologies are required to move men
and things not only across all distances, but to do so at an
ever-faster pace. Thus as the railroad replaced turnpikes
and canals, it was in turn replaced by the airplane, which
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was then replaced bv th<=> -ipf -r^*-„Y rne 3et
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Jets are now being developed
which promise to lessen even further the time spent
travelling from continent to continent. And soon, no doubt,
there will be shuttles to Mars.
However, the automobile, which is rightly emphasized by
Aglietta as a hallmark of modern consumption, does not seem
at first glance to fit within the perspective that I am
developing here. It is a means of conveyance which allows
travellers to overcome distance quickly, especially in local
travel, but it does not seem to be amenable to close
regulation, like the train or the airplane. The automobile,
in some sense, allows one to move freely; it can be used for
much more than simply travelling to and from the workplace.
But whatever freedom is provided by the privately owned
automobile, it is compensated for by the financial
obligations one incurs through the consumption of the
automobile. Cars are one of the most expensive consumer
items purchased by households, and they are usually bought
on credit. In this sense, then, the automobile marks the
convergence of the two regulatory trends which have been
highlighted in this chapter. The automobile, like the other
forms of transportation I have examined, accelerates the
movement of people; and like farm machinery, the automobile
binds the consumer with a debt that must be paid over time.
At this point, the techno-fetishist should have had
enough of this heretical babbling - the car as a restriction
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or burden!
-
and should be ready to put a halt to this li
of thought. The perfect roadblock would seem to be
available, or rather, a rotary, which can turn this argument
back on itself. m this questionable interpretation of
agricultural and transportation technology, have I not ended
up treating the consumer in just the manner which Marxists
have, in a manner of which I complained at the very start of
this chapter? Indeed, is not my treatment of consumers even
closer to the rigid Marxism of structuralists than the
treatment of consumers offered by the several Marxists I
discussed in the first part of this chapter? I make it
sound as though the settlers on the American frontier were
simply herded like cattle onto the various forms of
transportation, and fed farm equipment as if it were fodder.
I appear to be oblivious to the possibility that the
settlers may have actually wanted or needed this technology.
My discussion of the consumption of technology has pushed
the Marxist perspective back into nineteenth-century
America, and broadened it to include the material condition
of space, or land. But after all that, it is still capital
which ultimately prevails, and appears to thoroughly
determine consumption and the values which underlie it.
My response to all of this, however, would be to point
out the limitations which I have imposed upon my argument
against Marxism's treatment of consumption. This last
chapter has presented one dimension of a genealogy of
ers
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convenience; it helps to explain, in part, the techno-
fetishism of modernity. Contrary to this possible critique
of my perspective, I do acknowledge that there was indeed a
need for the various technological developments which I hav
so far examined, or to put this differently, that consume
did find this technology to be valuable. This need, of
course, is the need for convenience. My claim is not that
American capitalism created this need in the nineteenth
century, or created consumers who valued convenience. My
point is that American capitalism played upon this need for,
or value of, convenience, and was thereby able to undermine
the threat posed by unsettled land.
Of course, I am not claiming that this value of
convenience is a uniquely American one; it is a value which
characterizes modernity. But the spatial situation of the
United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
provided the conditions in which this value was able to
flourish. The spatial situation of the United States helps
to explain why modern consumption standards have developed
principally in the United States. But this chapter has not
shed any light on the proliferation of the value of
convenience after the threat of American space was overcome,
or beyond the borders of the United States. In the next
chapter, I will try to indicate the broader foundation of
the value of convenience.
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CHAPTER 5
WEBER, NIETZSCHE, AND MODERN ASCETICISM
The material considerations of the last chapter were
offered not simply as an argument against certain recent
Marxist thought on consumption. They were also offered
because of the influence which those particular material
conditions had on the development, or rather, deployment, of
the value of convenience. The material conditions of the
United States in the nineteenth century had an exacerbating
or accelerating influence on another development which had
been taking place in other Western countries, as well as the
United States. What I have in mind here is not the
development of capitalist relations of production, which
Marxists have done so much to illuminate, but the devolution
of Christianity. And if Marxists have tended to overlook
the significance of American space in the development of
late capitalism's "social norm of consumption, » they have
remained totally oblivious to the possibility that religious
ideas, and the problems or situations to which those ideas
are a response, can have any significant impact on the
development of capitalism in modernity. Although the
several Marxists I discussed in Chapter 3 have moved to
varying degrees beyond the simple economic determinism of a
more structuralist Marxism, they do not seem to have gotten
much farther than Marx himself in recognizing any effective
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role of (not for) religion in the development of Western
capitalism.
At this point, I am going to pick up a theme which was
raised before I considered Marxist thought on consumption, a
theme which emerged in my criticism of Hannah Arendt. But
to recall this theme, which concerns Christianity and the
body, it is best not to return to my argument with Arendt
s
interpretation of Christianity as a form of reverence for
life. For Arendt sees such reverence not only in
Christianity, but in Marxism as well. And while I disagree
with both of these claims, criticizing them will not get me
very far in linking the materialism of Marxism with
developments in, or transformations of, religious ideas.
Ultimately I will come back to Arendt and challenge her
interpretation of Marxism, but to begin again on this line
of thought concerning Christianity, it is best to do so with
Max Weber's thoughts on Protestantism and capitalism. For
Weber's thoughts on Christianity and modernity are much
closer than Arendt 's to the argument I want to make.
Weber ' s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism has generated an exorbitant amount of controversy
since its initial publication as a two-part article in 1904-
5. 1 And although I have not been shying away from
controversy up to this point, perhaps I should offer some
explanation or apology for my choice of such a battered
text. My reading of Weber's text is one which emphasizes
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the limitations he imposes on his argument. I pay clos
attention when he claims that he has "no intention whatever
of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that
the spirit of capitalism
. . . could only have arisen as the
result of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that
capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the
Reformation." 2 And I count myself as part of the group when
he claims that "we are merely attempting to clarify the part
which religious forces have played in forming the developing
web of our specifically worldly modern culture, in the
complex interaction of innumerable different historical
factors." 3 I have to withdraw, however, when Weber, in a
footnote toward the end of the text, abandons his earlier
restraint and says of religious ideas, "[t]hat they are in
themselves, that is beyond doubt, the most powerful plastic
elements of national character, and contain a law of
development and a compelling force entirely their own." 4 I
have no qualms with excessive argumentation (see Chapter 1,
pp. 19-21, and all of Chapter 4), but when it becomes
dogmatic instead of rhetorical, as it does in this last
quote from Weber, I have to balk.
So in the use to which I put Weber's argument in this
chapter, I will be treating it as an argument of limited
claims. Weber offers a perspective on modernity which
emphasizes the role of religious ideas, and my aim in this
chapter is to examine and expand that perspective. My
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position on Weber's argument, therefore, is much less
polemical than was my treatment of either Arendt or Aglietta
et al., on the issue of consumption. (I guess this
indicates where my dogmatic tendencies lie.)
Weber's task in The Protestant EthjLg, as I read it, is
not just to identify the influence of the Reformation on the
development of the modern, that is, rational, spirit of
capitalism. 5 There is little doubt that the main claim of
his argument is that Protestantism, especially Calvinist
Puritanism, spawned a new breed of entrepreneurs who threw
themselves into business life without the slightest
religious compunction. What the Reformation bequested to
its secular successor, claims Weber, was "above all an
amazingly good, we may even say a pharisaically good,
conscience in the acquisition of money, as long as it took
place legally." 6 But Weber also recognized the legacy of
the Reformation among those who labored for the new breed of
entrepreneur, and were concerned less with the accumulation
of wealth than with satisfying the needs of their
households. The Protestant idea of "labour as a calling
became as characteristic of the modern worker as the
corresponding attitude toward acquisition of the business
man.
"
7
So what Weber was trying to get at in his controversial
text was not just the rise of the modern entrepreneurial
spirit. More broadly, he was concerned with the emergence
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of individuals of a sort which was amenable to the
rationally organized capitalism of modernity, which Weber
famously characterized as an "iron cage." 8 As Weber
describes his task, "in order that a manner of life so well
adapted to the peculiarities of capitalism could be selected
at all, i.e. should come to dominate others, it had to
originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone,
but as a way of life common to whole groups of men. This
origin is what really needs explaining." 9
Of course, part of such an explanation would have to be
concerned with the literal whipping of the labor force into
shape, but Weber leaves this aspect of the explanation to
others. The approach Weber takes is to focus on
developments in religious ideas. At the outset, it should
be emphasized that Weber's claim is not that certain
religious ideas clandestinely maintain their hold over
modern entrepreneurs, managers, and workers, keeping them
within the bounds of the established order. On the
contrary, Weber acknowledges that there is no longer any
need for "transcendental sanctions," 10 because the modern
economic order "is now bound to the technical and economic
conditions of machine production which to-day determine the
lives of all the individuals who are born into this
mechanism." 11 And it determines those lives, Weber adds,
"with irresistible force." (This compulsion of individuals
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by the economic order is only one facet of the iron cage.
Later I will discuss another feature of the cage.)
So Weber's claim concerning religious ideas is not that
they still play a role in modernity, but that religious
ideas did play a role, early on, in the creation of
individuals who eagerly take their positions in the modern
economic processes of production and consumption. According
to Weber, it was the Protestant Reformation which exerted
this influence on the development of modern individuals.
What Protestantism accomplished was the reversal of the
Catholic attitude toward worldly activity, which Weber
describes as indifference. In my criticism of Arendt's
interpretation of Christianity, I touched on the attitude
toward earthly life which was expressed in the gospels of
the Apostles, and in the writings of Augustine. I described
this attitude as an ambivalence towards mortal, earthly
life, not as an indifference. (See Chapter 2, pp. 45-52,
77.) The point of that description was to indicate another
pole in the range of Christian attitudes toward earthly
life, beside the reverence for such life which Arendt
identified as the defining feature of Christianity. My
point was that even though the coming of Christ had made
mortal life and death essential to salvation, there was also
a certain contempt for earthly life among some Christian
writers. Mortal earthly life was both a punishment and a
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promise, a scourge and a blessing. (See the quote from
Augustine in Chapter 2, p. 51.)
Weber's treatment of the Catholic attitude toward
earthly life, however, is not as polemical as the treatment
I offered in Chapter 2. His concern is not to challenge a
conflicting interpretation of Christianity, but to link the
Reformation with earlier Christian thinking, in the form of
a reversal. For Weber's purposes, the Catholic attitude
toward earthly life is best characterized as indifference,
not ambivalence. I have no quarrel with this character-
ization, since Weber contrasts this indifference with any
positive evaluation, or reverence, of life, and therefore
seems to support my argument against Arendt.
The indifference which Weber emphasizes is found in the
gospels (e.g. Matthew 6:25, Luke 12:22-3), but the clearest
source for it is one of the epistles of St. Paul. For Paul,
earthly, mortal life was not something to be hated (see
quote from John, in Chapter 2, p. 50) or lost (see quote
from Mark on the same page in Chapter 2). In his first
epistle to the Corinthians, Paul advises the faithful not to
hate this life, but to continue in their earthly activity
while waiting for the second coming of Christ. Noting that
the time for man on earth had been shortened, 12 and that
the form of this world was passing away, 13 Paul advised
that "each man remain with God in that condition in which he
was called." 14 The end of time on earth was almost at hand,
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so men should not be unduly concerned with their situation
in this world.
It is this "Pauline indifference" which figures
prominently in Weber's treatment of Catholicism in The
Protestant Ethic
. According to Weber, Protestantism
eventually reversed this Catholic indifference to life on
earth, and came to positively value earthly activity. And
Protestantism accomplished this feat, in part, by
reinterpreting the idea of a "calling" which is found in the
above quote from Paul. Although Weber acknowledges that
there were "certain suggestions" of such a positive
evaluation in the Middle Ages and in classical Greece (see
my discussion of Xenophon's Oeconomicus in Chapter 2, pp.
25-6)
,
he claims that the Reformation brought something
"unquestionably new" to the positive estimation of worldly
activity:
the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in
worldly affairs as the highest form which the
moral activity of the individual could assume.
This it was which inevitably gave every-day
worldly activity a religious significance, and
which first created the conception of a calling in
this sense.
This Protestant revaluation, of course, did not occur
all in a moment, and the Puritanism upon which Weber's
argument chiefly rests, is distinct in important ways from
the writings of the sixteenth-century reformers. In setting
up Weber's argument concerning Protestantism and capitalism,
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I would like to spend a little more time examining the
changes within this revaluation than Weber himself does.
This shift in attitude toward worldly activity began,
as Weber indicates, with Martin Luther's own transformation
in regard to worldly activity. At first, Luther's position
was very much the same as that expressed in the above quote
from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. m his
commentary on the seventh chapter of that epistle, which he
wrote in 1523, Luther emphasizes Paul's message "that all
outward things are optional or free before God and that a
Christian may make use of them as he will; he may accept
them or let them go." 16 A little later in that commentary,
Luther gets more specific about the proper Christian
relation to things of this world, and offers some advice on
how a Christian can maintain an indifferent attitude toward
mortal life. In reference to verses 29-31 of that letter,
which I quoted above, Luther writes:
This is a general teaching of all Christians, that
they should treasure that eternal blessing which
is theirs in the faith, despising this life so
that they do not sink too deeply into it either
with love and desire or suffering and boredom, but
should rather behave like guests on earth, using
everything for a short time because of need and
not for pleasure. ... A Christian should hold
to this principle also in all other things. He
should only serve necessity and not be a slave to
his lust and nurture his old Adam. 17
Along with this indifference to worldly activity,
Luther also shared with Paul, at least early in his career,
that interpretation of the calling which was expressed above
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in the quote from Corinthians. Paul advised the Corinthians
to remain as they were when they were called, because that
condition in which one was called made no difference to
one's salvation. Whether one was married or not,
circumcised or not, a slave or not, made no difference. 18
In his commentary on Corinthians, Luther reiterates this
indifferent attitude toward the calling, as the condition in
which one was called, and expands the scope of Paul's
examples
.
And what Paul here says concerning a slave [thathe should not mind, or care about, his bondage],
the same is to be said of all paid servants,
maids, day laborers, workmen, and domestics in
their relations to their masters and mistresses.
It should also be said of all vows, associations,
corporations, or any tie by which one person is
related or obligated to another: in all these
matters service, loyalty, and duty are to be
maintained, regardless of whether the one party is
Christian or non-Christian, good or bad, so long
as they do not hinder faith and justice and allow
you to live your Christian life. For all such
estates are free and no impediment to the
Christian faith. 19
Luther's interpretation of the calling, however,
gradually moved away from the indifference of St. Paul, and
worldly activity came to be a matter of great concern to
him. The performance of one's calling in this world became a
positive duty, and was no longer "optional and free before
God." (Support for this claim will be offered below.) Weber
notes this shift in Luther's thought, and describes it as an
increasing "traditionalism," by which Weber means the
maintenance of traditional economic relations. 20
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But in any case, this increasing traditionalism of
Luther's thought is not of great concern to Weber. m fact,
he claims that the chapter of The_Protest^_E^ which
concerns Luther's conception of the calling was only meant
to determine that the "idea of the calling in the Lutheran
sense is at best of questionable importance for the problems
in which [he is] interested." 21 From Weber's perspective,
what is significant about the idea of the calling is the way
in which it eventually came to challenge traditionalism, the
way in which it helped to usher in the modern economic
order. And in this regard, it is the interpretation of the
calling which was developed by various Calvinist sects, not
Luther, which is important. As a result, Weber does not
offer much of a description of the traditionalism of the
later Luther, or an explanation for this shift. He does
indicate that this change in Luther's position on worldly
activity was due, in part, to Luther's increasing
involvement in worldly affairs, and partly to his experience
with peasant rebelliousness. 22 But Weber mentions these
sources of Luther's traditionalism only in passing; he
places more emphasis on Luther's "more and more intense
belief in divine providence, which identified absolute
obedience to God's will, with absolute acceptance of things
as they were. " 23
For my purposes, it is worthwhile to examine Luther's
later notion of the calling in some detail. The way Weber
.ew on
;ome
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leaves it, one does not get any significant impression of
the disciplinary dimension of Luther's conception of the
calling. Weber simply mentions Luther's experience with
rebellious peasants as something which effected his vi<
worldly activity, and cites in a footnote a letter of
Luther's in support of his claim. 2* a quick glance at s<
of Luther's, as well as Calvin's, writings on worldly
activity and the calling, however, will help to uncover the
disciplinary impulse behind that Puritan conception of the
calling which Weber emphasizes, and help to bring out the
aspect of Weber's argument which most interests me - the
creation of modern producers/consumers, not entrepreneurs.
In 152 5, the peasants who were revolting in the German
territory of Swabia issued a list of their demands in the
form of a pamphlet called "The Twelve Articles." in the same
year, Luther responded to these demands in his "Admonition
to Peace." 25 After identifying the princes and lords of
Germany as the source of the rebellious temper of the German
peasantry, and chastising them for this, Luther addresses
the peasants themselves. He criticizes those peasants for
revolting against the oppressive situation in which they
found themselves, and is especially perturbed at the
peasants' use of the gospel to justify their rebellion.
Luther finds that everything in the articles of the peasants
"is concerned with worldly and temporal matters." He
replies:
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You want power and wealth so that you will notsuffer injustice. The gospel, however does notbecome involved in the affairs of this world but
sufrerinf °™ .
1±fJ in the world in Serins of ' *f g, injustice, the cross, patience andcontempt for this life and temporal wealthTherefore, you must take a different attitude 'if
Chri^ian^h
6 C\ristians «nd use the name * "
to u 't
6n St°P
r
hat y 2°6U are doin9 and deciden s tler hese injustices. 6
With the outbreak of the Peasants' War of 1525,
however, Luther abandoned the patient chastisement of the
peasants which he had expressed in the Admonition, and
called for the swift and violent suppression of the
rebellion. In a pamphlet entitled "Against the Robbing and
Murdering Hoardes of Peasants," Luther advised leaders, both
Christian and heathen, to take up the sword against the
peasants, who were "robbing and raging like mad dogs." 27 it
was the duty of princes and rulers, and all other Christians
as well, to destroy the peasants precisely for their
rebelliousness. Luther says of the revolting peasant:
anyone who can be proved to be a seditious person
is an outlaw before God and the emperor; and
whoever is the first to put him to death does
right and well. For if a man is in open
rebellion, everyone is both his judge and
executioner; just as when a fire starts, the first
man who can put it out is the best man to do thejob. For rebellion is not just simple murder; it
is like a great fire, which attacks and devastates
a whole land. Thus rebellion brings with it a
land filled with murder and bloodshed; it makes
widows and orphans, and turns everything upside
down, like the worst disaster. Therefore let
everyone who can, smite, slay, and stab, secretly
and openly, remembering that nothing can be more
poisonous, hurtful, or devilish than a rebel. 28
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So for Luther in 1525, the calling was hardly a thing
of indifference. it was the duty of the peasants to endure
their oppressive situation. When the peasants rejected thei
calling, and rebelled against their worldly condition, they
"abundantly merited death in body and soul," 29 and it then
became the duty of all Christians to execute this sentence.
During this rebellious period, Luther's conception of the
calling was directed primarily at maintaining order in the
affairs of this world. it was the duty of everyone to
maintain the existing order; one's salvation depended on
it.
Later in his career, Luther continued to use the idea
of the calling as an instrument of order. in his lectures
on Genesis, which were written in the mid-1530
• s,
30 Luther
still maintained that there was a duty to perform one's
calling, but he offered a different argument in support of
this claim than the one he offered to the peasants. No
longer was it a matter of the duty to bear one's burdens on
earth; rather, it was a question of maintaining the order
that God had created on, or as, earth.
In one of these lectures, Luther discusses the
scholastic distinction between the "absolute" and the
"ordered" power of God. As an example of God's absolute
power, Luther mentions the heavenly provision of manna to
Moses and his followers, and as an example of God's ordered
power, he cites the ordinary situation in which men must
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labor in order to receive food. m the latter case, God
exerts his power by using men. "This they call God's
•ordered' power, namely, when he makes use of the service
either of angels or of human beings." 31 The point Luther
makes by way of this distinction is that men can not know
anything about the absolute power of God, but must "keep the
ordered power in mind and form our opinion on the basis of
32it." God "does not command us to act in accordance with
.
.
absolute power, for He wants us to act in accordance
with the ordered power." 33 The way in which the Christian
acts in accordance with God's ordered power, of course, is
by following his or her calling.
In another lecture on Genesis, Luther claims that to
abandon one's calling, or even to change one's calling,
without direction from God or one's "superiors," is a sin.
In his interpretation of Genesis 16:9, where an angel tells
Hagar, the runaway maidservant of Sarah, to return to her
mistress, Luther concludes:
Therefore no one should change his position in
life because of his own judgment or desire. God
will change it either through death or because of
the desire and judgment of those who are your
superiors. If this does not happen, those who
give up their vocations commit a sin. 34
Relations of superiority and inferiority, of course, are
part of God's ordered power.
According to Luther, therefore, if one is to avoid sin,
one must remain in and fulfill the position in which God has
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called one, no matter how unpleasant or servile that calling
might be, for God regards all callings alike. Luther
emphasizes that this last point about the equality of all
callings before God "must often be impressed upon men, for
it makes hearts confident and prevents the dangerous
abandoning of a calling, the abandoning that is never
attempted without sin." 35
The conception of the calling which Luther held later
in his career was not so much traditionalistic, in the sense
that it was directed toward maintaining traditional economic
relations, as it was disciplinary or regulatory. it was not
particular relations which were paramount to Luther, but
order itself. Luther left open the possibility that God
might use "superiors" to change things, but such changes
would be orderly, that is, according to God's ordered power.
This disciplinary conception of the calling was also present
in the writings of Jean Calvin, the other great reformer of
the sixteenth-century. And it was Calvin, more than Luther,
who influenced those Puritan sects which are so important
for Weber. Nevertheless, Weber spends even less time on
Calvin's conception of the calling than he does on
Luther's. 36 This is because Calvin's influence on the
Puritans was centered not on his notion of the calling, but
on another concept, which I will get to shortly. But the
disciplinary dimension of Calvin's idea of the calling must
be briefly indicated here, because it is quite different
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than the idea of the calling which Weber finds among the
Puritans.
in the third book of his Institutes of the Christian
Religion, which he wrote in 1835 or 36, Calvin sounds very
much like Luther did in that same period, in regard to the
calling. Calvin says of the calling: "he only who directs
his life to this end will have it properly framed; because,
free from the impulse of rashness, he will not attempt more
than his calling justifies, knowing that it is unlawful to
overleap the prescribed bounds." 37 For both these
reformers, therefore, the calling served as a call to order,
and a guarantee that order would be maintained. For Luther,
the idea of the calling required that "no one change his
position in life because of his own judgment or desire," and
for Calvin, it required that no one "overleap the prescribed
bounds .
"
And while Luther emphasized, as a sort of ministerial
pointer, the value of the idea that all callings were equal
before God, Calvin makes a similar point, although he does
not claim all callings are equal. Calvin writes:
Again, in all our cares, toils, annoyances, and
other burdens, it will be no small alleviation to
know that all these are under the superintendence
of God.
. . . Every one in his particular mode of
life will, without repining, suffer its
inconveniences, cares, uneasiness, and anxiety,
persuaded that God has laid on the burden. This,
too, will afford admirable consolation, that in
following your proper calling, no work will be so
mean and sordid as not to have a splendour and
value in the eye of God. 38
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Even if all callings are not equal in the eye of God,
according to Calvin, they are all of value; this should
console those who find themselves in unpleasant or
oppressive circumstances, and help them to avoid the sin of
rebellion, or unauthorized assertion.
The Protestant reversal of the Pauline indifference
toward earthly life was not limited to the disciplinary
development of Luther's and Calvin's conceptions of the
calling, however. There is another facet of this reversal
which I would like to emphasize before moving on to Weber's
discussion of Puritanism. Like the disciplinary character
of their conceptions of the calling, the feature of Luther'
and Calvin's thought that I now want to stress is one which
Weber passes over in The Protestant Ethir.
r
but it too is
important for the claims I will eventually make concerning
Protestantism and the value of convenience.
In regard to worldly activity in general, beyond the
requirements of one's calling, Calvin, and eventually
Luther, took positions which cannot be described as
indifferent. Early in Luther's career, when he wrote his
commentary on I Corinthians 7, he advised Christians to
"behave like guests on earth, using everything for a short
time, because of need and not for pleasure." (See p. 237)
By following this lesson from Paul's epistle, one could
avoid sinking "too deeply" into earthly life. But as
Luther's conception of the calling moved away from Paul's
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indifferent attitude toward the particular situation in
which Christians were called, so too did his estimation of
worldly activity in general. By the mid-1530 's, when he was
writing his lectures on Genesis, Luther had come to
revaluate life on earth, and saw more to earthly activity
than the mere satisfaction of necessity; it was something
joyful, to be enjoyed. And for his part, Calvin also
rejected advice such as that of the early Luther, and found
earthly activity to be enjoyable, within moderation of
course
.
The point I want to stress, however, is not just that
Luther and Calvin came to see earthly life as something to
be enjoyed. Alongside this evaluation, there also occurred
in the thought of these reformers an intensification of that
contempt for earthly life which I identified earlier, in
challenging Arendt 1 s interpretation of Christianity. What I
want to stress, therefore, is neither the less severe side
of Luther's and Calvin's evaluation of earthly life, nor
their contempt for such life. I want to emphasize the
intensified ambivalence of their thought. The ambivalence
of these reformers was not an indifferent, either this way
or that, attitude, as one might expect from the current
usage of this word; their ambivalence was an emphatic this
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way and that.
In Luther's thought, this ambivalence is found quite
distinctly in his lectures on that section of Genesis which
23
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I stressed in my argument with Arendt (i.e. Genesis 3:16-9)
in which God punishes Adam and Eve for eating from the t
of knowledge. On the one hand, Luther expounds upon th
punishments, and fills in the broad parameters which
established in the verses themselves. For instance, in
regard to woman's punishment (verse 16) Luther claims that
"Eve's sorrows, which she would not have had if she had not
fallen into sin, are to be great, numerous, and of various
kinds." 40 Woman's punishment is not just the increased pain
in childbirth, which is mentioned in the verse, but also th
"severe and sundry ailments" listed by Luther, which women
may suffer throughout pregnancy, 41 as well as the "various
dangers" a woman encounters "during all the rest of her
life, while she devotes herself to her children." 42
And besides the procreative dimension of the
punishment, Eve, who prior to her sin "was very free and
.
was in no respect inferior to her husband," 43 became
subject to his rule. Compared to the husband, who "rules
the home and the state, wages wars, defends his possessions
tills the soil, builds, plants, etc.", "[t]he woman . . .
is like a nail driven into the wall." 44 Ultimately, of
course, after a life full of such punishments, Eve, like
Adam, had to die, at least in the flesh. 45
Now on the other hand, despite this grim portrayal of
the earthly life of woman, Luther also claims that Eve's
punishment was "truly happy and joyful." 46 And this is not
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just because God made it possible for her to attain eternal
life through this punishment, although this undoubtedly is
the most joyful aspect of earthly life for Luther. But even
on earth, the life of woman is joyful. in her punishment,
Eve sees that
she is not being deprived of the blessing ofprocreation, which was promised and granted beforesin. She sees that she is keeping her sex andthat she remains a woman. She sees that she isnot being separated from Adam to remain alone andapart from her husband. She sees that she maykeep the glory of motherhood. 47
Furthermore, motherhood is joyful not just for women,
but for men as well. Part of the glory of motherhood,
claims Luther, "is that we are all nourished, kept warm, and
carried in the womb of our mothers; that we nurse at their
breasts and are protected by their effort and care." 48
Expressing his personal enjoyment of motherhood, Luther
writes: "To me it is often a source of great pleasure and
wonderment to see that the entire female body was created
for the purpose of nurturing children. How prettily even
little girls carry babies on their bosom." 49
For Luther, therefore, motherhood was both a punishment
and a blessing, a sign of God's wrath and of his mercy, a
source of guilt and hope. Luther displayed a similar
ambivalence in regard to Adam's punishment (verses 17-9).
But here, Luther not only expands the list of punishments,
as he did with Eve's, but claims that they have gotten more
severe since the time of Adam. Luther points out that
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according to Genesis, Adam had only to contend with the mis-
fortunes of "thorns, thistles, and hard work"" i„ providing
food for the household.
o^L"°
W
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arn from e*Perience that countlessthers have been added. How many kinds of damaaeand how many diseases affect the crops? ?he plantsand the trees, and finally everything that th*earth produces! Furthermore, frosts?Ughtningbolts injurious dews, storms, overflowing riverssettling of the ground, earthquakes - all dodamage
.
That the list of calamities which could befall a farmer
had increased since Adam's time, Luther interpreted as a
consequence of man's increasing corruption and seduction by
Satan. Luther claimed to be "fully of the opinion that
because of the increase of sins the punishments were also
increased and that these troubles were added to the curse of
the earth." 52 But it was not just the increase in the
variety of disasters which convinced Luther that the world
was becoming more depraved. Luther also believed that
farmers in his day experienced "more frequent disasters to
crops than in former times," and that this was another
indication that "[t]he world [was] deteriorating from day to
day. " 53
One might imagine that the subjection of Eve, while
being a punishment for women, was a blessing for men, but
Luther interprets this subjection as a punishment for both
sexes. The husband's rule over his wife and the household
"cannot be carried on without the utmost difficulties." 54
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And as was the case with the agricultural burdens which were
placed upon man, Luther claims that the tasks of
"supporting, defending, and ruling over his own
. are
far more difficult in our age than they were in the
beginning." 55 This was due, of course, to the increasing
"perversity of people."
On the one hand, therefore, Luther saw the life of the
common householder as being a sign of man's condemnation by
God. All his activity bears witness to man's fall. As
Luther puts it:
whenever we see thorns and thistles, weeds and
other plants of that kind in a field and in thegarden, we are reminded of sin and the wrath ofGod as though by special signs. Not only in the
churches, therefore, do we hear ourselves charged
with sin. All the fields, yes, almost the entire
creation is full of such sermons, reminding us of
our sin and of God's wrath, which has been aroused
by our sin.
But on the other hand, just a few pages later in his
lecture, Luther claims that although farmers "are plagued
with hard labor, that labor is seasoned with matchless
pleasure, as daily the new and wonderful sight of the
creatures impresses itself upon their eyes." 57 The life of
the husband, therefore, like the life of the wife, is at
once both a reminder of man's fall from grace and a source
of pleasure.
Luther's ambivalence in regard to the punishment of
man, however, is not as clearly drawn as his ambivalence
toward motherhood. At that point in his lecture where
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Luther remarks about the "matchless pleasure" of farm life,
he was attempting to justify the lives of princes and
pastors, which seem to be free from the "sweat of the brow"
of the husband. Luther points out the enjoyable side of
farm life in order to make his case for the difficulty of
the life of the ruler or pastor. These latter occupations
do not have such pleasures as the farmer does, and their
labor is even more difficult. Luther goes so far as to
claim that "[i]n one single day these people work and sweat
more than a farmer does in an entire month, if you consider
the vastness of their work and its dangers." 58 Then Luther
distinguishes princes and pastors, and claims that his own
calling is the most difficult of all. "The hard work in
connection with a household is great; greater is that
connected with the state; and greatest is that in connection
with the church." 59
Given this particular context, one would not expect
Luther to dwell upon the pleasurable aspects of the lives of
rulers and pastors. This would weaken his argument that
such persons should be supported by taxes and tithes, and
should not have to perform physical labor for their
livelihood. 60 Overall, however, Luther's interpretation of
Adam's and Eve's punishment is one which stresses that
earthly life is both a reminder of man's depravity and
sinfulness, and is also something God gave men "to enjoy." 61
Luther expounds upon the punishments which God inflicted
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upon men and women in their earthly lives, but he also takes
pains to point out the pleasurable, enjoyable aspects of
earthly life. At the beginning of his lecture on Genesis
3:16-9, Luther emphasizes that the "godly" must not despair
at the severity of mortal life but must turn "'to the
outside what is beautiful.'" This "means not merely looking
at what is evil but delighting in God's gifts and blessings
and also burying the punishments, annoyances, pains, griefs,
and other things." 62
Although Luther's polemics may have hindered him
somewhat in turning to the outside the delightful features
of earthly life, this was not the case with Calvin.
Calvin's ambivalence towards earthly life took a different
form than Luther's. Whereas Luther developed and expanded
the punitive dimension of mortal life, Calvin spent time
discussing the various enjoyments of that life. But, of
course, Calvin did not neglect the darker side of life on
earth.
Calvin recognized that human life, since Adam's and
Eve's fall from grace, was plagued by various scourges and
calamities, but he did not interpret these vexations as a
sign that mankind was becoming increasingly depraved. There
are none of Luther's eschatological premonitions in Calvin's
interpretation of man's punishments. For Calvin, these
punishments were not a sign that another disaster, on the
order of the biblical Deluge, was in store for man, as they
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63were for Luther. Instead, Calvin saw in the many
vexations and annoyances of life God's reminder to men that
the things of this life on earth were uncertain and
fleeting. Describing God's response to the folly of men,
Calvin writes:
S SPrSi t?e Wh°le SOUl ' ensnared by allurementsof the flesh, seeks its happiness on the earth.To meet this disease, the Lord makes his people
sensible of the vanity of the present life, bv aconstant proof of its miseries. Thus, that they
may not promise themselves deep and lasting peacein it, he often allows them to be assailed by wartumult, or rapine, or to be disturbed by otherinjuries ... by diseases and dangers he setspalpably before them how unstable and evanescent
are all the advantages competent to mortals. 64
In order for Christians to keep their attention on the
eternal, truly happy life which awaits them in heaven, they
must refrain from becoming too deeply involved with the
affairs of earth. Calvin's advice to Christians in this
regard is not to become indifferent to earthly life, to be
able to either accept the things of this world or let them
go, as the early Luther, following Paul, had advised;
instead, he takes a much stronger position. Calvin claims
"that our mind never rises seriously to desire and aspire
after the future, until it has learned to despise the
present life." 65 For Calvin, "there is no medium between
the two things: the earth must either be worthless in our
estimation, or keep us enslaved by an intemperate love of
it."66
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Given these rather extreme statements, one might expect
that Calvin would have adopted the early Luther's
distinction between pleasure and necessity, or the
Augustinian distinction between use and enjoyment (see
footnote 17), and recommended that Christians limit their
involvement in earthly life to necessity only. But Calvin
rejects such a recommendation as being "unnecessarily
austere," 67 and in his rejection, appears to contradict his
earlier claim that "there is no medium between" the
worthlessness of life and the enslavement to it. in the
chapter immediately following the one in which the claim
against a medium was made, Calvin writes:
For if we are to live, we must use the necessary
supports of life; nor can we even shun those
things which seem more subservient to delight than
to necessity. We must therefore observe a mean,
that we may use them with a pure conscience,
whether for necessity or for pleasure. 68
So on one hand, Calvin says that in order to avoid
becoming enthralled by earthly pleasures, there can be no
mean; life on earth must be worthless to Christians. On the
other hand, he says that earthly delights can not be
avoided, so Christians must strike a mean between necessity
and pleasure. If Calvin had left things as they stand here,
one could explain the apparent contradiction of these claims
about earthly life by pointing out that the former claim
establishes an ideal, while the latter claim is made in a
spirit of concession to reality. Ideally, Christians should
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be contemptuous of life on earth, but since such a life does
have its fleeting pleasures and delights, Christians should
strive to maintain a balance in their enjoyment of things of
this life.
But Calvin does not leave things as they stand here.
He does more than simply concede that earthly life is
pleasurable; he points out how all creation is intended to
be pleasurable to man. "'There is not one little blade of
grass, there is no color in this world that is not intended
to make men rejoice, '» 69 claims Calvin. Consequently,
Christians are "'are not only to be spectators in this
beautiful theater but to enjoy the vast bounty and variety
of good things which are displayed to us in it.'" 70
As a guiding principle for such enjoyment of earthly
things, Calvin suggests that Christians "refer them to the
end for which their author made and destined them, since he
created them for our good, and not for our destruction. 1,71
He then gives some examples to elucidate this point:
Now then, if we consider for what end he created
food, we shall find that he consulted not only for
our necessity, but also for our enjoyment and
delight. Thus in clothing, the end was, in
addition to necessity, comeliness and honour; and
in herbs, fruits, and trees, besides their various
uses, gracefulness of appearance and sweetness of
smell.
Given this attitude toward pleasure, Calvin can hardly
be considered an extreme ascetic, and in fact, he described
as "inhuman" that philosophy which would restrict man's
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earthly activity to the satisfaction of necessity alone. 73
Therefore, the severe "worldly asceticism" of the Puritans,
which Weber emphasizes in The Protean* and which T
will discuss later in this chapter, can not be derived from
Calvin's teachings on earthly pleasures. Weber acknowledges
this in a footnote. 74
But Calvin, of course, was no hedonist, either.
Christians should enjoy food and drink, fine clothes and
flowers, and all other things which please the senses, 75 but
such enjoyment should never be carried to the point where it
distracts them from a pious concern for the true, eternal
happiness which is promised to Christians, or from the
fulfillment of one's calling. 76 Here, too, Calvin offers
some advice for "curbing licentious abuse" of earthly
pleasures: "There is no surer or quicker way of
accomplishing this than by despising the present life and
aspiring to celestial immortality." 77
While this advice may appear to be another
contradiction within Calvin's thought - in that his advice
amounts to telling Christians to enjoy life's pleasures, but
to curb excesses by despising this life - I prefer not to
describe this antinomy as such. At least since Hegel, the
idea of a contradiction seems to imply the immanent
resolution of the tension involved therein, but for Calvin,
as for Luther, the tension between the enjoyment of, and the
contempt for, life on earth was to be maintained. Both
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these reformers rejected the asceticism of monastic orders,
which can be interpreted as one route for eliminating such
tension. Instead, they heightened the tension between these
two attitudes toward earthly life, Luther by drawing out the
dark, punitive dimension of that life, while nonetheless
insisting on "turning to the outside what is beautiful," and
Calvin by indicating how pleasing all of creation was meant
to be, while insisting that Christians despise earthly
life. 78 As I have already indicated, I prefer to describe
this tension by the term ambivalence.
Having pointed out both the ambivalence of Luther's and
Calvin's attitudes toward earthly life, as well as the
disciplinary nature of their conceptions of the calling, I
can now pick up Weber's argument relating Protestantism,
specifically Puritanism, and capitalism. Eventually, of
course, I will return to these points, and situate them in
regard to Weber's argument. But first, I must discuss
another of Calvin's doctrines - predestination - the one
which Weber claims was the "most characteristic dogma" of
Calvinism. 79 The doctrine of predestination is crucial to
the relation between Protestantism and capitalism which
Weber tries to establish in The Protestant Ethic . In the
Institutes
. Calvin describes this doctrine as follows:
By predestination we mean the eternal decree of
God, by which he determined with himself whatever
he wished to happen with regard to every man. All
are not created on equal terms, but some are
preordained to eternal life, others to eternal
damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been
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°ther of these en<*s, we saythat he has been predestinated to life or death. 80
This doctrine did not originate with Calvin. m his
letter to the Ephesians, Paul had expressed the idea that
God, "before the foundation of the world," chose those who
would be saved, 81 and to the Romans, Paul wrote, "For whom
He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the
image of His Son." 82 Although the letter to the Ephesians,
as well as the above quote from Romans, refer only to the
predestination of those who were saved, Paul does give some
indication in his letter to the Romans that others were
predestined to damnation. At least he leaves open this
possibility: "What if God, although willing to demonstrate
His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much
patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? And he
did so in order that he might make known the riches of His
glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared before hand
for glory
. . .
"
83 Paul almost seems to suggest that the
predestination of those who are saved required the
predestination of those who are damned, so that there would
be a contrast. In any case, Calvin interprets Paul's
statements on predestination as including both those who are
saved and those who are damned. I will return to this
feature of predestination shortly.
Another important feature of this doctrine, one which
Weber emphasizes, is that it effectively places the
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salvation of an individual beyond the influence of that
individual or the church. God determined whether one would
be saved or damned before he ever created man, and there was
nothing that one could do to alter this situation. Calvin
insisted that one was predestined by God "according to the
good pleasure of his will. ..." And "[w]herever this
good pleasure of God reigns, no good works are taken into
account." 84 Paul expressed this gratuitous dimension of the
doctrine of predestination in his letter to the Romans, 85
and Augustine, writing in the fifth century, also insisted
that the salvation of the elect was gratuitous. 86 But in
the course of those years in which the Roman Catholic Church
established itself as the dominant religion of the Western
world, the idea that there was nothing that one could do to
attain salvation became buried under the proliferation of
sacraments, some of which served as steps one could take to
ensure one's salvation (e.g. penance and extreme unction).
Protestantism, of course, rejected most of these
sacramental developments, and Calvin's conception of
gratuitous predestination was, in some sense, a weapon to be
used in this struggle with the Catholic Church. For
example, Calvin was sharply critical of the sacrament of
penitence as it was established by the "schoolmen." Calvin
did believe that repentance for one's sins was an important
part of a Christian life, and claimed that "it is certain
that no man can embrace the grace of the Gospel without
betaking himself from the errors of his former life into the
right path, and making it his whole study to practise
repentance." 87 But according to the Catholic sacrament of
penitence, repentance had to follow a particular, tripartite
formula, and had to be performed on a regular basis.
First, the sinner had to be deeply sorrowful for his
sins; that is, he had to be contrite.
88 Secondly, the
sinner had to orally confess all of his sins to a priest, at
least once a year. 89 And finally, the sinner had to perform
some "satisfaction of works" for those sins.
90 Although
Calvin rails at length against each of these elements of the
sacrament of penitence (especially the priestly arrogation
of the exclusive role of confessor) , I need only focus on
his criticism of the practice of satisfaction to indicate
the conflict between this sacrament and the doctrine of
predestination.
The repentant performed satisfaction for their sins in
various manners: prayers, fastings, gifts to the church
or
to the poor, or other charitable works could be
required.
Besides these forms of satisfaction arose the
practice of
purchasing indulgences. According to this practice,
one
could buy from the church a pardon for the
satisfaction that
one had to perform. Calvin, of course was
thoroughly
revolted by this crass practice, in which
"the salvation of
the soul [was] made the subject of a lucrative
traffic,
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salvation taxed at a few pieces of money, nothing given
gratuitously.
"
However, the selling of indulgences was, for Calvin,
only the most obvious form of the blasphemy which the church
had committed by requiring satisfaction to be performed for
sins. The very idea of satisfaction being required for
forgiveness amounted to the purchase of salvation. Calvin
summarizes the papal attitude toward this element of
penitence as follows:
They say that it is not sufficient for the
penitent to abstain from past sins, and change his
conduct for the better, unless he satisfy God for
what he has done; and that there are many helps by
which we may redeem sins, such as tears, fastings,
oblations, and offices of charity; that by them
the Lord is to be propitiated; by them the debts
due to divine justice are to be paid; by them our
faults are to be compensated; by them pardon is to
be deserved. 92
According to the doctrine of predestination, however, the
forgiveness of sins is free, gratis. It is not just that
one does not have to pay for one's sins to be forgiven; one
can not pay. "Assuredly," insists Calvin, "divine grace
would not deserve all the praise of election, were not
election gratuitous; and it would not be gratuitous, did God
in electing any individual pay regard to his future
works. " 93
Besides flying in the face of the doctrine of
predestination, as interpreted by Calvin, the Catholic
practice of performing satisfaction was also an insult to
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the honor of Christ, the son of God. Those whom God
predestined to eternal life were saved by Christ, "the Lamb
of God, who takes away the sins of the world.- 94 Calvin
emphasizes the import of this greeting which John the
Baptist offered to Christ: "He [Christ] takes them [sins]
away, and no other; that is, since he alone is the Lamb of
God, he alone is the offering for our sins; he alone is
expiation; he alone is satisfaction." 95 To assume that the
works or satisfactions performed by men, or the indulgences
which were purchased from the church, have anything to do
with the forgiveness of sins, upon which salvation depends,
is both an effrontery to the honor of Christ, 96 as well as a
challenge to God's gratuitous predestination of man.
Of course it was not just the sacrament of penance
which suffered at the hands of Calvin. The doctrine of
predestination, when carried to its logical conclusion,
seemed to undermine the importance which the Catholic Church
attributed to the sacraments in general. The position which
the mature Church took in regard to the sacraments is
exemplified in the writing of Thomas Aquinas, who wrote in
the thirteenth century. In his Summa Theologica
. Aquinas
recognized seven sacraments, and argued that these
sacraments were necessary for salvation. Aquinas'
syllogistic reasoning on this matter runs as follows:
Augustine says: 'It is impossible to keep men
together in one religious denomination, whether
true or false, except they be united by means of
visible signs or sacraments. ' But it is necessary
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for salvation that men be united together in thename of the one true religion. Therefore
sacraments are necessary for man's salvation. 97
Aquinas also taught that the sacraments were "instituted by
God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace." 98
Although Calvin does not address Aquinas explicitly in
regard to the issue of the sacraments, he does challenge
those teachings mentioned above. To begin with, Calvin
recognizes only two of the Church's seven sacraments -
baptism and eucharist - and spends one of the last chapters
of the Institutes denying the legitimacy "of the Five
Sacraments, falsely so called." 99
But even the two sacraments which Calvin recognized
were not necessary for salvation. "[A]ssurance of
salvation," writes Calvin, "does not depend on participation
in the sacraments, as if justification consisted in it.
This, which is treasured up in Christ alone, we know to be
communicated, not less by the preaching of the Gospel than
by the seal of a sacraments, and may be completely enjoyed
without this seal." 100 And as for the teaching that grace is
conferred by the sacraments, Calvin replies, "[t]hey confer
nothing." 101
Even though Luther, along with Calvin, professed the
doctrine of predestination, Weber indicates that the
doctrine waned in importance for Luther "the more his
position as responsible head of his Church forced him into
• • • 102practical politics." For Calvin, however, the doctrine
256
assumed a central role as his teaching developed. This
difference helps to explain why Calvin broke more cleanly
with the Catholic Church and its sacraments than did
Luther. 103 According to Weber, Luther maintained that God's
saving grace could be lost through sin, and "won again by
penitent humility and faithful trust in the Word of God and
in the sacraments." 10* on the other hand, Calvin, who clung
firmly to the doctrine of predestination, rejected the
possibility of either losing or recovering grace.
Consequently, claims Weber, the practice of private
confession disappeared "from all the regions of fully
developed Calvinism." 105
For Weber, the disappearance of this sacrament was "an
occurrence of the greatest importance. ... The means to a
periodical discharge of the emotional sense of sin was done
away with." 106 Weber's point, as I read him, is that this
emotional energy which had been discharged in, or generated
and regulated by, the sacrament of confession, could now be
focused in a different direction by Calvinists. But there
is more to the doctrine of predestination than the
gratuitousness of salvation, and the corresponding challenge
to the Catholic sacraments. There is another important
element of Calvin's doctrine of predestination which must be
mentioned here, what might be called the gratuitousness of
damnation. This other dimension of predestination posed its
own particular threat to Catholic doctrine, and generated
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its own emotional energy distinct from the guilt for
sin.
It was this element of the doctrine of predestination,
not
the gratuitousness of salvation, which seems to
have most
troubled the Catholic Church.
For despite the implicit antagonism between the
idea of
gratuitous salvation and the Catholic attitude
toward the
sacraments, the Church nevertheless accepted
the doctrine of
predestination, particularly the idea of gratuitous
salvation. Aquinas, who a few paragraphs
ago was cited to
indicate the importance which Catholic
theology placed on
the sacraments, can also be used to
present the Church's
view of the doctrine of predestination.
The following
quote, like those above concerning
the sacraments, is from
Aquinas' Summa Thp-oloaica:
Spl^^e^ P&XZX Skeins of
lit mercy, in sparing them; and in
respect of
others! who, ^reprobates, by means
of His
iofeTor ^oraf/rlpr^tes-otbers has no
reason
except the divine will.
in the above passage, Aquinas,
the "angelic Doctor" of
Catholicism, sounds somewhat like
Calvin, the heretic. Both
agree that salvation is
predestined for some, and that it
depends on the goodness and mercy
of God. of course, for
Aquinas to profess this
element of predestination and
also
claim that the sacraments were
necessary for salvation, he
had to resort to some
rhetorical maneuvers to get
around the
conflict between these ideas.
For Calvin, such maneuvers
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were nothing more than sophistical subterfuges, and h
attacked them as such.™ What I want to stress, however, is
not the way the Catholic Church accommodated these
problematic ideas, or the way Calvin sought to upset that
accommodation; instead I want to point out that element of
the doctrine of predestination that the Catholic Church
could not accept.
The above quote from Aquinas gives some indication of
the exclusion that I want to emphasize. in that quote,
Aquinas uses the term predestination in reference only to
the saved; the term reprobation is used in regard to the
damned. For Aquinas, predestination does not include those
who are not saved; reprobation, as something distinct from
predestination, is the source of their damnation. This
distinction is made more clearly in the following quote, and
its implications are more fully drawn out by Aquinas (and
myself)
:
Thus, as predestination is a part of providence,
in regard to those divinely ordained to eternal
'
salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence
in regard to those who turn aside from that end.
.
. .
Therefore, as predestination includes the
will to confer grace and glory, so also
reprobation includes the will to permit a person
to fall into sin
r
to impose the punishment of
damnation on account of that sin .™9 (emphasis
added)
As I have tried to indicate through my underlining,
predestination, without merit, belongs only to the saved;
upon them grace and glory are conferred; they are ordained
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to eternal salvation. The damned, on the other hand, turn
aside from eternal salvation; God permits them to fall into
sin, but does not ordain that they do so. And they are
punished on account, or because, of their sin.
Aquinas, in other words, lets God off the hook for the
damnation of the non-elect, and shifts responsibility to the
damned themselves. Ultimately, of course, it is God's will
which permits them to sin, but the damned earn their
damnation through their sins. The responsibility which is
established by this distinction between predestination and
reprobation can be interpreted as the general, broad form of
that specific responsibility which was institutionalized by
the Church in the sacrament of confession. (in order to be
forgiven by the priest, you had to be responsible for your
sins.) Although yearly confessions to a priest were not
required by the Church until the thirteenth century, 110 the
Catholic rejection of the gratuitousness of damnation did
not begin with Aquinas.
As I indicated earlier, Paul, in his letter to the
Romans, can be read as including both the saved and the
damned under the notion of predestination. (See p. 250)
Calvin read him in this manner, as will be shown, but so did
Augustine, one of the earliest defenders of the Catholic
Church. Augustine believed that the majority of men were
predestined to damnation, 111 and borrowed Paul's imagery of
the "vessels of wrath" to explain this point.
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n0t ° f this number [of theelect], who are of the same mass as these buthave been made vessels of wrath, are born' fortheir advantage. God creates nine of them rlshlv
b°e
rS» He also knows what
And, according to Augustine, those predestined to
damnation were so not on account of their particular sins,
or because of their personal turning away from salvation.
God does not damn them because he knows in advance that they
will sin after they have been born. 113 The damned, like the
saved, were chosen in the same manner in which God chose
between the twins Jacob and Esau (see footnote 85); that is,
before they were born, without regard to their future
deeds. 114 This is not to say that damnation, like salvation,
was completely gratuitous, however. Whenever Augustine
discusses the predestination of the damned, he does indeed
raise the issue of merit or responsibility, but not in
regard to individual sinners. Rather, it is Adam, the first
sinner (actually, the second)
, who ultimately bears the
responsibility for damnation.
For example, Augustine says that if one were to
understand God's judgments, one would see "that the whole
human race was condemned in its rebellious head by so just a
divine judgment, that if no one were to be freed from it, no
one could rightly blame the justice of God." 115 The head
which Augustine is referring to here is Adam. And again, in
reference to the lesson of Jacob and Esau, Augustine points
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out that both, initially, were damned by God "through n
deeds of their own to be sure, but as bound by the chain of
condemnation originating in Adam." 116 All men are bound by
this chain before they are born, and some are destined to
pardoned through God's merciful grace. But in regard t
those who are not saved, they have not earned their
damnation; they are predestined to damnation through the sin
of Adam. 117
Even though Augustine defended the justice of God in
his doctrine of predestination, by placing responsibility
for man's punishment on Adam, and explicitly rejected one of
the doctrine's logical, yet troubling, conclusions (i.e.
that sinners should not be admonished or punished, since
they may have been predestined to be among the damned 118 ) ,
Augustine's doctrine nevertheless became a source of
conflict within the Church during the century following his
death. 119 The semi-Pelagians, who tried to strike a
compromise between the conflicting teachings of Pelagius and
Augustine, rejected the doctrine of double predestination,
that is, that both the saved and the damned were pre-
destined. 120 During the second half of the fifth century,
the semi-Pelagians were successful in having the doctrine of
double predestination condemned by regional synods,
particularly in Gaul, or France. 121 But it was at the second
Council of Orange, in 529, that the idea of predestined
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damnation was effectively banished from accepted Church
dogma
.
Overall, Augustinianism fared much better than semi-
Pelagianism did at this official proclamation of church
teachings; the twenty-five propositions or canons to which
the members of the Council subscribed were drawn largely
from the writings of Augustine himself. 122 But in the five-
point creed which the signatories added to the document, the
Augustinian doctrine of predestination, or at least the
disturbing half of it, was excluded from the Church's
official theology. Actually, only two of the five points
were involved in this mutation. After indicating how Adam's
sin weakened the will of men, so that none thereafter could
love God in a suitable manner, the creed continues:
b) All, however, are able, after they have
received grace through baptism, with the co-
operation of God, to accomplish what is necessary
for the salvation of their soul.
c) It is in no way our belief that some are
predestinated by God to evil (predestination
heresy)
; rather, if there are any who believe a
thing so evil, we, with horror, say anathema. 123
(parenthesis in Clark's translation)
According to this creed, none are predestined by God to
evil, that is, God does not predestine some to commit sins.
For the opponents of Augustine's doctrine of predestination
had claimed that it rendered God the author of evil. 12A This
misrepresentation of Augustine's teachings was explicitly
rejected by the Council of Orange, but the Council also
implicitly rejected the Augustinian claim that some are
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predestined to damnation in general (as distinguished from
the predestination to commit particular sins)
. According t
the Council's creed, salvation was available to all men.
Salvation still depended on God's grace, as it did for
Augustine, but that grace appears to be available to all
men. No one need suffer eternal damnation.
While the Council's creed rejects one half of the
doctrine of double predestination, it does not mention
single predestination, that is, predestination to salvation
at all. in fact, the idea that all are able to accomplish
what is necessary for salvation would appear to leave littl
room for even such a restricted doctrine of predestination:
if all can attain salvation, and salvation is predestined,
does this mean all are predestined to salvation? Of course
not. Someone has to suffer; there have to be some vessels
of wrath (predestined or not) which allow God's mercy to be
merciful. (See p. 250) However, the creed does mention
that God's co-operation is necessary for salvation, so it i
conceivable that such co-operation is predestined, although
the Council never made this claim. But even if it had,
this, in turn, would have raised the question as to whether
all were indeed able to attain salvation.
But despite this apparent incongruity of the ideas of
universally available salvation and single predestination,
the Catholic Church did retain both of these ideas, as is
exemplified in the teachings of Aquinas. 125 And while such
264
combination appears to be logically unharmonious
, the creed
of the Council of Orange and Aquinas' limited concept of
predestination actually fit together quite nicely. The
Council's rejection of predestined damnation, in a sense,
paved the way for Aquinas' later predestination/reprobation
distinction. For the obverse of the rejection of
predestined damnation, is that those who are not saved are
responsible for their damnation. If all can be saved, and
none are predestined to damnation, then who but the sinner
can be responsible for damnation? This responsibility, it
will be recalled, was at the heart of Aquinas' distinction,
according to which the reprobated were not predestined, but
were punished for their own sins.
In this light, Aquinas' predestination/reprobation
distinction can be interpreted as a late form of
Catholicism's moderation of Augustine's doctrine. Those
with Nietzschean sensibilities, perhaps, can appreciate the
way the Council of Orange's mitigation of the severity of
Augustine's predestination came around in the thirteenth
century as the burden of responsibility, in the forms of
Aquinas' distinction and mandatory confessions.
The teachings of the Council of Orange, with their
predominantly Augustinian bent, were quite influential in
the development of medieval theology, 126 but they also mark
the point where the Church abandoned Augustine's idea of
predestined damnation. It was against this long-standing
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position of the Catholic Church that Calvin threw himself
with all his weight. To those who urged that the doctrine
of predestination, as developed in Paul's letters and
Augustine's literary artillery, was too troubling and
dangerous a doctrine to merit widespread discussion, Calvin
replied:
There is nothing in the allegation that the wholesubject is fraught with danger to pious minds, astending to destroy exhortation, shake faithdisturb and dispirit the heart. Augustine 'disguises not that on these grounds he was often
charged with preaching the doctrine of
predestination too freely
. . . Those, however
who are so cautious and timid that they would bury
all mention of predestination in order that it may
not trouble weak minds, with what colour, pray,
will they cloak their arrogance, when theyindirectly charge God with a want of due
consideration, in not having foreseen a danger for
which they imagine that they prudently provide. 127
Calvin insisted not only that the doctrine of
predestination be taught, but that it be taught in its
entirety; he rejected the truncated version of the Catholic
Church, which limited predestination to election only, and
denied that some are predestined for reprobation. 128 For
Calvin, the damned do not earn their damnation through their
sins, as the Council of Orange implied and Aquinas
maintained. Rather, they are predestined to damnation just
as the elect are predestined to salvation. In contradiction
of the Catholic Church's teaching that all can be saved and
none are irrevocably damned, Calvin claims: "All are not
created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal
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life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each
has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that
he has been predestinated to life or to death." 129
In pushing this point about the predestination of the
damned, Calvin is even more severe than Augustine.
Augustine, at least, interposed the responsibility of Adam
to mitigate the gratuitousness of damnation. Calvin,
however, does not offer this consolation. »[l]f we look for
the source of their ruin," writes Calvin, concerning the
damned, "we must ultimately come to this, that being cursed
by God, all they do, say, or intend, only furthers and
increases their curse. Yet, the cause of eternal rejection
is so hidden that there is nothing left for us to do but to
be amazed at the incomprehensible mind of God." 130 Calvin
also calls this ultimate question-mark the "secret" or
"hidden counsel of God." 131 And on the occasion when Calvin
actually offers some sort of answer to the question of man's
damnation, he is hardly more comforting: "Those . . . whom
God passes by he reprobates, and that for no other cause but
because he is pleased to exclude them from the inheritance
which he predestines to his children." 132
The severity of this teaching should be evident. Not
only are some damned, through no fault of their own, but
there is no explanation for why they are damned, other than
that their damnation pleases God. And not only is there no
comforting explanation available for those who are damned,
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but there is nothing that can be done about it. Man's deeds
have no bearing on his election to salvation, or his
predestination to damnation. This is the ''decretum
horribile" which Calvin taught. 133
As was the case with Augustine, Calvin's teachings on
predestination became a source of controversy after his
death, and were the subject of several synods. 134 But in
Calvin's case, the doctrine was not shorn of its sharp
edges, but was retained as a double decree which included
damnation. The statement of the doctrine which Weber cites
in The Protestant Ethic comes from the Westminster
Confession of 1647, the product of one of these synods.
This Confession not only states explicitly that some are
"foreordained to everlasting death," but at one point
claims, in direct opposition to the teachings of the
Catholic Church, "All those whom God hath predestined unto
life, and those only, He is pleased in His appointed and
accepted time effectually to call by His word and spirit
(out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by
nature)." 135 (emphasis added)
I mentioned earlier that the Calvinist elimination of
private confession was interpreted by Weber as a source of
emotional energy. The sense of guilt for sin was no longer
discharged in confession, and could be focused in a
different direction. (See p. 26) But the idea that some
were hopelessly, helplessly, and gratuitously damned
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question of man's salvation or damnation, and promised
immortality to those who followed its teachings and partici-
pated in its sacraments.
My point is that Calvin's doctrine of predestination
radically challenged this Catholic confidence in salvation,
and not just because the doctrine undermined the sacraments.
For Calvin, as for Augustine, most people were from the
start irrevocably denied the possibility of heavenly
immortality. And it was because of this dreadful dimension
of the doctrine, which threw salvation into doubt, that
predestination's "psychological effect was extraordinarily
powerful." 138 As Weber puts it, "The question, Am I one of
the elect? must sooner or later have arisen for every
believer and have forced all other interests into the
background. " 139
Calvin, apparently, had no doubt about his own
salvation, and suspected that true believers would have the
same confidence. He found it strange that "many who boast
of being Christians, instead of thus longing for death, are
so afraid of it that they tremble at the very mention of it
as a thing ominous and dreadful." 140 For Calvin, death was
not something to be avoided, either intellectually or
physically; instead, he taught that Christians should
"ardently long for death, and constantly meditate upon
it." Calvin's doctrine of predestination, I want to
suggest, was effective in getting people to focus upon their
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eventual death, even if it did not make them long for it.
The doctrine raised, in a very poignant way, the specter of
man's mortality. But according to Weber, most of Calvin's
followers were unable to attain, or maintain, his confidence
in heavenly immortality.
" [F]or the broad mass of ordinary
men
.
. .
" writes Weber, "the certitudo salutis in the
sense of the recognizability of the state of grace
necessarily became of absolutely dominant importance." 142
That is, they needed a sign of their salvation, and one was
provided in the form of the calling.
Earlier, I discussed the shift in attitude toward the
calling, from the indifference of Paul's first letter to the
Corinthians, to the disciplinary concern of the mature
Luther and Calvin. (See pp. 7-12) For both Luther and
Calvin, the idea of a calling came to be used as a tool for
maintaining order in the face of rebellious masses. But in
regard to the serious questions raised by the doctrine of
predestination, the idea of a calling became an instrument
of change.
In their responses to the anxiety the faithful had
concerning salvation, Calvinist ministers came to encourage
"intense worldly activity" as the most suitable means of
dispersing doubts about, and inspiring confidence in, one's
salvation. Weber describes this Puritanical attitude
toward earthly activity and its relation to the questions
raised by predestination, as follows:
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It was through the consciousness that his rthe
willed of God but rather done by God that heattained the highest good toward which thisreligion strove, the certainty of salvation 144(parenthesis in original) "
By the rigorous and conscientious performance of one's
earthly calling, one not only maintained the order which God
willed, as Luther and Calvin had taught, but one could
"increase" or "augment" the glory of God. 145 The greater the
success one had in performing one's calling, the greater the
glory of God which one accomplished through one's earthly
activity, and the surer one could be that one was of the
elect. For only one of the elect could have an "effectual
calling," one which was capable of augmenting "the glory of
God by real, not apparent, good works." 146
But it was not really success itself which was
important in regard to salvation. Rather, it was the fact
that one had organized one's life to serve the glory of God
which was truly important, that one's life "was thoroughly
rationalized in this world and dominated entirely by the aim
to add to the glory of God on earth." 147 Success happened to
follow upon such a dedicated, disciplined form of life, and
so was valuable as a sign, or proof, of one's election. At
this point I should note, as Weber does, that this attitude
toward success in one's calling, as providing proof of one's
predestination to salvation, was quite foreign to Calvin
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himself. calvin never wavered in his teaching that works
have nothing to do with salvation and damnation, and he
denied that works give any indication of God's "secret
counsel." 1- m fact, Calvin warned against attempts to
understand this realm of mystery, and taught that « [i]t is
not right that man should with impunity pry into things
which the Lord has been pleased to conceal within
himself. » 149
Nevertheless, this deviant use to which the Puritans
put the idea of the calling was, in Weber's eyes, of the
greatest economic significance. it was by ascribing to the
calling the important role of signifier of salvation, that
Calvinism was able to reclaim and redirect into economic
activity that emotional energy which Catholicism had
regulated through the sacraments. As individual believers
successfully performed their particular callings, not only
was their certainty of salvation confirmed and the glory of
God enhanced, but the productivity of the community was also
increased. This effect of the Puritanical use of the
calling is described in utilitarian terms by Weber: "The
specialization of occupations leads, since it makes the
development of skill possible, to a quantitative and
qualitative improvement in production, and thus serves the
common good. ,,15°
It was this promotion of the common good that provided
the basis for the distinction between real and apparent good
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works, and even for distinctions among effectual callings.
Those callings which were useful to the community were
pleasing to God, and those which were more useful than
others were more pleasing to, and more greatly glorified,
God. 151 According to Weber, the Puritan ministers were not
opposed to changes in callings, as long as the changes were
made in order to augment God's glory, that is, to increase
the productivity of the community. 152 Weber's claim is that
this dynamic conception of the calling, with its
specializing effect, helped to usher in the rationally
organized capitalism of modernity. This dynamism stands in
sharp contrast to what I termed the disciplinary, or as
Weber put it, "traditionalistic, •• conception of the calling
which Luther and Calvin employed to defend the old economic
order.
This is not to say that there was no disciplinary
dimension to the Puritanical conception of the calling,
however. As Luther's and Calvin's conceptions of the
calling were aimed, in part, to restrain the rebellious
activity of an expropriated peasantry, the Puritans'
conception of the calling was used to fit that same stratum
into the new economic order. For instance, Puritans
supported the brutal British poor laws which were mentioned
in the previous chapter (see endnote 107 of Chapter 4). 153
Even though the Puritans believed that not everyone was
predestined to salvation, they still believed, according to
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Weber, that "for everyone without exception God's Providence
has prepared a calling, which he should profess and in which
he should labor. God created everyone for his glory.
For those, such as vagabonds and beggars, who pursued no
calling, and were therefore a blight on the glory of God,
the Puritans favored the creation of workhouses, which could
instill the discipline which was required by the glory of
God and the capitalist economy. 155
Although the Puritanical notion of the calling as proof
of salvation may have been a great boon to the development
of modern capitalism, operating as it did to establish this
order on both the level of the Puritan entrepreneur and the
level of the undisciplined peasantry, the idea was
nonetheless an inherently dangerous one from the religious
perspective of Calvinism. For one thing, the idea that
proof of one's election could be provided by the successful
pursuit of one's calling came perilously close to the
Catholic Church's position that one could attain salvation
by good works on earth. 156 Although the Puritan ministers
insisted that such works were nothing more than an
indication of salvation, and that salvation in no way
depended on worldly success, there was always the danger
that among those anxious believers who accepted Calvin's
doctrine of predestination, such works would come to
outweigh faith in providing certainty of salvation. Instead
of bolstering the Calvinist's faith in his salvation,
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worldly success might come to replace that faith as a source
of certainty.
This notion of the calling as proof also posed another
threat to Calvinism, in that the success that attended the
disciplined, purposeful activity of the believer could
undermine that very discipline. The more successful, that
is, wealthy, the Puritan became in his calling, the greater
was the temptation and feasibility of living a leisurely,
comfortable life. Weber points out how Richard Baxter, the
Puritan minister upon whose writings he principally relies,
frequently warned against the accumulation of wealth. Weber
writes that for Baxter, "Wealth as such is a great danger;
its temptations never end, and its pursuit is not only
senseless as compared with the dominating importance of the
Kingdom of God, but it is morally suspect." 157
The primary objection which Puritan ministers such as
Baxter raised against wealth, was that it could lead to
"distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life," 158 that
is, a life devoted solely to the glorification of God.
According to Weber, the Puritan ministers were more
suspicious of wealth than was Calvin himself. 159 Given the
greater weight which those ministers placed upon worldly
activity, in comparison to Calvin, it is understandable that
they would be more concerned than he was with the dangers of
earthly success. And in response to this threat, which
followed upon their novel idea that salvation could be
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proven, Calvinist ministers were compelled to move even
farther away from Calvin's teachings. They developed what
Weber calls "worldly asceticism," something quite distinct
from the ambivalence to earthly life which Calvin (and
Luther) maintained.
Weber identifies two principal features of this
Puritanical asceticism. The first of these is the
prohibition against wasting time. For the Puritans, claims
Weber, »[w]aste of time is
. . . the first and in principle
the deadliest of sins." 160 Any time not spent performing
one's calling was wasted time, since that time could have
been spent in furthering the glory of God. For these
Puritans, time was "infinitely valuable because every hour
lost is lost to labour for the glory of God." 161 This
concern with time did not originate with the Puritans, but
arose instead among those other-worldly ascetics, the
Catholic monks. 162 And it was not even the Puritans who
first brought this monastic regulation of time out into the
worldly activity of men. 163 But it was the Puritans who
brought this concern with saving time to bear on worldly
activity in an ascetic manner.
Closely bound to the Puritans' concern with time was
the harsh attitude that the Puritans held toward earthly
pleasure. Weber writes that the worldly asceticism of the
Puritans "turned with all its force against one thing: the
spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to offer.",164
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The Puritans were suspicious of pleasurable activity in
general, claims Weber, and the "[impulsive enjoyment of
life, which leads away both from work in a calling and from
religion, was as such the enemy of rational asceticism." 165
This tendency of Puritanism is exemplified in the following
quote from Baxter, as is the close relation between this
suspicion of pleasure and the concern with saving time:
'Keep up a high esteem of time, and be every day
vou\rT^ ^ n y°U l0Se n°ne ° f ^Ur tim^' thanyou are that you lose none of your gold and
silver. And if vain recreation, dressings,
feastings, idle talk, unprofitable company, or
sleep be any of them temptations to rob you of anyof your time, accordingly heighten your
watchfulness.' 166
This distrustful attitude toward earthly activities
such as eating, dressing, and conversing is missing that
counterbalancing element which created a tension in Calvin's
teachings on the pleasures of this world. Calvin, who at
some points insisted on the utter worthlessness of earthly
life, at other points was able to claim that "[t]here is not
one little blade of grass, there is no color in the world
that is not intended to make men rejoice." (See p. 247) It
will be recalled that Calvin also argued that food was not
simply a necessity, but was also a source of "enjoyment and
delight," and that clothing was properly directed not toward
necessity alone, but to "comeliness and honour" as well.
I will return to this difference between the
Puritans and Calvin shortly, but first I must follow the
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last lines of Weber's argument. While this worldly
asceticism of the Puritans can be interpreted as a safeguard
against the dangers posed to righteousness by earthly
success, this asceticism nonetheless complemented the
beneficial effect which the Puritans' unique conception of
the calling had on capitalist development. While the
Puritan entrepreneur restlessly devoted himself to his
calling, in order to prove his election to salvation, he was
restrained from squandering his increasing wealth by
Puritanical asceticism. This asceticism, claims Weber,
"acted powerfully against the spontaneous enjoyment of
possessions; it restricted consumption, especially of
luxuries. " 167
At an early stage of capitalist development, such
limitations of consumption helped to further that
development. For "the inevitable practical result" of the
combination of asceticism and the idea of the calling as
proof, was the "accumulation of capital through ascetic
compulsion to save. The restraints which were imposed upon
consumption of wealth naturally served to increase it by
making possible the productive investment of capital." 168
But as was indicated earlier, in the discussion of
contemporary Marxist perspectives on consumption (Chapter
3) , capitalism would eventually require an augmentation of
consumption in order to absorb excess productive capacity.
(See discussion of Aglietta's perspective on pp. 102-13 of
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Chapter 3.) Although Weber, who wrote Th^rotestan^thlc
years before Henry Ford's production/consumption process
began to roll, does not deal explicitly with capitalism's
need to promote the consumption of commodities, he does
acknowledge that a shift from limitation to augmentation
of consumption had occurred in capitalism. m fact, the
requirement to consume is a principal element of Weber's
notion of the iron cage, which he introduced in the last few
pages of his text. The following long quote, in which the
idea of the cage is first mentioned, highlights precisely
this shift from the Puritanical restriction, to the modern
promotion, of consumption.
In Baxter's view the care for external goods
should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saintlike a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at
any moment'. But fate decreed that the cloak
should become an iron cage.
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the
world and to work out its ideals in the world,
material goods have gained an increasing and
finally an inexorable power over the lives of men
as at no previous period in history. 169
There is no doubt that, for Weber, the rationally
organized capitalism of modernity is a cage in part because
it offers no options but for people to take up their roles
in this economic order. As Weber puts it, "The Puritan
wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so." 170 But
that is not all there is to the cage. The concern with
"external" or "material" goods, the commodities which are
produced by this economic order, is the feature which Weber
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explicitly mentions in his discussion of the cage. The
Puritans' light cloak of material goods has become a cage
for modern men.
Although Weber acknowledges that the religious
asceticism of the Puritans, which limited consumption, "has
escaped from the cage," 171 he does not offer any explanation
for this escape. He brings up this issue of modern man's
enslavement to commodities, perhaps, just to point up the
difference between those conditions at the inception of the
modern period, upon which his text has focused, and the
situation in which he was writing, early in the twentieth
century. But I think that there is more to this difference
than mere contrast, and that Weber brought up the issue of
modern consumption and the cage at the end of his text in
order to leave the reader with a question. And although he
wrote that "fate decreed that the cloak should become an
iron cage," I do not think Weber raised the question of how
the cloak became a cage, only to leave off his questioning
with a reference to fate. That is, I do not think Weber
raises this question in the pious, humble sense in which
Augustine and Calvin raised the question of God's
predestination of men, as a sort of sacred question-mark
beyond which men should not venture. Instead, Weber raises
the question, as I read him, to provoke one to think about,
and attempt to answer, it. This is what I plan to do in
the
remainder of this chapter.
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To begin with, one must concede that any explanation of
the shift from the ascetic limitation of consumption to
modern fetishistic consumption must take into account the
needs of capitalism itself, as indicated by those Marxists I
examined in Chapter 3. Weber would most likely have been
willing to make such a concession. in the final paragraph
of The Protestant Ethir, Weber states that "it would also
further be necessary to investigate how Protestant
asceticism was in turn influenced in its development and its
character [and, I might add, its dissolution] by the
totality of social conditions, especially economic." 172 it
is not as clear, however, whether Weber would have been
willing to go so far as to concede that material conditions
outside the capitalistic production process must also be
taken into account, as I argued in Chapter 4. But in any
event, the line of inquiry I want to follow here, in regard
to the shift from limited to frenzied consumption, is the
one which Weber "traced" in his text, the one having to do
with religious ideas. I think one can tease an answer to
this question about consumption out of Weber's argument
itself, when Weber's argument about Protestantism is viewed
from a different, and somewhat broader, perspective.
The broader perspective I have in mind here is that of
Nietzsche, who was concerned not so much with the rise of
capitalism, but with the devolution of Christianity, or as
he would put it, the history of nihilism. Although this is
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just one among several important differences between
Nietzsche's and Weber's perspectives, to dwell on these
differences here would only further complicate and confuse
the argument I am trying to make. All I want to do is
indicate how the implicit question with which Weber closes
his argument in The Protestant Ethic, can be more clearly
seen, and therefore approached, when glimpsed from
Nietzsche's unique perspective. I must stress, however,
that this introduction of Nietzsche to Weber is without
doubt an extrapolation, and that I am, in a sense, forcing
Nietzsche to look more closely at Protestantism than he
himself was prone to do. Unlike Weber, Nietzsche was
disgusted, not fascinated, by Protestantism.
The first point I want to make about Nietzsche's
perspective on Protestantism, is that he recognized it as a
distinct stage in the decline of Christianity. In a note
written in 1887, Nietzsche describes Protestantism as
follows
:
Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and boring
form of decadence in which Christianity has been
able so far to preserve itself in the mediocre
north; valuable for knowledge as something complex
and a halfway house, in so far as it brought
together in the same heads experiences of
different orders and origins.
This idea of Protestantism as a halfway house on the decline
of Christianity is quite compatible with Weber's
interpretation of Protestantism, especially in regard to
2 8 3
Weber's insistence on the importance of the doctrine of
predestination.
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As I tried to emphasize in my elaboration of Weber'
remarks on predestination, Calvin's resurrection of thi
doctrine in the troubling, disturbing duality in which
Augustine had framed it, was a challenge to the confident
and complacency which were spawned by the sacramental
Church. Salvation was not only thrown into doubt, but
explicitly denied to the majority, according to the doctrine
as elaborated by Calvin and reiterated by those synods which
confirmed Calvin's teaching. (See p. 267) From Nietzsche's
perspective, Calvin's challenge to the Catholic Church's
long-standing rejection of the double decree can be
interpreted as an attempt to halt the decline of
Christianity, to revive that religious intensity which
accompanies the anxious concern with salvation. Calvin's
doctrine of predestination, I am suggesting, brought the
issue of the afterlife into sharp focus and held it before
men, and in this way could aid in rekindling religious
fervor. 174
I would also like to suggest that Luther's and Calvin's
ambivalence toward earthly life, which I earlier discussed
at some length (but which Weber himself does not develop)
,
can also be interpreted in terms of the halfway house. By
urging believers to both enjoy life and despise it, to see
in earthly life both God's creative majesty and his
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righteous chastisement, both of these reformers can be seen
as trying to heighten that tension within the Christian,
which had been weakened by Catholicism's increasing
tolerance of worldly activity. By attempting to retighten
the Christian ambivalence concerning life on earth, Luther
and Calvin were trying to make the Christian a more respon-
sive religious instrument, one which was closely tuned to
its involvement with the things of this world. I see this
heightened ambivalence of Luther and Calvin as another way
in which they tried to revive Christianity.
But what about the worldly asceticism of the Puritans,
which on Weber's account played an important role in the
development of modern capitalism? Does Nietzsche's
perspective on Protestantism have much to offer on this
feature of Protestantism? The initial answer to these
questions would have to be "Not explicitly." But a more
elaborate, interesting answer to these questions can be
provided. To do this, it will be necessary to draw out
Nietzsche even further, and to expound at some length what
appears to be nothing more than an incidental remark of
Nietzsche's. In one particular note, in which Nietzsche
criticizes German (i.e. Lutheran) Protestantism as being
stale, lazy, and comfortably relaxed, he says of
Protestantism, "A homoeopathy of Christianity is what I call
it." 175 Homoeopathy was a nineteenth-century medical
practice in which small doses of a poisonous drug were
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administered as a remedy for the sick. If administered to
the healthy, these drugs would produce the same symptoms as
those found in the sick. 176
Now while the note in which this remark about
homoeopathy occurs would appear to be quite incompatible
with any discussion of Protestant asceticism, since it
emphasizes the laziness and comfortableness of
Protestantism, and plays on the fact that homoeopathy uses
weak doses of drugs, I am going to argue that this idea of
Protestantism as homoeopathy is nevertheless helpful in
understanding worldly asceticism. One can get around the
initial obstacle which the context of Nietzsche's remark
poses to any discussion of asceticism by pointing out that
Nietzsche was referring in that note to German Lutheranism,
not the Calvinist Puritanism which Weber stressed. The
legitimacy of expanding Nietzsche's comment on homoeopathy
to this more austere form of Protestantism will become
apparent below.
This practice of religious homoeopathy was not
something peculiar to Protestantism. Although he does not
use this particular term to describe it, Nietzsche's account
of the activity of the "ascetic priest" in The Genealogy of
Morals provides a clear example of homoeopathy. In the
third essay of the Genealogy . Nietzsche emphasizes the
importance of asceticism for the priest; it is "the main
instrument of priestcraft, the supreme guarantee of their
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power." 177 Asceticism serves as a guarantee of priestly
Power, in that priests are the best examples of those who
live according to the ascetic ideals they espouse. "The
ascetic priest," claims Nietzsche, "is an incarnation of the
wish to be different," 1- and it is the difference which such
priests attain through their asceticism that gives them
their power. But asceticism is also the "main instrument of
priestcraft," and by this Nietzsche means that ascetic
ideals are employed by the priest in his ministerial
activity. it is here that the connection between asceticism
and homoeopathy becomes clear.
For Nietzsche, the priest serves a definite
medicinal function. "We must look upon the ascetic priest
as the predestined advocate and savior of a sick flock," 179
writes Nietzsche. And although he often refers to the
priest as a physician, ultimately Nietzsche rejects this
description. "It is scarcely correct to call him a
physician," Nietzsche says of the priest, "much as he likes
to see himself venerated as a savior. What he combats is
only the discomfort of the sufferer, not the cause of his
suffering, not even the condition of illness itself." 180 A
more accurate description of the ascetic priest would seem
to be that of a pharmacist, or druggist. "To be sure, he
carries with him balms and ointments." 181 And from
Nietzsche's perspective, it was Christian priests who
brought this pharmacological practice to its most highly
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developed form. of Christianity, Nietzsche writes, "Never
have so many restoratives, palliatives, narcotics been
gathered together in one place." 182
But these drugs can never result in a cure, because
they are poisons. » [E ]ven as he [the priest] alleviates the
pain of his patients," claims Nietzsche, "he pours poison
into their wounds." 183 Furthermore, in order to practice his
special skill, the priest "must first create patients," 184
and he does so by prescribing his poisonous drugs to the
otherwise healthy. So the homoeopathic activity of the
priest is not focused solely on the sick; he also strives to
gain the healthy as clients. For these reasons, Nietzsche
writes that "wherever the ascetic priest has been able to
enforce his treatment, the sickness has increased
alarmingly, both in breadth and depth." 185
In the Genealogy Nietzsche lists several of the
"medications" which are used by the homoeopathic priests to
create and treat their patients. Among the wide variety
which Nietzsche finds in the priestly "cabinet of hypnotic
186drugs," I would like to emphasize here just that the
ascetic ideals of the priest are part of this pharmacy.
Poverty, humility, and chastity, which Nietzsche identifies
in the Genealogy as the "three mighty slogans of the ascetic
• 1 87ideal," are described in an earlier note, as "dangerous
and slanderous ideals," and as "poisons." 188 But Nietzsche
recognizes the homoeopathic benefits of these ideals, and
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that "in the case of certain illnesses" these poisonous
ideals can be "indispensable as temporary cures." 189 S o
Nietzsche was not opposed to the homoeopathic use of
asceticism in general,™ it was just the way in which the
priests used it which really bothered him.
According to Nietzsche, asceticism is one of the many
things which was "ruined by the church's misuse of it." 191
For the Christian priests, asceticism was not a "temporary
cure;" it was a way of life. And this way of life was based
on a contempt for the body, the life processes, the
sensuous. in contrast to Arendt (but perhaps as one-
sidedly)
,
Nietzsche found that Christians "despised the
body; they left it out of account: more, they treated it as
an enemy." 192 Christians were characterized by a "contempt
for, and a deliberate desire to disregard the demands of the
body." 193 For them, "[suffering, struggle, work, death are
considered as objections and question marks against life, as
something that ought not to last; for which one requires a
cure." 194 That cure, of course, is Christian asceticism; the
homoeopath's practice is thereby securely established. The
upshot of this use of asceticism is that "at last a pale,
sickly, idiotically fanatical creature was thought to be
perfection;" 195 and sickness triumphed over health.
To turn now to that specifically Protestant asceticism,
which so interested Weber, it should be obvious that
Nietzsche could not have held it in very high esteem. And
sm
r
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since Nietzsche did not have much to say about Protestanti
generally, much less about Calvinist Protestantism, it is
tempting to simply treat worldly asceticism as just anothe
weak, dilute feature of that "spiritually unclean and
boring" form of Christianity, Protestantism. But since the
purpose of this examination of Nietzsche's perspective is to
see whether he can help to answer the question of whether
there is any relation between the limited consumption of
ascetic Protestantism and modern consumption, I must spend a
little more time here. For things are more complex than
they might at first appear.
To begin with, it is not clear that Nietzsche would
have had nothing besides contempt for Protestant asceticism,
at least the asceticism of Luther and Calvin. in fact, I
think Nietzsche may have appreciated precisely that
ambivalence which I tried to identify in Luther's and
Calvin's writings. in the Genealogy
. Nietzsche discusses
the ascetic ideal of chastity (which I, for reasons already
mentioned, have not discussed - see footnote 75 of this
chapter). In this discussion, he cites Luther's attitude
toward chastity with approval, because it was not a one-
sided adoration of chastity. "[P]erhaps Luther's greatest
merit," wrote Nietzsche, "was to have the courage of his
sensuality." 196 For Nietzsche, "[t]here is no inherent
contradiction between chastity and sensual pleasure: every
good marriage, every real love affair transcends these
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;se
opposite*. •- According to the context in which the
remarks were made, Nietzsche seemed to believe that Luther
had such a marriage.
Now when Nietzsche says that these opposites are
transcended, he is not referring to the dialectician's sense
of transcendence as aufheben, where one of the opposed
entities is advanced or elevated, in a new, superior form,
and the other is left behind. As I read him, when Nietzsche
mentions the transcendence of the opposites of chastity and
sensuality, he means the transcendence of these things as
mutually exclusive opposites. Nietzsche continues his
discussion of chastity as follows:
But even in cases where a real conflict existsbetween the sexual urge and chastity, the issuefortunately, need not be tragic. At least this'holds for all those happy, soundly constituted
mortals who are far from regarding their
precarious balance between beast and angel as an
argument against existence. The finest and most
luminous among them
. . . have even seen in this
conflict one more enticement to life. 198
While Nietzsche most certainly would not have included
Luther or Calvin among the brightest lights of the soundly
constituted set (their ambivalence about earthly life was
maintained with an eye constantly toward the afterlife,
after all)
,
I would like to assert that he nevertheless
would have appreciated their ambivalence. The invigorating,
if ultimately misguided, effects of their taut, tense
ambivalence would not have been lost on Nietzsche. But the
worldly asceticism of the Puritans, which smothered the
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celebratory, joyous dimension of Calvin's and Luther's
ambivalence, is another matter.
After pointing out how the happy, well-constituted
types could turn the conflict between chastity and
sensuality into an enhancement of, or an enticement to,
life, Nietzsche describes how the less-appealing sorts would
approach this virtue. "On the other hand, it is obvious
that, once those pigs who have failed as pigs
. . . come
round to the worship of chastity, they will view it simply
as their own opposite and will worship it with the most
tragic grunting zeal." 1" i think Nietzsche would have had a
similar judgment of the severe asceticism of the Puritans.
Their suspicion of all pleasurable activities which might
draw from the time spent glorifying God, would surely have
rankled Nietzsche, and in their time-saving slogans
Nietzsche would likely have heard the sgueal of swine. For
these ascetics were so caught up in their worldly activity,
in their callings, that they had to idolize that attitude
which found life on earth to be worthless and despicable.
In this way they could go about their earthly activity with
a good conscience. Recall that even in Weber's scheme,
worldly asceticism emerged as a ministerial tool, or drug,
which was supposed to minimize the dangers posed by the idea
of the calling as proof.
Now the fact that the asceticism of the Puritans
profited worldly activity must not be imagined to be to its
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credit when viewed from Nietzsche's perspective. Although
Nietzsche complained bitterly of the other-worldliness of
traditional priestly asceticism, the dogged, dreary pursuit
of one's calling was not an alternative to other-worldlin
which Nietzsche would have applauded. in fact, in the list
of drugs which he found in the priests' medicine cabinet,
Nietzsche mentions
-'mechanical activity," which is quite
similar to the Puritan's calling. "Mechanical activity,
with its numerous implications (regular performance,
punctual and automatic obedience, unvarying routine, a
sanctioning, even an enjoining of impersonality, self-
oblivion)
-
how thoroughly and subtly has the ascetic priest
made use of it in his battle against pain!" 200 (it will be
recalled that Luther and Calvin were pioneers in this
disciplinary use of mechanical activity, or the calling.
See pp. 231-7) So, from Nietzsche's position, there is not
that much which is new with worldly asceticism. The old
ascetic slogan of poverty may have been abandoned by this
new form of asceticism, and it may have, following Luther
and Calvin, reversed the Pauline indifference to worldly
activity, but the increased dosage of mechanical activity,
in the form of the calling, made up for any decreases in
those other medications. In the end, the patient was as
sick as ever.
Finally, and most importantly, the question must be
posed from a Nietzschean perspective, of whether there is
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any connection between the worldly asceticism of the
Puritans and the techno-fetishism of modernity. Or,
alternately, is there some sort of unbridgeable chasm
between these two very different attitudes toward
consumption? To answer these questions, it must first be
pointed out that for Nietzsche, asceticism did not end with
Christianity. On the contrary, Nietzsche recognized in the
most unlikely of places a new, particularly modern form of
asceticism. He found this asceticism in scientific
objective scholarship, which he found to be frequently
offered as the very opposite of religious asceticism.
"People say to me that such a counterideal [to
asceticism] exists," writes Nietzsche, "that not only has it
waged a long, successful battle against asceticism but to
all intents and purposes triumphed over it. The whole body
of modern scholarship is cited in support of this." 201 But
for Nietzsche, "[t]he case is exactly opposite of what is
claimed here: scholarship
. . . represents not the opposite
of the ascetic ideal but, in fact, its noblest and latest
202form." It is the commitment of these scholars to the
ideal of truth which gives them away as ascetics. For in
their pursuit of scientific truth, modern scholars adopt
their own unique ascetic regime: "[i]t is necessary that the
emotions be cooled, the tempo slowed down, that dialectic be
put in place of instinct, that seriousness set its face on
stamp and gesture." 203 "As for the absolute will to truth
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which begets such abstinence, it is nothing other than a
belief in the ascetic ideal in its most radical form," 20*
charges Nietzsche.
As I stated at the very beginning of this examination
of technology, however, my concern is not with science and
the values which underlie it. I am concerned, instead, with
the value which underlies the consumption of technology, a
value I have identified as convenience. What I would now
like to suggest is that this value of convenience, like the
value or ideal of scientific truth, can be shown to be the
value of another late form of asceticism. In other words,
my claim is that techno-fetishism is asceticism. Now I am
sure that this claim must appear even more implausible than
Nietzsche's unusual interpretation of science as asceticism
- at least scientists reject the testimony of their senses
in their search for truth. The modern consumer of
technology, however, would appear to be a slave to his
senses and pleasurable sensations. Fast food, constant
audio and visual entertainment, comfortable travel, and all
of these comforts in a wide variety to choose from, would
hardly seem to indicate an ascetic lifestyle. On the
contrary, modernity would appear to be characterized by the
constant titillation of the senses, the maximization of
pleasure, the refusal to deny anything to the self. How can
anyone possibly interpret this age of bliss as one which
contains any trace of asceticism?
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My response to this question would be to ask some
different ones: How can one imagine that asceticism, which
had been practiced and perfected for millennia by various
priests, was overcome completely and permanently with the
eclipse of religious belief, or the death of God, to use
Nietzsche's notorious phrase? Can one really accept that
the tremendous self-loathing which produced Christianity,
according to Nietzsche, has been extinguished by that God's
demise? Anyone who is at all receptive to Nietzsche's
sensitive, perhaps hyper-sensitive, examination of
asceticism would seem to me to have trouble imagining that
modernity had gotten over this particularly human sickness.
But even so, there is still quite a big step to be taken to
get from the suspicion that asceticism must still be lurking
in modernity, to the conclusion that the consumption of
modern technology is one of the forms which it has assumed.
Weber's argument about worldly asceticism, when read through
Nietzschean lenses, seems to me to help bridge this gap.
As I have already mentioned, Calvin's insistence on
predestination as a double decree, and his and Luther's
ambivalence toward earthly life, can be interpreted as
efforts to preserve Christianity; in this sense,
Protestantism can be seen as a "halfway house." But these
efforts of the reformers were bound to fail; their medicine
was too strong and their patients too sick to ever achieve a
cure. In fact, new medications were required to counter the
2 9 6
deleterious effects of those harsher drugs. The calling as
proof of salvation, and the severe attitude toward earthly
Pleasures, were antidotes used by Puritan ministers to
counter the prescriptions of Calvin, and to a lesser degree,
Luther. Worldly asceticism, like the asceticism of earlier
priests, was homoeopathic medicine, the application of
poisons to sick people - but it was, despite appearances to
the contrary, a weaker form of medication than its
predecessors. it allowed Christians to throw themselves
without compunction into worldly activity. Charitable works
were no longer the hallmark of Christian activity;
successful business enterprises became the sign of God's
presence in the world. Even though the Puritans limited the
enjoyment of earthly activities and things, their asceticism
provided proof of immortality, of the eventual relief from
the toils and troubles of mortal existence.
But even this weaker form of asceticism could not stop
the progress of the nihilistic disease. Faith in God, or in
the possibility of immortality, which was both the premise
and promise of the Christian God, eventually became
untenable. This is not to say that people are no longer
willing to profess their faith, either by celebrating
rituals with other believers in some church congregation, or
by sending checks to the saints of the television
satellites. What I am saying is that in the most developed
of those cultures in which Christianity flourished, man's
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earthly activity, by and large, is no longer undertaken with
a view to heavenly immortality. The idea of immortality has
receded from the forefront of the modern horizon; it is no
longer a guiding principle of human actions on, and beyond,
earth. For now, I am going to simply assert this claim
about the demise of Christianity, which is sure to be
rejected by some, although evidence, if not proof, of this
claim could be offered. My argument presupposes that this
claim will not present a stumbling block to most readers.
To continue this line of assertions, I want to further
claim that even though God may have receded or retreated
from the modern world, the need for a God remains. Men have
not become well, in the Nietzschean sense that they cele-
brate their mortality, their embodiment, their senses, both
pleasurable and painful. All of these human conditions
still remain a source of anxiety to men, but the projection
of this anxiety into a supersensuous realm of immortality,
access to which is determined by God, will no longer suffice
to comfort men. A new drug is needed; a new ascetic
practice is required. My claim is that convenience is that
drug, and the consumption of technology is that practice.
As I argued earlier, when I challenged Arendt's
interpretation of modernity, the tremendous productive
capacity of modernity, and the heightened concern for
maintaining and increasing that capacity, are not
indications of any modern "reverence for the body." On the
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contrary, if one takes into account what it is that is
consumed by modern producers, it becomes apparent, at least
to me, that modernity is characterized by a certain
revulsion against the body, mortality, and necessity. The
demands of the body, which were ignored or strictly
regulated by Christian asceticism, in both its monastic and
Puritanical forms, are no longer something to be neglected
or restricted. Instead, they have become, to recall the
distinction I introduced earlier, limits imposed by the
body. And the overcoming of these limits is the value of
convenience, in the particularly modern sense of this word.
The asceticism which I am trying to identify may
appear, at first glance, to be the opposite of its
Puritanical predecessor. The latter restricted consumption,
while modern asceticism, as I have stretched the term, is
based on continually increasing consumption. But there are
certain similarities between the halfway house of worldly
asceticism and modern techno-fetishism, aside from their
relation to human mortality. The Puritans' concern for
saving time, for not wasting a moment, is also present,
although in an altered form, in modern asceticism. For the
Puritan, any time spent outside of the performance of one's
calling was, strictly speaking, wasted time. For moderns,
it is not time spent away from the calling which must be
minimized, but time spent in the satisfaction of the demands
of the body. I have already discussed as examples of this
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attitude toward time, certain developments in the production
and preparation of food, and the means of transportation
(although I earlier emphasized the material conditions of
the United States as a factor in that modern attitude)
.
Here, let me just mention that the body's demands for
clothing (e.g. shopping by phone or mail on credit) and
shelter (e.g. pre-fabricated homes, maintenance-free
condominiums) have also become satisfied much more quickly
in modernity than ever before. Along with the material and
economic conditions which played a role in this "saving" of
time, there is also this element of modern asceticism.
Just as there is no proof which is available to
convince modern Christians that God has retreated from the
world, there is no way to prove to the techno-fetishist that
modern consumption practices have anything to do with the
death of God. But here, too, evidence is available. Such
evidence will be presented in the following, final chapter
of this text. But I want to close this chapter with a brief
examination of one particularly ironic example of such
evidence.
Early in The Protestant Ethic
,
Weber offers the
writings of Benjamin Franklin as "a document of that
[capitalist] spirit which contains what we are looking for
in almost classical purity." 205 In Franklin's books of
ethical maxims, Weber finds examples of the worldly
asceticism of Puritanism, without that religious context.
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For Weber, Franklin is on the ousp; he represents the
transition from the age in which a oaliing was pursued for
religious reasons, to the age of the cage, in whioh a
calling is pursued for utilitarian reasons, if indeed, there
is any choice involved at all.
For Franklin, the successful pursuit of a calling was
not undertaken to prove one's predestination to salvation,
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nor was wealth accumulated in order to provide for a
life of leisure and comfort. According to Weber, Franklin
valued the accumulation of wealth in itself, and not for
what it could prove or provide. Weber describes the
transitional character of Franklin's ethic as follows:
the earning of more and more money, combined withthe strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment
of life, is above all completely devoid of any
eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture.
It is thought of so purely as an end in itself,
that from the point of view of the happiness of,
or utility to, the single individual, it appears
entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational.
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acqui-
sition as the ultimate purpose of his life. 207
Now even though Franklin may have abandoned the
Calvinism of his parents, his advice on how to accumulate
wealth sounded somewhat like those Calvinist ministers, such
as Baxter, whom Weber cited to elucidate Puritan asceticism.
In Franklin's Necessary Hints to Those That Would be Rich
(1736) and Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), which Weber
quotes at length in his text, there is that concern with
time which characterized Puritan asceticism, but for
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Franklin time was valuable not because it could be spent
glorifying God through one's calling. Instead, Franklin
claimed "that time is money. He that can earn ten shillings
a day by his labour, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half
of that day,
. . . has really spent< or rather thrown
five shillings.
. .
«*» In a later> widely rea(J essa^
entitled "The Way to Wealth," Franklin is even more emphatic
about the value of time.
*ut doest thou love Life
,
then do not swuanderTime, for that's the stuff Life jj wa H» ^Poor Richard says. ... if Time be of all Thingsthe most precious, wasting Time must be, as PoorRichard says, the greatest prodigality.*09
In this same essay, Franklin also discusses that other
dimension of Protestant asceticism, restricted consumption.
Although Weber does not cite this essay, and does not really
discuss Franklin's attitude toward consumption, there is a
particular passage from it which supports Weber's
interpretation of Franklin as a sort of non-religious
ascetic, and also serves my argument about modern
asceticism.
Here you are all got together at this Vendue of
Fineries and Knicknacks
. You call them Goods , but
if you do not take Care, they will prove Evils to
some of you. You expect they will be sold cheap ,
and perhaps they may for less than they cost; but
if you have no Occasion for them, they must be
dear to you. Remember what Poor Richard says, Buy
what thou hast no Need of. and ere long thou shalt
sell thv Necessaries / 1 "
In this warning against excessive consumption, Franklin
employs the necessary/artificial distinction which has
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surfaced in various places and forms throughout my essay.
Of those goods mentioned in the above guote, Franklin
continues, "These are not the Necessaries of Life; they can
scarcely be called the Conveniences, and yet only because
they look pretty, how many want to have them. The
artificial Wants of Mankind thus become more numerous than
the natural." 211 Franklin recognized in this increase of
wants a certain danger, as did the Calvinist ministers, and
he warns against this trend. He is especially suspicious of
the purchase of such goods or commodities on terms of
credit. "But what Madness must it be to run in Debt for
these Superfluities!" 212 warns Franklin.
So in both his concern with wasted time and his
restrictive attitude toward consumption, Franklin does
appear to be advocating a form of asceticism which closely
resembles the worldly asceticism of Puritanism. But I want
to suggest that Franklin was not simply a Puritan stripped
of his religious foundation, as Weber seems to suggest.
Franklin was indeed ascetic, I want to argue, but he
displays elements of the modern asceticism I am trying to
bring to light. (Franklin's disdain for consumption on
credit is not one of these modern elements.)
A first glimpse of this asceticism can be found in the
above quote concerning necessity and artificiality, where
Franklin seems to be saying that if such goods were
definitely among the "Conveniencies, " then they would be
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less artificial, or more necessary, and would therefore be
less troubling or dangerous. Franklin's notion of necessity
seems to be expanding to include the need for convenience.
This impression from the quote is further supported by the
fact that about midway through his life, at the age of
forty-two, Franklin appears to have undergone a shift in his
attitude toward time. At this point, Franklin retired from
his printing business, although he still received a share of
that business' profits for many years afterwards. 213
Franklin no longer spent his time in the pursuit of wealth,
as he had advised others. In a letter to a friend, written
in the year in which he retired, Franklin describes his new
life as follows:
Thus you see I am in a fair way of having no othertasks, than such as I shall like to give myself,
and of enjoying what I look upon as a great
happiness, leisure to read, study, make experi-
ments, and converse at large with such ingenious
and worthy men, as are pleased to honour me with
their friendship or acquaintance, on such points
as may produce something for the common benefit of
mankind.
Franklin even urged friends to follow his example. In
another letter to another friend, he asked,
By the way, when do you intend to live - i.e. to
enjoy life.
. . will you retire to your villa,
give yourself repose, delight in viewing the
operations of nature in the vegetable creation,
assist her in her works, get your ingenious
friends at times about you, make them happy with
your conversation, and enjoy theirs: or, if
alone, amuse yourself with your books and elegant
collections. 2
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This advice concerning the economy of time is certainly
quite different than that offered by either Richard Baxter,
Weber's prototypical Calvinist, or Poor Richard, Weber's
model of the ascetic entrepreneur. Both of these ascetics
would have looked upon the advice of the retired, leisurely
Franklin as an invitation to waste time. Retire to your
villa? Give yourself repose? Amuse yourself with books and
collections? Such activity, or lack of activity, would not
have augmented the glory of God, according to Baxter, nor
would it have augmented one's wealth, as Poor Richard says.
But for the mature Franklin, such leisurely pursuits were
not a waste of time, because they were all directed toward
the "common benefit of mankind."
For Franklin, mankind could be served not just by the
successful performance of an earthly calling, such as his
business as a printer prior to retirement. Mankind could
also benefit from the scientific investigation of the laws
of nature, and the application of those laws to man's
earthly condition. Franklin valued that time which he spent
performing experiments and designing "improvements" for
mankind, and retired so that he would have more of such
time. Even though his retirement was disrupted by his full
and varied career in public service, Franklin nevertheless
became a prominent figure in eighteenth-century "natural
philosophy," and designed several important devices over the
course of his life. A brief examination of some of these
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devices will make it clearer what Franklin had in mind when
he wrote about the common benefit of mankind.
Borrowing from German designs, Franklin developed a
wood-burning stove which became enormously popular. The
advantages of the "Pennsylvania fireplace," or Franklin
stove, as it came to be known, were many, according to a
pamphlet which Franklin wrote to promote its sale. 216 But
the principal benefit of the stove was that it was much more
efficient than an open fire. Franklin's design made use of
the hot gases which, in a common fireplace, rise directly
into the chimney. m Franklin's stove, those gases were
used to heat a thick metal plate, which in turn heated the
air above and around it. The result was »[t]hat your whole
Room is equally warmed; so that People need not croud (sic)
so close round the Fire, but may sit near the Window, and
have the Benefit of the Light for Reading, Writing,
Needlework, &c. They may sit with Comfort in any Part of
the Room, which is a very considerable Advantage in a large
Family, where there must often be two Fires kept, because
all cannot conveniently come at one." 217
In other words, the stove freed people from the hearth,
and allowed them to go about other activities in the heated
room. Staying warm was no longer as much of a burden, and
the stove saved some of the time that had been taken up by
the body's demand for heat. And since these stoves were
more efficient and used less wood than fireplaces, they also
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shortened the amount of time that one had to spend moving
wood about to feed the fire. The stoves were also easier t
light and were safer than open fires. m conclusion,
Franklin says of the stove, "With all these Conveniences,
you do not lose the pleasing Sight nor Use of the Fire,
in the Dutch Stoves, but may boil the Tea-Kettle, warm th
Flat-irons, heat Heaters, keep warm a Dish of Victuals by
setting it on the Top, &c . &c." 218 so besides heating
bodies, the stove could simultaneously be used to help
perform other household tasks. it is in this sense of
improving efficiency in the necessary activity of the
household, of speeding things up, that the Franklin stove
can be described as a convenience.
Franklin, as is well known, was also a pioneer in the
study of electricity, and here too he put this knowledge in
the service of convenience. Aside from his invention of the
lightning rod, Franklin also used his knowledge of
electricity to kill animals that were to be eaten. One
advantage of electrocution was that it resulted in
immediate, sudden death, and was therefore more humane than
other methods. But electrocution also helped to minimize
the time that meat had to hang in order to become tender.
"The flesh of animals, fresh-killed in the usual manner, is
firm, hard and not in a very eatable state ..." wrote
Franklin to some friends, but "in its progress towards
putrefaction
. . . the flesh becomes what we call tender, or
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is in that state most proper to be used as our food." 2" But
when the animal is electrocuted in the manner which Franklin
fully described, "the putrefaction sometimes proceeds with
surprising celeritv ,|220 por t?v-=~t,i •y v y. F Franklin, this acceleration of
"putrefaction" was the chief recommendation for electric
slaughtering.
It is also interesting to note that Franklin was a
leader in making the production and storage of electricity
more convenient in itself. The first experiments with
electricity were performed with the "Leyden jar," a glass
tube which was rubbed with a piece of silk, which thereby
condensed the electric charge. Soon after Franklin received
such a tube from a friend in England, he wrote back to that
friend that
the European papers on Electricity, frequently
speak of rubbing the tube, as a fatiguing
exercise. Our spheres are fixed on iron axes,
which pass through them. At one end of the axis
there is a small handle, with which you turn the
sphere like a common grindstone. This we find
very commodious, as the machine takes up but
little room, is portable, and may be enclosed in a
tight box, when not in use. 221
Franklin and his American colleagues, therefore, not only
performed experiments along the lines which had been
established in Europe; they also facilitated the performance
of such experiments by creating portable generators.
Franklin even turned his invention of the lightning rod
into a device for speeding up the investigation of
electricity, and he did so in a manner which indicates the
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direction in which the development of electricity would be
carried out. One of the lightning rods on Franklin's house
in Philadelphia ran not to the ground outside the house, t
render lightning harmless, but ran instead into the hou
itself, and then to a ground. Franklin attached two bell
to the wire running through his house, and these sounded
whenever an electrical charge was being drawn through the
lightning rod. in a letter describing this arrangement,
Franklin claimed to have "frequently drawn sparks and
charged bottles" from this device. 222 Through this
technique, Franklin eliminated the necessity of rubbing the
bottle or turning the crank; all he had to do to acquire a
charge for his experiments was draw off electricity which
was generated in the atmosphere. And Franklin's device even
notified him when it was time to charge his bottles, so that
he did not have to spend time waiting for the proper moment.
I would like to mention one last example of Franklin's
inventiveness, an example which comes from the realm of
transportation technology, which was discussed in the
previous chapter. Upon his return to the United States
after many years service as the American ambassador to
France, Franklin designed a sedan chair which was used to
move him about the city of Philadelphia. While there is
nothing truly innovative here, since such conveyances had
been developed over a century before in Europe, there is
something about Franklin's use of the sedan chair which
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illuminates the point I am trying to make. Early in the
seventeenth century, John Winthrop, the Puritan governor of
Massachusetts Bay Colony, had refused to accept the gift of
a sedan chair, and even toward the end of that century,
horse drawn carriages were frowned upon in Boston as things
of this world only. 223 Roughly a century later, however,
Franklin had no religious compunction about such worldly
things as sedan chairs. indeed, Franklin wrote that he
wished "I had brought with me from France a balloon
sufficiently large to raise me from the ground. in my
malady it would have been the most easy carriage for me,
being led by a string held by a man walking on the
ground." 224 Such a wish would most likely have been worthy
of punishment in seventeenth-century New England, but it was
appropriate and prescient in eighteenth-century
Philadelphia.
My point in discussing Franklin is not to contradict
Weber's interpretation of him as an entrepreneurial ascetic.
My claim is not that Franklin was, contra Weber, a
libertine, or a lover of luxury. For those devices which
Franklin invented and developed were not, in his eyes,
"superfluities" of the sort which he warned against in his
books of ethical maxims. If these things were not absolute
necessities, they were "conveniencies, " and as such they
were valid and valuable, as the quote several pages above
indicated.
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I do want to point out, however, that Franklin was not
as free from religion as Weber's portrayal of him implies.
Although Franklin claimed to have abandoned religious
disputation early in his career, 225 toward the end of his
life he did set down his religious beliefs in a letter to
Ezra Stiles, the President of Yale College. in that letter,
written a month before his death, Franklin claimed »[t]hat
the most acceptable Service we render to him [i.e. God] is
doing good to his other Children," and »[t]hat the soul of
Man is immortal, and will be treated with Justice in another
Life respecting its Conduct in this." 226 These beliefs,
based as they are on the idea that earthly works have some
bearing on one's salvation, fly in the face of the doctrine
of predestination and the reformers' denigration of good
works. But what I want to stress is not simply the fact
that Franklin completely abandoned the Calvinism of his
parents. Rather, I want to emphasize that Franklin's
inventiveness, his skill at applying scientific knowledge to
make man's life on earth more convenient and comfortable,
had a religious sanction. In providing, for the "common
benefit of mankind," devices such as efficient stoves and
lightning rods, Franklin was not concerned with making
money, as one might expect given Weber's argument. In fact,
Franklin refused to accept patents on his inventions. 227
Instead, Franklin's motives were other worldly; his concern
was with the salvation of his soul, not earthly treasures.
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From Weber's perspective, as I mentioned above,
Benjamin Franklin was a transitional figure. He represents
to Weber the worldly asceticism of the Puritans, without
that religious foundation. And for Weber, the worldly
asceticism of Franklin was eventually eclipsed in the modern
[c]age. From my perspective, as well, Franklin is on the
cusp, but for me he represents a new form of asceticism, as
well as a certain utilitarian religion. And as I interpret
modernity, even though the religious concern with an
afterlife may have waned, the new form of asceticism has
flourished as more and more time has been saved from bodily
necessity.
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But Augustine's doctrine of predestination appears tobe more than just a response to the invasion of the RomanEmpire. Augustine also used this doctrine, especially theelement of gratuitous salvation, as a weapon against the
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sinners. y
Priests, writes Calvin, "exact [contrition] as due,that is, full and complete: meanwhile, they decide not when
one may feel secure of having performed this contrition indue measure.
. . . when such bitterness of sorrow isdemanded as may correspond to the magnitude of the offence,
and be weighed in the balance with confidence of pardon,
miserable consciences are sadly perplexed and tormented' when
they see that the contrition due for sin is laid upon them,
and yet that they have no measure of what is due, so as to
enable them to determine that they have made full payment."
Calvin, Institutes
. vol. 2, p. 204.
Although Calvin recognized that the Catholic sacrament
of penitence may have provided comfort to a "good part of
the world," among the elect who were chosen for salvation,
it was a source of anxiety. Those "who were affected with
some sense of God" could never rest in confidence that they
had been perfectly contrite, or had enumerated all of their
sins. Calvin, Institutes , vol. 2, p. 205. So Calvin's
rejection of penitence was not a harsh denial of comfort to
believers, as Weber intimates, but was intended to provide
comfort and confidence to the elect. Of course, Weber's
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I agree with Schaff 's point that God did not, accordingto Augustine, predestine some to commit sins. As will be
mentioned in the text, Augustine rejected the claim that hisdoctrine of predestination undermined men's personal
responsibility for, and the punishment of, their sins on
earth. But one can maintain that some were predestined todamnation, on account of Adam's sin, without making any
claims about the particular sins of particular men. After
all, according to the doctrine of predestination, even whenlimited to salvation alone, men's deeds have no bearing on
predestination.
The crux of the conflict in these interpretations of
Augustine seems to run back to the question of whether man's
damnation through Adam can be interpreted as being
predestined or not. If the fall was not predestined (the
infralapsarian position), then the damnation of Adam's
progeny would also seem not to be predestined. If one sides
with the supralapsarian perspective, however, and sees the
fall as predestined by God, then the damnation of man would
be predestined as well. Applying these latter terms of
debate to Augustine's position, Schaff argues that Augustine
was of the infralapsarian camp, "though logical instinct
does sometimes carry him to the verge of supralapsarianism.
"
p. 853.
What I would like to suggest is that by leaving aside
the question of whether or not Adam's fall was predestined,
the two conflicting interpretations of Augustine's
predestination can find some common ground, besides the
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remained over the years proponents of a more stringent,
strict Augustinianism, among whom were Wycliffe and Huss
"the precursors of the Reformation." p. 870.
127. Calvin, Institutes , vol. 2, pp. 533-4.
128. Ibid., p. 560. The language Calvin uses to describe
this attitude toward predestination is confusing, in light
of Aquinas' distinction between predestination and
reprobation. Calvin writes: "Many professing a desire to
defend the Diety from an invidious charge admit the doctrine
of election [i.e. predestined election to salvation], but
deny that any one is reprobated [i.e. predestined to
reprobation]." p. 560. Although in the absence of my
brackets, Aquinas would appear to be excluded from this
group, since he does acknowledge that the damned are
reprobated, the context in which Calvin makes this remark
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146. Ibid., p. 114. Calvin also claimed that "[t]he
special election which otherwise would remain hidden in God,
he at lenqth manifests by his calling." Institutes
. vol. 2,
p. 580. But in this context, Calvin is using calling in the
sense of God's communication to man, and not in the sense of
one's earthly occupation. In the same chapter, Calvin
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163 LeGoff makes the case that sometime around thefourteenth century, Christian merchants began to develop a
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merchant used this measurable sense of time not only to
regulate his business activity and labor force, but that he
also "introduced his business organization into everydaylife and regulated his conduct according to a schedule."
For LeGoff, this marks "a significant secularization of the
monastic manner of regulating the use of time." Ibid., p.51
.
It would seem, therefore, that the Puritans were not
the first to regulate time outside of the monastery. I
think Weber would have acknowledged that these merchants of
the late Middle Ages were part of that "well-beaten track"
which the Puritans followed. But the differences between
the medieval merchant and the Puritan entrepreneur, is that
for the latter, the regulation of his time was part of an
ascetic practice, while for the former, part of his schedule
included "the time of rest . .
., diversion, and visiting,
the leisure and social life of men and substance." Ibid.,
p. 51. As will be indicated immediately below in the text,
Puritan asceticism viewed such leisure and diversion as a
waste of time, and urged that such activities be kept to a
minimum.
Since I will have no other opportunity in this essay
for considering LeGoff s writings, I must mention one more
of his insights - a particularly fascinating one from the
perspective I have been developing. In an essay entitled
"Merchant's Time and Church's Time in the Middle Ages,"
LeGoff relates the development of late medieval
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CHAPTER 6
TRACES OF MODERN ASCETICISM
While Franklin may have provided an ascetic
example of "almost classical purity" to Weber, he is not
quite as helpful in regard to the asceticism I am trying to
identify. Modern asceticism, which I am claiming is bound
up with the fetishistic consumption of technology, is not
supported by religious aspirations, such as those voiced by
Franklin late in his life. Specifically, modern asceticism
is not ultimately grounded in the goal of an other-worldly
immortality, as was Christian asceticism in its various
forms. The celibacy and regularity of monastic orders and
the worldly asceticism of the Puritans were directed toward
that which was promised by Christ - life everlasting. And
for his part, Franklin thought that the benefits he provided
to men in common would gain for him this prize.
Modern asceticism, on the other hand, is not grounded
in the Christian idea of an afterlife. While this
asceticism has indeed come to embrace the promise of
immortality, it is not an otherworldly afterlife toward
which this asceticism aims. I will discuss this recent type
of immortality later in this chapter. What I want to stress
at this point is that modern asceticism, even though it was
not able to abandon its Christian framework all at once, is
distinguished from Christian asceticism partly, but
precisely, by its rejection, tacit or otherwise, of
Christian immortality. This rejection of Christian
immortality, I will argue
, is clQsely^ up^ ^
other distinguishing feature of modern asceticism, the
consumption of convenience.
To support these claims, and to begin establishing in
more detail the dimensions of modern asceticism, I will have
to move beyond the limited example of Franklin and his
inventions, and examine other modern thinkers whose
connection with technological development is not so clear as
is Franklin's. However, these other thinkers - Hobbes,
Locke, Marx, and Marcuse - have the advantage of
highlighting the relation between technological development
and the mortal, finite body. it is in their non-Christian
attitudes toward mortality and necessity that these four can
be interpreted as modern ascetics. My choice of these
theorists is based solely on their appropriateness to the
argument I am making, which is, in its own way, narrow and
focused. I do not want to give the impression that I have
objectively surveyed modern political thought, or even these
four thinkers, for that matter, and am offering a
distillation of that experience. On the contrary, this
reading is biased; it slashes the surface.
I should also offer at this point some explanation for
the direction which my argument has taken. It certainly may
be asked why I have chosen to focus on political theorists
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in this final chapter. Why not continue examining
technological apparatuses such as those that Franklin
invented? Could I not make my case for modern asceticism by
referring to those devices which are consumed in order to
deny the limits of the body? The answer to these questions
is yes, the argument could be carried in that direction.
And I imagine that it should be obvious by now how I would
interpret contemporary technological developments, such as
satellite communications, space shuttles, organ transplants,
test-tube babies, etc. Devices such as these can all be
interpreted as means for overcoming the temporal and spatial
limits of embodiment. But as I stated at the outset of this
critique of techno-fetishism, my concern is not primarily
with mapping the development and deployment of technology in
modernity, but with uncovering or unearthing the value of
convenience, roots and all. (See Chapter 1, pp. 4-6.) Given
this genealogical objective, the four theorists listed above
are more appropriate than a survey of recent technological
developments. For they help to make the case that the
modern attitude toward technology is based on a particularly
modern attitude toward the body, mortality, and necessity.
And it is only insofar as these thinkers are concerned with
this attitude that I am concerned with them. As I said
above, this reading is biased.
I will pursue a chronological direction in this
examination of modern thought, beginning with Thomas Hobbes.
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And I will focus on the mature version of Hobbes account of
the formation of civil society - Leviathan. As the subtitle
of that text indicates, Hobbes, despite his reputation as
one of the first theorists of the modern state, was not
unconcerned with religious questions, but was, on the
contrary, concerned with "the Matter, Forme and Power of a
Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil." in my treatment of
Leviathan
,
I will emphasize to some extent the religious
dimension of Hobbes- thought, although I will avoid getting
involved with the dichotomous argument concerning Hobbes'
atheism or Christianity. I tend to side with those who
recognize an ambiguity in regard to the role of Christianity
in Hobbes' thought. 1 But what is important for me is not
the question of whether or not Hobbes was an atheist, but is
the way in which Hobbes introduces a new, non-Christian
attitude toward mortality and necessity, while remaining
very much within the structure of Christian discourse. It
is this attitude, not Hobbes' religious convictions, which I
want to stress.
The issue of human mortality runs throughout Hobbes'
argument in Leviathan . The state of nature which he
describes there is one in which the fact of man's mortality
is never long out of mind. "Nature hath made men so equal,
in the faculties of the body, and mind . . . ", claims
Hobbes, that there "ariseth equality of hope in the
attaining of our ends." 2 When two men in this state of
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natural equality come to desire the same thing, their parity
leads them to become competitors. For in the state of
nature, every man has the natural right "to use hi
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of hi
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently,
of doing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason,
he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.- 3 si
neither of these naturally equal men has such an advantage
that one can hope to intimidate the other into abandoning
that common desire
,
or forfeiting his natural right to that
object of contention, they come to regard each other as
enemies in a struggle to assert their natural right.
This natural competition is intensified by the passions
of men, primarily vanity. Hobbes describes this passion as
follows
:
For every man looketh that his companion should
value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself:
and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing,'
naturally endeavors, as far as he dares, (which'
amongst them that have no power to keep them in
quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
other)
,
to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by damage; and from others, by the
example.
Leo Strauss has demonstrated at length how the competition
which occurs in Hobbes' state of nature expands into a life
and death struggle in the presence of the uncontrolled
appetite, or passion, of vanity. 5 I need not set out
Strauss' argument here, but can just say that he helps to
explain Hobbes' conclusion that the state of nature is
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always in danger of turning into a state of war, "every man,
against every man."' And as far as Hobbes is concerned, as
long as the possibility of outright mortal conflict is
imminent, there is a state of war. " For war, consisteth not
in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of
time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known.
"
7
What I would like to emphasize about Hobbes- state of
nature, however, is not its natural equality, or the role
that vanity plays in it, but that it raises the issue of
human mortality, and that it does so in a temporal context.
One of the problems, or "incommodities , » of the state of
nature, to use Hobbes- term, is that men's lives in that
state tend to be short, that is, of short duration. in his
famous description of life in this state of nature, Hobbes
says it is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 8 At
another point in the text, Hobbes says that in the state of
natural equality, "there can be no security to any man, how
strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which
nature ordinarily alloweth men to live." 9 In the state of
nature, in other words, men are sold short, or short-
changed, on their time; they die not only violently, as
Strauss emphasizes, but prematurely, as measured by natural
standards
.
There are, of course, natural forces or causes which
lead man out of this state of nature, and allow him to buy
some time, or extend the duration of his life. The singular
"man" is appropriate here, not just because life in the
state of nature is solitary, but also because those forces
which Hobbes identifies as leading out of the state of
nature, are effective at the level of the individual. The
possibility for man to come out of the state of nature,
Hobbes claims, consists "partly in the passions, partly in
his reason."'" it is of man's nature, therefore, to be
inclined by his passions and his reason, to leave the state
of nature. But like the state of nature, these passions and
reason are also imbued with a sense of mortality, and are
guided by considerations of death. The role which death and
mortality play in Hobbes' thought is hardly limited to the
state of nature.
One of the forces that leads out of the state of nature
- reason
- does so by placing a limitation on the exercise
of the natural right to do and take whatever one wants.
This limitation comes in the form of a law of nature.
Hobbes stresses that a law of nature, like any law, is an
obligation to do nor not to do something, whereas a right of
nature, like any right, is a liberty to do or forego doing
something. 1 And even though man in the state of nature
tends to be rather nasty and brutish, he is reasonable
enough, when not in a passionate frenzy, to recognize the
laws of nature.
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in his discussion of the laws of nature, Hobbes defines
a law of nature, in its generic sense, in a surprisingly
specific manner.
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A law of nature, therefore, is not just an obligation or
limitation which men naturally recognize; it is a limitation
on the natural right to do what one thinks will best
preserve one's life. According to the very idea of natural
law, man cannot reasonably exercise his natural right in a
manner which would actually lead to his demise.
Furthermore, man must do, or as Hobbes put it, he is
forbidden to omit doing, that which he thinks will best
preserve, or prolong, his life.
Hobbes gets even more specific about natural law after
defining the category, and names two such laws. The
fundamental law of nature is "to seek peace, and follow
• 1
3
it." The second such law, which is derived from the
first, is "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as
far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himself." 14 So as Hobbes
reads the laws of nature, man is naturally inclined, by dint
of his reason, not to exercise his natural right in a manner
which could lead to violent competition and his early
demise. Rather, natural man is inclined to sacrifice his
natural right, in common with others, in order to attain and
preserve peace, but most importantly, to save his mortal
life.
This natural, reasonable inclination toward peace and
civil society, of course, is just that, an inclination.
Given Hobbes' view of the violent character of the state of
nature, it is apparent that the laws of nature do not
thoroughly determine man's behavior, and that man can ignore
those precepts which are discovered by his natural reason.
For instance, a man might be willing to put himself at risk
in order to have revenge upon someone who slighted or
insulted him. But there are other elements in the
constitution of Hobbes' natural man which come to the aid of
reason, and help to promote peace. These other elements are
passions, and foremost among them, in regard to man's
inclination toward peace, is the fear of violent death. 15
On Hobbes' account, of all the incommodities of the
natural state of war, the "worst of all" is the "continual
fear, and danger of violent death." 16 And it is this worst
feature of the war which urges men most strongly towards
peace. Here again, Leo Strauss' interpretation of Hobbes is
instructive. After describing how the passion of vanity
leads man in Hobbes' state of nature to engage in a physical
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struggle to have revenge on another for some real or
imagined wrong, Strauss traces the development of his
struggle to another level.
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ural man happens unforeseen upont e danger of death; in this way he comes to knowthis primary and greatest and supreme evil in themoment of being irresistibly driven to fall backbefore death m order to struggle for his life. 17
It is this face to face confrontation with death, with
the possibility that one's time may soon be over, which
clarifies and intensifies the reasonableness of the laws of
nature. The cold breath of death
, one might say, compels
the natural man to seek peace in some form of civil society,
where he no longer has to rely on himself for protection.
But while death is the goad which impels men toward civil
peace, it is also the outer limit on the exercise of any
civil authority. It marks the boundary beyond which civil
society cannot go, because it also marks the spot beyond
which man cannot go in his renunciation or transfer of his
rights. For Hobbes, "there be some rights, which no man can
be understood by any words, or other signs, to have
abandoned, or transferred." 18 The first of these is "the
right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take
away his life." 19 So death is at the heart, or throat, or
eor
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Hobbes- relation between man and the commonwealth. m life
and death situations, man need not obey any authority, and
can act out of his most fundamental, natural right.
Now this is not to say that the sovereign authority, to
whom men confer all of their power and some of their natural
right, 20 cannot issue the punishment of death. in Hobbes'
scheme, the civil authority of the commonwealth is the sol
dispenser of punishments for breaches of particular laws,
of the covenant upon which the commonwealth rests. 21 Among
the punishments Hobbes lists in L^yiathan, are corporal
punishments, "such as stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of
such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully
enjoyed," 22 and capital punishment. 23
But even though Hobbes' absolute sovereign wields the
"power of life and death," 24 it cannot compel a man to kill
or injure himself.
If a sovereign command a man, though justly
condemned, to kill, wound, or main himself; or not
to resist those that assault him; or to abstain
from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other
thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that
man the liberty to disobey. 25
In this statement, Hobbes not only recognizes the right to
disobey orders to kill or injure oneself, but also implies
the right to resist attempts by the sovereign and its agents
to inflict punishments. "A covenant not to defend myself
from force, by force, is always void," claims Hobbes; "no
man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from
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death, wounds, and imprisonment."* Hobbes argues that thi
natural inalienable right to resist "is granted to be t
by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and
Prison, with anned men, notwithstanding that such criminals
have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.""
So the limit of man's renunciation of his rights to the
commonwealth, as well as his inclination to renounce
anything in the first place, are derived from the same
source
- the mortal, finite body. Man's recognition that he
is a finite being, that there is a limit to his being -
death
- is what makes the reasonableness of the laws of
nature unmistakably clear to him. This insight, which is
gained from the fearful moment in a life and death struggle,
leads men to renounce some of their natural rights, so that
they may lengthen their mortal lives in a commonwealth. But
when the commonwealth comes to threaten one's life, or even
to take hold of one's body, that force which led to the
formation of the commonwealth becomes a justification for
resisting that commonwealth by any means whatever. Hobbes
begins his chapter "Of Punishment and Rewards" by making the
surprising concession that no one has to submit to
punishment by the sovereign. "For by that which has been
said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to
resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended that
he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his
28person." For "a man cannot tell, when he seeth men
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proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his
death or not." 29
One should not overplay the role which death, or the
fear of death, plays in Hobbes thought, however. There are
other passions besides the fear of death which lead men out
of the state of nature, and there is another justification
for avoiding legal punishment besides the fact that one
might be killed in the violence of punishment. Those other
passions and justifications may be lumped together under the
category of "commodious living." m Hobbes' list of the
passions which incline men toward peace, he adds to the fear
of death, men's "desire of such things as are necessary to
commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain
them." 30 And in regard to justification for avoiding
punishments, Hobbes cites not just the possibility of death,
but also the fact that "there is no benefit consequent to
such patience." 31 I take this to mean that imprisonment and
other punishments do not promote that "commodious living"
which one sought in forming the covenant in the first place.
So the role which the body plays in Hobbes thought is
not limited to the fear of death. In forming covenants to
promote peace, Hobbes' natural man is looking not just to
lengthen his life, but to overcome those "nasty, brutish"
aspects of life in the state of nature. Hobbes' conception
of necessity, like Calvin's before him and Franklin's after,
was not restricted to absolute physical necessity. Man's
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needs included those things which made life commodious,
convenient, as Franklin would say.- Hobbes- claim that men
join covenants in the hope that they will be able to obtain
the commodities necessary for commodious living indicates
that he was not under the sway of Puritan asceticism, with
its suspicious attitude toward worldly goods. But even
though Hobbes was no Puritan, he does represent an early
form of that modern asceticism which denies the body's
limits through the consumption of convenience.
What I want to stress about Hobbes- thought, however,
is not the status he affords to comfort and convenience,
even though this feature of his thought is obviously related
to my argument about convenience. Rather, I would like to
stress the less obvious connection between the role which
human mortality and death play in Hobbes' thought, and
modern asceticism. As I mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter, modern asceticism is distinguished from Christian
asceticism by the stance it takes toward human mortality and
the possibility of immortality. This difference can be
brought out by a comparison of the worldly asceticism of the
Puritans, which I examined in the previous chapter, and the
asceticism I claim to have found in Hobbes' thought.
At first glance, there appears to be a certain
similarity between these two forms of asceticism - they both
can be interpreted as responses to anxiety concerning man's
mortal condition. Calvin made men anxiously aware of their
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mortality through his resurreotion of the doctrine of
gratuitous, double predestination. This doctrine, it will
be recalled, placed the possibility of other-worldly
Mortality absolutely and unalterably beyond man's control
or influence. The Puritans- conception of the calling and
their asceticism, I argued, following Weber, were responses
to the dreadful character of Calvin's doctrine of
predestination.
Like, Calvin, Hobbes also raises the issue of man's
mortality, but he does so through his description of the
state of nature, where violent, premature death always
threatens. But when Hobbes raises the issue of man's
mortality, at least in the first two parts of Leviathan. it
is not in relation or regard to immortality. Death, in this
part of Hobbes' argument, does not hold forth the
possibility of eternal life. Rather, death for Hobbes was,
as Leo Strauss put it, "the greatest and supreme evil." on
my reading of Hobbes, death is evil because it is the
ultimate temporal limit which is imposed on man by his body.
The death with which man comes face to face in the life and
death struggle, reveals man's essentially finite, temporal
being. If he dies, his time is up, so he must do whatever
he can to avoid death, and increase that time which nature
allots to man. Therefore, it is not just the desire for a
commodious life that fits Hobbes within the frame of my
argument about convenience. The role which the fear of
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death plays in his thought also oan be interpreted as an
instance of the modern concern with overcoming the limits of
the body, in this case, the ultimate temporal limit, which
is death.
This interpretation of Hobbes, however, would appear to
hold, if at all, only for the first two parts of Leviathan.
In the third part, "Of a Christian Commonwealth," Hobbes
does recognize the possibility of eternal life, and even
goes so far as to claim that if the civil sovereign issues a
command which "cannot be obeyed, without [the subject] being
damned to eternal death; then it were madness to obey it." 33
This appears to contradict my claim that the life and death
of the finite, mortal body presents, in Hobbes- thought, the
ultimate limit of sovereign authority, as well as a limit to
the renunciation of man's rights. For one could conceivably
be commanded by the sovereign to do something upon the
penalty of death, which would result in one's banishment
from the kingdom of God, and the loss of one's eternal life.
According to Hobbes, at least, in this part of Leviathan ,
one would be mad to abandon one's eternal life in such a
situation, in order to escape death; one should instead give
up one's mortal life in order to save the immortal one.
Hobbes seems to recognize, in this advice, another temporal
dimension beyond man's earthly time, one that is infinite,
or eternal.
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But situations l ike the one described above, in which
God's authority conflicts with that of a civil sovereign,
should not really present as much trouble as they have in
the past, writes Hobbes^ To avoid such conflicts, men
"need to be taught to distinguish well between what is, and
what is not necessary to eternal salvation." 35 And in the
chapter of Leviathan entitled "Of what is Necessary for a
Man's Reception into the Kingdom of Heaven," Hobbes offers a
lesson in making this distinction. But if Hobbes- lesson is
followed closely, one can see that Hobbes really does not
contradict my earlier claims about the mortal body, but
instead bears them out. Ultimately, Hobbes cannot fully
endorse martyrdom for the sake of one's eternal life. One's
time on earth, one's mortal life, is too valuable, for
Hobbes, to justify such a sacrifice.
Hobbes' lesson concerning what is necessary for
salvation is a fairly simple one. He minimizes those
requirements, so as to minimize the chance for conflict
between the heavenly sovereign and those of earth. "All
that is NECESSARY to salvation," claims Hobbes, "is
contained in two virtues, faith in Christ, and obedience to
laws." 36 In regard to the first of these virtues, faith,
Hobbes boils things down to one necessary article of faith:
"The, unum necessarium, only article of faith, which the
Scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation, is this,
that JESUS IS CHRIST." 37
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When it comes to the laws which men must obey to attai
salvation, Hobbes continues his process of simplification,
and tries to separate from all of God's laws that pure
minimum which is necessary for eternal salvation. Hobbes
begins his discussion of these laws by identifying them with
the laws of nature which he examined in the first part of
L6Viathan
- "
For our s™ior Christ hath not given us new
laws," writes Hobbes, "but counsel to observe those we are
subject to
.
. .
The laws of God therefore are none but the
laws of nature." 38 And as Hobbes reduced the articles of
faith down to one necessary belief, he similarly distills
one law which must be obeyed. Of the laws of nature, or of
God, "the principal is, that we should not violate our
faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns,
which we constituted over us by mutual pact one with
another. " 39
Hobbes' short, neat lesson on the question of how to
obey both God and an earthly sovereign, therefore, teaches
that only two things are necessary: faith that Christ is
king, and obedience to civil sovereigns. But this lesson is
not so neat after all, and it really has not resolved the
fundamental problem between civil and divine authority.
Suppose the civil sovereign commands that one renounce one's
faith in Christ, a faith which is necessary for salvation,
or else be put to death. Should one obey the civil
sovereign, as the law of God commands, and renounce one's
oe
faith in Christ? Or should one follow the advioe Hcbbes
gave before starting this lesson, in which he claimed that
it would be madness to obey a command which would result in
eternal death?
Hobbes seems to realize that he had not cleared things
up quite as much as he had intended, and at the very end of
the chapter on the requirements for salvation, he discusses
precisely that sort of situation which I described above.
Hobbes struggles, once again, with the problem of what to d
when a civil sovereign, in effect, commands one to renounc
one's faith and eternal salvation. Hobbes- advice at this
point is no longer to disobey. Hobbes now writes, "And for
their faith, it is internal, and invisible; they have the
licence that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into
danger for it." 40 One need not, therefore, become a martyr
for one's faith. Because faith is something internal, one
can say or do whatever the sovereign commands, and still be
saved. One no longer has to be willing to lay down one's
earthly life, to consider that life worth nothing, in order
to glorify God and his promise of eternal life.
I must point out that immediately after saying that one
need not put oneself in danger for one's faith, Hobbes does
explicitly recognize that martyrdom is still a possibility.
People need not risk their earthly lives for their faith,
writes Hobbes, "[b]ut if they do, they ought to expect their
reward in heaven, and not complain of their lawful
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sovereign; much less make war upon him. For he that is not
glad of any just occasion of martyrdom, has not the faith he
Professeth, but pretends it only."- But Hobbes himself, I
want to argue, is not glad for any just occasion of
martyrdom His theory of a Christian Commonwealth, based as
it is upon his theory of man's natural inclination to live
in a commonwealth, does not leave much room for martyrdom,
or the traditional Christian justification of it, which
based on a contempt for earthly, mortal life.
To begin with, the context in which Hobbes offers hi
endorsement of martyrdom is one in which the objective s
to be preventing aggressive, dangerous martyrdom, such a
that which occurs in religious wars. Men need not become
martyrs, according to Hobbes, but if they do, they should
not "complain of" or "make war upon" their sovereign. in
other words, if you must be a martyr, do it quietly, so that
you do not disturb the peace of the commonwealth.
Hobbes further undermines the justification of
martyrdom by noting that the subjects whom he envisions in
his commonwealth pose no real threat to sovereign authority,
and that therefore there is no reason to make them martyrs.
This is evident in the following quote, in which Hobbes tips
his hand concerning the role of Christianity in the
commonwealth.
But what infidel king is so unreasonable, as
knowing he had a subject, that waiteth for the
second coming of Christ, after the present world
shall be burnt, and intendeth then to obey him,
the'christ'fanff^ believi^ that Jesus is
^to^^o^atT °bliged i« coSS?4„ce to
in a commonwealth formed of Hobbesian subjects, there
is no need for martyrdom or persecution, even if the
commonwealth is not a Christian one. For the man which
Hobbes describes in the first part of Ley^athan, recognizes
certain natural laws, but the general principle underlying
all natural laws is that man cannot do that which threatens
his life, that is, his earthly, mortal life. Hobbesian man,
whether in the state of nature or a commonwealth, is always
justified in doing anything to save his life, including, one
must assume, renouncing his faith. Martyrdom, in light of
Hobbes view of nature and human nature, is not reasonable.
Martyrdom, in fact, is a threat to the order which Hobbes is
trying to establish in Leviathan
,
hence, it should be done
quietly and passively, if it is done at all. Martyrdom
challenges is the very idea of a law of nature, as Hobbes
defines it, because it is a voluntary relinquishment of
man's time on earth.
It should be obvious that Hobbes' view of human
mortality runs counter to the Christian tradition, as I
presented it in the second and fifth chapters of this essay.
The Christian idea that earthly life, while being a gift
from God, should nonetheless be held to be something
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worthless and contemptible, something one would readily
sacrifice, is not to be found in Hobbes. As I have tried to
show here, Hobbes- theory of - a commonwealth ecclesiasticall
and civil" is based on the preservation of man's life on
earth, not his eternal life in the "kingdom of God." This
attitude toward earthly life, which treats it as something
sacred or reverent, characterizes modern asceticism, and
distinguishes it from Christian asceticism. (At this point,
it should be apparent why I treated Arendt's interpretation
of Christianity so harshly in Chapter 2. The reverence for
life which she found in Christianity and modernity, I find
as a hallmark of modernity, which sets it apart from the
Christian tradition. But this modern reverence of life is
not a reverence for necessity, as Arendt • s interpretation
implies
.
)
But the concern with saving man's time on earth is only
one element of modern asceticism. The desire for commodious
living, or convenience, is another. And this second feature
of modern asceticism can also be distinguished from
Christian asceticism, and not just because it increases,
rather than restricts, consumption. The desire for a life
of convenience, in which the limits of the body do not
consume much of man's time, runs counter to the Christian
idea that the toil and trouble of earthly life were a
punishment for Adam's sin/3 This distinction between
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modern and Christian asceticism, however, is not readily
apparent in the thought of Hobbes.
Hobbes does mention in Leviathan that '.man was created
in a condition immortal, not subject to corruption, and
consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of
his nature; and fell from that happiness by the sin of
Adam."" But Hobbes makes this point in his discussion of
salvation and eternal life in the third part of Le^athan.
He does not use the idea of the fall to help explain the
state of nature in the first part of the text, and therefore
is not forced to come to grips with the conflict that exists
between the idea that life in civil society can ameliorate
the nasty, brutish aspect of earthly life, and the idea that
those inconvenient aspects are the punishment for sin. In
other words, Hobbes never tries to answer the question of
how his idea of commodious living can be reconciled with the
Christian idea of the fall. However, John Locke, another
modern ascetic, struggles with this problem, and in his own
manner, resolves it. An examination of Locke's treatment of
the fall will help to make clear how this feature of modern
asceticism - the desire or need for convenience - differs
from the Christian tradition.
To begin with, I must point out that Locke's wrestling
with Christian doctrine was not by any means limited to the
idea of the fall. Like Hobbes, Locke sought to render
Christianity a firm support for civil society, but Locke was
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more systematic than Hobbes in this effort. Years afte
publishing the Two Trea tises of ft^nw (1690)> Locke
offered his interpretation of the New Testament, or at least
all that was reasonable in it, in The Bsaganafelgngss of
Christianity as Delivered in tho
-rrlrtjugg (1695). And at
the end of his life, Locke was working on paraphrases of
Paul's epistles, in which he continued his rationalization
of Christianity.' 5 Locke's treatment of the fall,
therefore, is just one facet of his project of constructing
a reasonable Christianity, although it is an important
facet.
Locke begins The Reasonableness of Christianity by
squarely facing up to the problem that Hobbes never
confronted in Leviathan. In the first sentence of this
text, Locke acknowledges that there really is no way of
avoiding the issue of the fall. "it is obvious to anyone
who reads the New Testament," begins Locke, "that the
doctrine of redemption, (and consequently of the gospel,) is
founded upon the supposition of Adam's fall." 46 He
continues: "To understand therefore what we are restored to
by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the scripture shows
we lost by Adam." 47
In his consideration of what was lost by the fall,
Locke offers an interpretation which initially appears to
closely follow the traditional Christian interpretation of
the fall. The punishment of Adam arose out of his violation
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of the command of God not to eat from a certain tree. (it
is interesting to note that Locke, in this interpretation of
the fan which opens Ikjeasonabl^,^^
does not specify that the forbidden tree was the tree or
knowledge of good and evil. Perhaps Locke sensed a
similarity between the hubris that led Adam and Eve to seek
such knowledge, and his own rational impulses., The
punishment of which God warned Adam was death, but when Adam
ate of the forbidden tree, "he did not actually die; but was
turned out of paradise from the tree of life, and shut out
for ever from it, 'lest he should take thereof and live for
ever.'" So the first thing Adam lost was immortality.
Locke's description of man's life after the fall, that
is, man's mortal life, bears that temporal tone which was
noted above in Hobbes' description of life in the state of
nature. On that very day that Adam ate, writes Locke, "His
life began from thence to shorten and waste, and to have an
end; and from thence, to his actual death, was but like the
time of a prisoner between the sentence, and the execution
which was in view and certain." 49 Now Locke's theory of
civil society, like Hobbes', offers as a principal advantage
to man the fact that his life would be lengthened by
consenting to give up some of his natural rights to form
such a society. 50 And as was the case with Hobbes, this
idea of postponing death by consenting to form a civil
society, runs Locke up against the Christian idea that man's
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mortality is a punishment inflicted by God. But unlike
Hobbes, Locke resolves this tension between his rational
theology and the fall. Before getting to Locke's escape
from this dilemma, however, I would like to emphasize
another aspect of the fall, one which runs against that
other benefit of civil society, which is that the longer
life it provides is also easier and more convenient than
life outside civil society.
Along with his loss of eternal life, Adam also lost
through his sin the bountiful life God had given him in
paradise. Locke points out "that paradise was a place of
bliss, as well as immortality; without toil, and without
sorrow.
-
But when man was turned out, he was exposed to
the toil, anxiety, and frailties of this mortal life." 51
This is Locke's interpretation of God's cursing the ground,
in Genesis 3:17, and it is this aspect of the fall which
should cause some hesitation by modern ascetics like Hobbes
and Locke. For just as Locke's civil society shares with
Hobbes' the feature that it can lengthen man's mortal life,
it also offers the promise of alleviating some of the "toil,
anxiety, and frailties of this mortal life." In his
description of the state of nature, Hobbes calls these
problems of mortal life " incommodities ; " Locke calls them
"inconveniences." In the Second Treatise on Government
.
Locke writes, "I easily grant that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inoonveniences of the state of
Nature. " 52
:rs
Now it is true that when each of these thinke
discusses the problems with the state of nature, neither of
them cite the fall, or Adam's sin, as the source of these
problems, but both prefer instead to cite the natural
liberty and equality of men in that state." But since each
of these thinkers wants to use Christianity as a support for
the commonwealth or civil society that they are trying to
build on natural, rational principles, there is occasion for
asking how the convenient, commodious life which they see as
part of the promise of civil society, can be reconciled with
the Christian idea that man's mortal life, with its toils,
burdens, and troubles, is a punishment God inflicted upon
men as a result of Adam's sin.
In responding to this question, Locke begins to veer
away from the traditional Christian interpretation of the
fall. In the previous chapter, it will be recalled, I
indicated in passing that Augustine, Luther, and Calvin,
despite their many differences, all recognized that the
punishment which was inflicted upon Adam and Eve was
extended to all their posterity. 54 Locke rejects this tenet
of Christianity, and this rejection provides a way around
this particular conflict between natural reason and
Christian revelation.
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On Locke's reading, Adam was indeed "turned out of
paradise" as a punishment for his sin, but Adam's posterity
was "born out of it."" It is not as a punishment ^ ^
were born out of paradise; it is rather just a condition in
which they find themselves, given Adam's punishment. From
Locke's perspective, to even suggest that God would have
punished all men for the transgression of Adam, "when
millions had never hear of, and no one had authorized to act
for him
-
or be his representative," 56 violates not only the
idea of consent, upon which Locke grounds his political
philosophy, but it also is an effrontery to the honor of
God. such an idea, claims Locke, "indeed would be hard to
reconcile with the notion we have of justice; and much more
with the goodness and other attributes of the supreme being,
(which he had declared of himself, and which reason and
revelation must acknowledge to be in him.)" 57
According to Locke, in order for God to punish Adam's
posterity for his sin, God would have had to take away
something to which that posterity had a right. That is the
nature of punishment. But, Locke argues,
The state of immortality in paradise [and, one
could logically add, the blissful life there] is
not due to the posterity of Adam, more than to
any other creature. Nay, if God afforded them a
temporary, mortal life, it is his gift; they owe
it to his bounty; they could not claim it as their
right; nor does he injure them when he takes it
from them.
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we now
Since men do not have a right even to their mortal life,
much less can they claim to have a right to eternal,
blissful life. Man's mortality and his troubled life on
earth, therefore, cannot be considered punishments,
according to Locke. Even "such a temporary life as
have, with all its frailties and miseries," writes Locke,
"is better than no being."" It is just tne condition J
which men find themselves after Adam's fall, but its still a
gift from God. 60
This interpretation of the fall has significant
implications for that conflict between reason and revelation
which I have identified in the thought of Locke and Hobbes,
but these implications are most readily apparent not in The
Reasonableness of Christianity
, but in an earlier work.
When he attacked Filmer's De Patriarch* in the First
Treatise on Government
, Locke seems to already have
understood the implications of his reading of the fall.
Although Locke does not mention the punishment which God
inflicted upon Eve in The Reasonableness of Christ i an i
f
Y , he
does focus on that aspect of the fall in the First Treatise ,
in order to refute one of Filmer's arguments for patriarchal
hierarchy. And the interpretation of Eve's punishment which
Locke offers in the First Treatise foretells of the reading
of the fall which Locke would offer later, and reveals the
implications of this reading.
- qp
-
'
as ln The ReasnnablenP^ ^
L°Cke denies that God's punishment of Adam is
intended for all men, but his argument here is not based on
the definition of punishment, as it was in The
Reasonabl enes^_oJ_ChrisUanlt^
> but on the rules of
grammar. 61 But Locke is not quite so restrictive when it
comes to Eve's punishment. Locke writes about the words of
Genesis 3:16, in which Eve's punishment of multiplied pain
and subjection to her husband is inflicted, as follows:
"and if we will take them as they were directed in
particular to her, or in her, as a representative, to all
other women, they will at most concern the female sex only,
and import no more but that subjection that they should
ordinarily be in to their husbands.-' 62 Locke's liberalism,
apparently, was not as developed as that of J.s. Mill, since
Locke suggests that all women are subject to their husbands
on account of Eve. But Locke rejects the idea that even
this subjection is a punishment which all women must suffer.
For immediately following the preceding quote, Locke
continues
:
but there is here no more law to oblige a woman to
such a subjection, if the circumstances either of
her condition or contract with her husband should
exempt her from it, than there is that she should
bring forth her children in sorrow and pain if
there could be found a remedy for it. 63
This, then, is Locke's way of getting around the
constraints which the traditional Christian interpretation
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of the fall posed to the modern civil society. The
punishments of Adam and Eve are not extended to all men
women as punishments, but just as the condition in which
they were born. Again referring to the words by which Eve
was punished, Locke writes, "neither will any one, I
suppose, by these words think the weaker sex, as by a 1
subjected to the curse contained in them, that it is their
duty not to endeavor to avoid it."" On the contrary, if a
remedy could be found for the pain of childbirth, or for the
subjection of women to their husbands, Locke argues, women
may certainly take steps to ameliorate these conditions or
avoid them altogether. To extend Locke's argument to the
condition in which men find themselves after the fall, death
and toil can also be avoided. Men, no less than women, can
avoid the brutishness and inconvenience of life in the state
of fallen nature, and, in fact, they form civil society
precisely to avoid those conditions.
The rational or reasonable Christianity which Locke
developed over the course of his career, would appear to be
better-suited to the modern asceticism I have identified
than to Christian asceticism itself. Locke's interpretation
of the fall renders it compatible with that facet of modern
asceticism which I stressed in my discussion of Hobbes,
which is the idea that mortal, earthly life is something
valuable, and should be lengthened as much as possible. On
Locke's reading of the fall men may be expected to avoid
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death, just as they may be expected to avoid the other
inconveniences of the state of nature. Such mortal
conditions are not punishments which must be suffered, as
they are according to one pole of the traditionally
ambivalent, Christian attitude toward earthly life.
The traditional Christian idea that life is in some
sense contemptible, even though it is a gift from God, was
in large part based on the account of the fall in Genesis,
in the preceding chapter, I indicated that both Luther and
Calvin used these verses from Genesis to intensify the
ambivalence of Christianity in regard to earthly life. (See
Chapter 5, pp. 238-49) But on Locke's reasonable reading of
Christianity, especially the fall, there no longer appears
to be any tension involved in the evaluation of earthly
life. There also no longer appears to be any justification
for Christian asceticism, which was based on the idea that
mortal life was inferior to, and should be willingly
sacrificed for, immortal life. The Christian ascetic, if I
may be allowed to generalize so boldly, denied or regulated
the needs and desires of the body so as to gain time for the
contemplation of, and preparation for, an otherworldly
immortality. With the revaluation of earthly, mortal life
which was undertaken by Hobbes and Locke, the objective of
Christian asceticism recedes into the background, and
mortal, temporally finite life comes into prominence.
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Despite their differences, both Christian and modern
asceticism can be interpreted as ways of saving time.
Christian asceticism saved time in order to gain
immortality, while modern asceticism saves time in two
different senses. On the one hand, modern asceticism saves
time in the sense of prolonging life, and on the other, it
saves time from necessity, by making life more convenient.
The modern ascetic's consumption of convenience saves time
in the sense that it minimizes the amount of time which is
spent on bodily necessity. m the terms I used in Chapter 2
to define my conception of convenience, the ascetic
consumption of convenience saves time by overcoming the
temporal and spatial limits which are imposed by the body.
But, of course, it is not just the time-saving features
of Hobbes' and Locke's civil societies which makes me
describe convenient living as a form of asceticism. The
more important similarity between Christian and modern
asceticism, the one which provides the real justification
for my describing modern consumption practices as
asceticism, is that both, in their different ways, deny the
body. This feature of modern asceticism tends to get shaded
when one emphasizes how modern asceticism differs from
Christianity. In distinction to the negative pole of the
Christian ambivalence to earthly life - recall Luther's
claim that "[a] 11 the fields, yes, almost the entire
creation is full of such sermons, reminding us of our sin
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and of God's wrath" 65
- the Christianity espoused by Hobbes
and Locke in their attempts to turn Christianity into a
footing for the modern political order, appears to be a
celebration of mortal life and earthly comfort. But when
one looks more closely at the direction in which modern
consumption or necessity has developed, it becomes apparent
that those practices continually assault the limits which
are imposed by man's embodiment. it is in this sense that
the modern consumption of technology can be seen as a new
way of denying the body, mortality, and necessity, as a new
form of asceticism. Or to put this in Nietzsche's terms,
the modern consumption of convenience is the latest form of
homoeopathic medicine, one which is administered by new
priests
-the scientists and technicians.
So while the modern asceticism of Hobbes and Locke may
have eliminated the ambivalence in which Christianity
traditionally held earthly life, modern asceticism is not
without its own tension. This tension, obviously, is
derived not from the idea of the fall and man's punishment,
but is based instead on that fundamental contempt for the
body which Nietzsche identified as the source of
Christianity. (See Chapter 5, p. 288) For the body is the
foundation of all those limits which have been overcome, or
at least assaulted, by the consumptive practices of modern
asceticism. It is not Adam's original sin upon which modern
contempt for the mortal body is based; rather, it is the
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fact that the body is mortal which is the
s
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source of
modernity's uneasiness with the body. And on Nietzsche-
reading, the traditional Christian interpretation of th
fall is similarly based on a fundamental contempt for th
body. The fall is an interpretation of that revulsion.
To get a better glimpse of modern asceticism's contempt
for the body, it is necessary to move beyond Hobbes and
Locke, who, at least as I read them, stand too close to
Christianity to provide a clear image of modern asceticism.
I will now turn to a very different line of thought, one
which was developed in conscious contrast not only with
liberal political thought, such as that of Hobbes and Locke,
but also with Christianity. in the thought of Marx, and
many of those who have been influenced by that thought,
there exists a more mature form of modern asceticism than
that which I found in liberalism. This ascetic dimension of
Marx's thought is centered on his attitude toward necessity,
which I will now examine. Later I will argue that this
ascetic dimension of Marx's thought has been maintained and
developed by some contemporary Marxist, or Marx-influenced,
thinkers. By following this line of thought, one may catch a
clear glimpse of the ascetic trajectory of modernity, in
which the fetishistic consumption of technology appears as
the project of denying, and eventually eliminating, the
mortal body.
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Before taking up this examination of Marx's concept of
necessity, I should point out that not only will this help
in identifying techno-fetishism as a form of asceticism, but
such an examination will also provide a third dimension to
the critical judgments of Marxism that I have offered
throughout this essay. Z have trouble with Marxism not just
because of the way in which dialectical thinking tends to
undermine ruthless criticism (see Chapter 1, pp. 18 . 21)
, or
because of the way in which Marx's notion of historical
materialism has become restricted to consideration of the
capitalist production process alone (see Chapter 3). what
bothers me most of all about Marxism, is the way in which
Marx's thoughts on necessity, especially his idea of a "rich
human need," has become a very subtle vehicle for modern
asceticism. The contrast between this interpretation of
Marxism and Arendt's, which treats Marxism as a smuggler of
Christian reverence for the body and necessity, should soon
become obvious.
Marx's attitude toward necessity was most clearly
stated very early in his career, in what eventually came to
be published as The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
of 1844, and has since become known as the "Paris
Manuscripts." In these manuscripts, as in his later work,
Capital, Marx challenges the liberal idea that through his
labor, man comes to appropriate as his own, some of that
which was given to men in common. (In Chapter 3, this
.s
_s
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Lockean conception of property was introduced, and the
critique of this concept which Marx offered in Capital was
discussed. see Chapter 4, p. 134, and note 12.) m his
earlier criticism of 1844, Marx introduces as a counter-
concept to the liberal notion of property, the idea of
estranged, or alienated, labor, 66 and it is in hi:
elaboration of this concept that Marx sets out hi,
perspective on necessity. Although the concept of alienated
labor is crucial for understanding the distance which Marx
sought to establish between himself and liberal political
economy, I want to focus just on Marx's conception of
necessity, and to show how this element of Marx's thought
actually links Marx to that asceticism which I identified in
the liberal thinkers Hobbes and Locke.
One of the ways in which men in a capitalist economy
become alienated from their labor, argues Marx, is that in
such an economic setting, men no longer undertake their
productive activity in a distinctively human manner. As
Marx puts it, "estranged labour estranges the species from
man." 67 Each species, according to Marx, has its own
particular species character, which "is contained in the
character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity
is man's species character." 68 Under capitalism, however,
men do not produce in a free and conscious manner, so they
become alienated from the character of the human species.
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But Marx goes farther than simply noting this
alienation of man from his speoies character; under
capitalism, men actually come to resemble animals more than
men, because their productive activity takes on the species
character of non-human animals. In distinguishing the
species man from animal species, Marx claims that
for
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Under the exploitative environment of capitalism, however,
man's productive activity comes to be nothing more than "a
means to his physical existence." 70 Men work, in other
words, in order to satisfy the demands of their bodies, and
in this they are more like animals than men. Men only
"truly" produce, as men, when they produce in the absence of
physical needs.
In contrast to the life-activity of animals, man, as a
species, has a more developed, richer life-activity, which
satisfies needs which are higher, more refined, than crude
bodily needs. Marx believed that this higher nature of man
would eventually blossom, once capitalism's exploitative,
dehumanizing relations of production were demolished. "It
will be seen," Marx wrote in the Paris Manuscripts, "how in
place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come
the rich human being and rich human need. The rich human
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being is simultaneously the human being in need of a
totality of human life activi 1- -ities
- the man in whom his own
realization exists as an inner necessity, as need.- 71
This attitude of Marx's toward necessity, in which the
demands of the body are denigrated to mere animal status,
and are distinguished from richer human needs, was not just
a conviction which he held early in his career, before he
undertook his painstaking analysis of the structure of
capitalism. On the contrary, Marx expressed this same
attitude in different contexts throughout his career. m
The German Ideology (1845-6), which Marx wrote with Engels
shortly after compiling the Paris Manuscripts, he again
denigrates physical necessity, but this time not in
distinguishing man's species from that of other animals, but
in describing the activity of man after the proletarian
appropriation of capitalism's highly developed forces of
production. In the terms of the Paris Manuscripts, one
might say that Marx and Engels are here describing the
situation in which the species character of man may be
fulfilled: "Only at this stage does self-activity coincide
with material life, which corresponds to the development of
individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of
all natural limitations." 72
By natural limitations, I read Marx and Engels to
mean those conditions in which physical necessity, or the
demands of the body, dominate man's productive and
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consumptive activity. For just a page or so before maki
the above claim about natural limitations, Marx and Engels
note that
[t]he only connection which still links rthejaunty of individuals] with the productiveforces and with their own existence - labour - haslost all semblance of self-activity and only
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as the means. 73
In other words, men have become like animals; their life-
activity is nothing more than the means of existence.
Marx eventually came to recognize that capitalism did
not simply reduce the needs of men to the level of animals.
Even though capitalism undoubtedly had this dehumanizing
effect, by 1857-8, when he wrote those notebooks which
eventually were published as Grundrisse, Marx recognized
that capitalism also had a tendency to develop and enrich
human needs. In Grundrisse
,
Marx claimed that "Capital's
ceaseless striving toward the general form of wealth drives
labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness
. . . and
thus creates the material elements for the development of
the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its
production as in its consumption." 74
But still, Marx set this "rich individuality" over
against the demands of the body. For he continues his
description of the richly producing and consuming
individuality by saying that its "labour also therefore
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appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of
activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct
form has disappeared."- Here, as in the Paris Manuscripts
and Th^_German_ld^ the demands of the body must be
overcome as limitations on human activity, if man is to
attain the complete individuality of his species character.
It should be pointed out that Marx's attitude toward
necessity, which denigrates the demands of the body and
celebrates the creation of rich human needs, appears to be a
reversal of that needs/wants distinction which has been
identified earlier in the thought of Luther and Franklin, or
more accurately, Poor Richard. Unlike those earlier
perspectives on necessity, which sought to limit the
multiplication of needs by granting to the "real," physical
needs a certain predominance, Marx held that the creation of
new needs, some of which I would describe as limits of the
body, depended on man's moving beyond the realm of "crude
practical need." 76 For Marx, "real" needs were not a limit
to be imposed upon the development of earthly conveniences;
they were, instead, an obstacle to such development which
must be overcome.
It must also be emphasized that Marx deeply appreciated
and applauded the expansive effect which capitalism had on
necessity. He shared with the liberals Hobbes and Locke an
appreciation for the way in which a civil society which was
based on private property (i.e. a capitalist society) helped
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beyond the expanded realm of physical need, or to put thi
differently, the higher value upon which modernity h
settled is the value of convenience, and it is satisfied
through the continued labor of men in the capitalist or
socialist production process, and the increased consumption
of technological apparatuses. Of course, this is not to say
that there are not some individuals who have come to value
something other than convenience, or that convenience
absolutely dominates every facet of the lives of s
people. other values are present in modernity, and s
people may lead their lives in the light of values other
than convenience. But from my perspective, such individuals
are not typically modern.
In a sense, Marx's description of the "true realm of
freedom" has contributed to the failure of modernity to
provide the conditions of that realm. The need to
continually reduce the amount of time and energy which men
expend upon bodily necessity, has become the end in itself.
And as I tried to show earlier, such assaults on the limits
of the body, especially temporal limits, are never-ending.
From my perspective, it is no wonder that modern ascetics
have little time for "the development of human powers as an
end in itself;" they are too busy trying to be rid of their
bodies and the limits the body imposes on their freedom.
Marx's conceptions of freedom and necessity only contribute
to, and cannot resolve, this dilemma.
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to develop, advance, or civilize man. In the following Ion
quote from Grundrisse, the laudatory tone of Marx's
description of this particular feature of capitalist
production reveals this appreciation, as well as the threat
which it poses. All of the following, claims Marx, "is a
condition of production founded on capital":
Hence exploration of all nature in order todiscover new, useful qualities in things;
universal exchange of the products of all alien
S 1^68 and lands; new (artificial) preparationof natural objects, by which they are given newuse values. The exploration of the earth in alldirections, to discover new things of use as wellas new useful qualities of the old; such as newqualities of them as raw materials etc.; thedevelopment, hence, of the natural sciences totheir highest point; likewise the discovery,
creation and satisfaction of new needs arising
from society itself; the cultivation of all thequalities of the social human being, production ofthe same in a form as rich as possible in needsbecause rich in qualities and relations -
production for this being as the most total an
universal possible social product, for, in order
to take gratification in a many-sided way, he mustbe capable of many pleasures
. . . hence cultured
to a high degree - is likewise a condition of
production founded on capital. 77
In the above passage, Marx inadvertently indicates the
point where the perspective on technology which is being
developed in this essay, which focuses on the development of
modern necessity or needs, makes contact with those
perspectives on technology which concentrate on its
expansive character, such as Heidegger's and Ellul's.
Marx's juxtaposition of ideas such as "the discovery,
creation, and satisfaction of new needs" and "the
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exploration of all nature in order to discover new, useful
qualities in things," reveals, at least to me, how Marx's
"social human being ... as rich as possible in needs-
participates in the modern project of Enframing. (See
Chapter 1, n.l, and Chapter 4 n ?7 ^ ~idjji.tix t
,
. j/.) But once again, this
is not the argument I want to make. Rather, I want to
emphasize how the development of new needs, which are
satisfied through the consumption of technology, reveals
something about modernity's attitude toward the body,
something about its notion of the self. Marx's endorsement
of the proliferation of needs, or the expansion of
necessity, shares with Hobbes
' and Locke's conceptions of
civil society, that modern ascetic tendency to deny the
body, or the temporal-spatial limits which are imposed by
it.
In fairness to Marx, I must mention that later in his
career, when he was working on the third volume of Capital
.
Marx appears to have moved away from his earlier position on
necessity, at least to some degree. He was still willing to
claim, as he had earlier, that "[t]he realm of freedom
really begins only where labour determined by necessity and
external expediency ends." 78 This is very similar to Marx's
claim in the Paris Manuscripts, that men only truly produce
in the absence of need. And in Capital, volume 3, Marx also
noted that needs develop as man himself does. But here is
where Marx begins to differ from his earlier statements
concerning necessity. whereas Marx celebrated the expansion
of human needs in the Paris Manuscripts and Grundrisse, in
the third volume of Coital, he seems willing to accept some
limitations on the development of needs, or at least those
new needs which are related to physical necessity.
in this late discussion of necessity, Marx recognizes
that physical necessity is not a static concept, but that
even such basic needs are susceptible to development.
Earlier I described such basic or real needs as demands of
the body, and their developed form, or other developed
bodily needs, I described as limits of the body. Marx, of
course, does not use such terms, but simply says that "the
realm of natural necessity expands with his [man's]
development, because his needs do too." 79 But this expanded
natural necessity is for Marx, at least later in his career,
part of the realm of unfreedom; these expanded, developed
needs, like the more basic physical needs, preclude freedom,
and must be overcome through the further development of the
forces of production. After noting that the realm of
natural needs expands, Marx continues,
but the productive forces to satisfy these expand
at the same time. Freedom, in this sphere, can
consist only in this, that socialized man, the
associated producers, govern the human metabolism
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under
their collective control instead of being
dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it
with the least expenditure of energy and in
conditions most worthy and appropriate for their
human nature.
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As I read this last passage, Marx appears to be
claiming that even man's developed needs, at least those
which are related to physical, bodily necessity, must be
satisfied in the fastest, easiest manner. in other words,
the "conditions most worthy and appropriate for
. . . human
nature" are the conditions which are most convenient, in
which the limits which are imposed by the body interfere
with man's time in a minimal manner. For Marx concludes
this discussion of necessity in the third volume of Capital
by describing the conditions of freedom: "The true realm of
freedom, the development of human power as an end in itself,
begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with this
realm of necessity as its basis. The reduction of the
working day is the basic prerequisite." 81
While it should be obvious that I share Marx's
recognition and expectation that new needs were and would be
developed in modernity (for my discussion of continually
expanding, modern necessity, see Chapter 2, pp. 56-7),
Marx's anticipation of a reduction in the working day is
more difficult to accept. Of course, there is no doubt that
the length of the working day has been shortened from the
brutal hours which necessitated state restrictions on the
hours of labor, and that the eight hour day has become the
standard in the most advanced economies. But in the case of
the United States, this standard has been in place since
1938, and has not been reduced through half a century of
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improvements and refinements in the forces of production.
Now as I read him, Marx meant by the reduction of the
working day, a continuous process which would free up more
and more time from the realm of necessity, as the forces of
production were developed. (Marx did emphasize, however,
that necessity would never be eliminated altogether. 82
) m
my judgment, this reduction in the length of the working day
has not come to pass in either the East or the West, and
does not look as though it is about to. There has not yet
emerged in modernity a way of being that has provided a
realm of freedom in which man could fully develop his human
faculties. in fact, it seems to me that moderns in both the
East and the West are ready to work harder and longer in
order to satisfy the continually expanding list of man's
needs, or more accurately, to satisfy the need to
continually expand that list. But my bias, I hope, is
obvious
.
Explanations of Marx's unfulfilled expectations
concerning the length of the working day are certainly
available. In the West, the control which capital exerts on
the development of needs, and in the East, the corruption
and inefficiency of the state, are obvious choices of
explanation which could be developed at length by those so
inclined. What I would like to suggest as an explanation of
this short-coming of Marx's thought, however, is that men
have not come to find any higher, richer needs which exist
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beyond the expanded realm of physical need. Or to put this
differently, the higher value upon which modernity has
settled is the value of convenience, and it is satisfied
through the continued labor of men in the capitalist or
socialist production process, and the increased consumption
of technological apparatuses. of course, this is not to say
that there are not some individuals who have come to value
something other than convenience, or that convenience
absolutely dominates every facet of the lives of some
people. other values are present in modernity, and some
people may lead their lives in the light of values other
than convenience. But from my perspective, such individuals
are not typically modern.
In a sense, Marx's description of the "true realm of
freedom" has contributed to the failure of modernity to
provide the conditions of that realm. The need to
continually reduce the amount of time and energy which men
expend upon bodily necessity, has become the end in itself.
And as I tried to show earlier, such assaults on the limits
of the body, especially temporal limits, are never-ending.
From my perspective, it is no wonder that modern ascetics
have little time for "the development of human powers as an
end in itself;" they are too busy trying to be rid of their
bodies and the limits the body imposes on their freedom.
Marx's conceptions of freedom and necessity only contribute
to, and cannot resolve, this dilemma.
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But its not just that science and technology can be of
help in providing the answer. From Preteceille and
Terrains perspective, science and technology really are not
part of the problem. Preteceille goes so far as to say that
to question science and technology, and all the productive
and consumptive development that they have provided, to
argue for a "regression of productive forces, is nothing but
an individualist flight on the part of the petit-bourgeois
elements edged out by the crisis." 85 And in another essay,
Preteceille describes as "regressive and illusory" any
attempts to solve "problems of energy, transport or ecology,
[by] suggesting a return to archaic forms of production, and
denouncing technology in general rather than its form and
use under capitalism." 86 But even if one does not criticize
technology in general, but limits one's criticism to the
values which underlie the development and deployment of
technology in capitalist/socialist modernity (i.e. the
domination of nature and convenience)
, and even notes how
capitalism helped to promote these values, one would still
be out of touch with the real problems of modernity; one
would be deluded and regressive.
This same attitude toward modern necessity, and the
values which underlie it, is present in Mandel's Late
3 8 3
Capitalism. After listing various sources of "consumer
society,
» Mandel claims that
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turns back the clock fromscientific to Utopian socialism and fromhistorical materialism to idealism. 87
To be fair, it must be noted that Mandel does recognize
that "the possibilities of developing and differentiating
material consumption cannot be unlimited," but he does not
get into that in Late Capitalism. 88 But if Mandel is
willing to accept limits on the development of needs, these
have not yet been reached. With consumer society, claims
Mandel, there has occurred a "genuine extension of needs," 89
and Mandel, I believe, anxiously anticipates the
continuation of this "progress." The needs themselves are
not open to question; the problem with consumer society lies
solely in the relations of production, not in the values
which guide and direct that consumption.
Mandel explicitly cites Marx as the source of this
attitude toward consumer society, or as I would put it,
modern necessity. He continues the quote above by saying
"Marx fully appreciated and stressed the civilizing function
of capital, which he saw as the necessary preparation of the
material basis for a 'rich individuality. 1 " 90 Very well,
but Marx wrote over a hundred years ago. Mandel, as well as
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Preteceille and Terrail, cannot fathom the query of whether
modern individuals night not be over-prepared for that rich
individuality, such a question could only he uttered by a
barbarian.
There is no doubt in my mind that my critical
perspective on consumption and technology in modernity would
be considered regressive and deluded, perhaps even "vulgar
and mean," 91 from the point of view of contemporary
Marxists, or at least those who uncritically accept Marx's
attitude toward necessity. But from my perspective, to
engage in a little name-calling, these charges against my
perspective are just one more example of modern techno-
fetishism, the inability to attain any critical distance
from modern technological developments. The ascetic
dimension of this techno-fetishism, however, is not readily
apparent in those Marxist texts I have been discussing. The
denial of the body which I am claiming underlies the Marxist
attitude toward necessity is not clearly revealed in these
attempts to forestall any criticism of modern needs.
However, this aspect of Marx's thought is revealed in some
of the writings of Herbert Marcuse, even though Marx's
influence on Marcuse was very limited, and was certainly not
predominant.
To begin with, I must point out that Marcuse was not as
sanguine about the development of needs as were those
Marxists I examined above. In An Essav on Liberation
.
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Marcuse explicitly acknowledges that the proliferation o
needs under modern capitalism helps to defuse the
revolutionary potential of those who are alienated and
exploited by capital. As Marcuse puts it,
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Marcuse calls for "the ascent of needs and satisfactions
very different from and even antagonistic to those prevalent
in the exploitative societies." 93
But like Marx, Marcuse appreciated the way in which
capitalist development of production forces helped to pave
the way for true freedom. In an earlier work, Eros and
Civilization
,
Marcuse claimed that "progressive alienation
itself increases the potential of freedom: the more external
to the individual the necessary labour becomes, the less
does it involve him in the realm of necessity. Relieved
from the requirements of domination, the quantitative
reduction in labor time and energy leads to a qualitative
change in human existence: the free rather than the labor
time determines its content." 94 Now even though "free time"
has not, in my mind, come to determine the content of human
existence, Marcuse did at least see something new in these
developments. He did not simply foresee the same sort of
386
ng
ree
needs being developed in a non-exploitative environment.
Marcuse continues the above quote as follows: "The expand!
realm of freedom becomes truly a realm of play - of the f
Play of individual faculties. Thus liberated, they will
generate new forms of realization and of discovering the
world, which in turn will reshape the realm of necessity,
the struggle for existence." 95 Marcuse foresaw the
development of a "new sensibility," of an aesthetic
appreciation or appropriation of the world which would
challenge the instrumental approach of modern industrial
civilization. 96 Marcuse, therefore, can not fairly be
described as a techno-fetishist
.
Nevertheless, there does exist within Marcuse
-s thought
one particular element which I find not only promotes
techno-fetishism, but also reveals the ascetic dimension of
the Marxist attitude toward necessity. This element is
Marcuse" s attitude toward death, which he articulated in
Eros and Civilization and in an essay entitled "The Ideology
of Death." In these works, both of which were written in
the 1950' s, Marcuse presents death as the ultimate
necessity, the ultimate limit. In Eros and Civilization .
Marcuse describes death in temporal terms, as "the final
negativity of time." 97 As such, death is the ultimate limit
to human freedom; it is the "one innermost obstacle [which]
seems to defy all project of a non-repressive development.
. . .
The brute fact of death denies once and for all the
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reality of a non-repressive existence .
"
9« The reason why
death is such a spoiler to the goal of human freedom, is
that " [t] he mere anticipation of the inevitable end, present
in every instant, introduces a repressive element into all
libidinal relations and renders pleasure itself painful..' 99
Now while the influence of Freud is obviously more
prominent than that of Marx in Marcuse' s Eros and
Civilization
,
the idea that death is the ultimate obstacle
to non-repressive development is quite similar to Marx's
attitude that necessity should be overcome and minimized
through technological developments. m "The Ideology of
Death," where the Freudian concern for libidinal relations
is less pronounced than the Marxist concern with state-level
domination, Marcuse discusses necessity as follows:
"Necessity indicates lack of power: inability to change what
is - the term is meaningful only as the coterminus of
freedom." 100 Death, as the ultimate biological necessity, is
a limit to freedom. But, Marcuse emphasizes, death does not
enjoy any special status in the realm of necessity. Death
is, as Marcuse puts it, "a technical limit of human
freedom." 101 For Marcuse, therefore, death is nothing more
than one facet of physical, bodily necessity; it is just
another limit which the body imposes on human freedom.
Actually, Marcuse' s claim is that death would be
thought of in such terms, and that overcoming or surpassing
the limit of death "would become the recognized goal of the
3 88
individual and social endeavor, if the prevailing
attitude toward death, "the ideology of death," could be
overcome. By the ideology of death, Marcuse is referring to
the use to which death has been put throughout the history
of Western philosophy, beginning with Socrates and
culminating in Heidegger. This ideology renders the issue
of death a support for existing political orders by
inverting death, as a bit of biological necessity, into
death as the end, or telos, of human life. Through this
"ontological inversion," death was transformed from an
empirical fact into an ontological necessity. Death comes
to be treated as pertaining "to the essence of human life,
to its existential fulfillment;" death becomes "the very
token of his [man's] freedom." 103 (my brackets) Displaying
a Marxist tendency to denigrate bodily needs, Marcuse judges
this ontological inversion as follows: "A brute biological
fact, permeated with pain, horror and despair, is
transformed into an existential privilege." 104
But of course, what bothers Marcuse is not just the
fact that in the ideology of death, something brutish and
basic has become ontologically significant. Along with
this, the acceptance of the necessity of death plays into
the hands of the dominant forces in society. Noting some of
the various historical forms which the ideology of death has
taken, Marcuse, in Eros and Civilization
,
writes:
Whether death is feared as constant threat [recall
Hobbes' use of death in the state of nature], or
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And in "The Ideology of Death," Marcuse claims that "no
domination is complete without the threat of death and the
recognized right to dispense death - death by legal verdict,
in war, by starvation. And no domination is complete unless
death, thus institutionalized, is recognized as more than
natural necessity and brute fact, namely as justified and
justification. " 106
As a counter to this submissive posture toward death,
Marcuse offers "some kind of
-normal- attitude toward death
- normal in terms of the plain observable facts, although
commonly repressed under the impact of the prevailing
ideology and the institutions supported by it." 107 what
Marcuse has in mind here, of course, is that attitude toward
death which sees it as a limit of the body which is to be
overcome through technological development. According to
this normal attitude, death will become "a necessity against
which the unrepressed energy of mankind will protest,
against which it will wage its greatest struggle." 108
Now from my perspective, Marcuse- s choice of the word
"normal" to describe that non-ideological attitude toward
death is a fortuitous one, and it is a choice with which I
fully agree. As I tried to indicate earlier, that same
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attitude was present in both Hobbes and Locke. Recall that
both of these theorists' found as one of the primary
benefits of civil society, the fact that it could prolong
life by allowing its members to avoid the risk of premature
death, a risk which prevailed in the state of nature. There
is no doubt that these liberal theorists used the fear of
death to impel men towards civil society, and in that sense,
they may be ideologists of death. But do not forget that
Hobbes, at least, drew the line of state authority at the
point of death. The state could not, according to Hobbes,
compel an individual to kill himself, or to submit to those
who might kill him. There was always available to the
individual the right to resist. For Hobbes, the state may
have had the power of life and death, but its legitimacy was
based on the fact that it allowed men to avoid death, and
live longer. It also is worth recalling here that Hobbes,
despite his attempt to subsume Christian doctrine under his
modern political order, could not fully endorse martyrdom;
he could not accept death as the "supreme sacrifice."
Marcuse's attitude toward death as a technical limit,
therefore, is normal not just in the sense that it is based
on "plain observable facts" (whatever they might be)
,
but is
also normal in the sense that it conforms to the ascetic
norms of modernity. Marcuse's goal of overcoming the
brutish, biological necessity of death seems to me to be the
culmination of modernity's attempt to deny the body and its
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limits. m regard to the limit of death, modernity has
become adept at not only prolonging life, through the
development of technologies such as organ transplant,
life-support systems. The limit of death has also been
pushed back at the other end, as the point of "fetal
viability" has receded in the face of technological
developments. it is probably futile to argue against such
progress, but at least it can be pointed out that these
developments have not really weakened the hold which the
modern, technological order has over individuals. The
recession of the point of fetal viability has recently been
suggested as a reason for limiting a pregnant woman's right
to abort the pregnancy; the proliferation of life-support
technology has made it necessary for individuals to take
legal steps to protect their ability to die with dignity, o
actually, to die at all.
What I am suggesting is that the technological
victories which modernity has achieved over death have not
been unequivocal advances in freedom, even as Marcuse uses
this term. These developments have not engendered "new
forms of realization and of discovering the world;" they
have not fostered a "new sensibility" or an "art of living"
(see note 96 of this chapter)
. Technological development
continues to set the natural world in order, to set it up a
"standing reserve," and the consumption of technology
continues to allow men to overcome the limits of the body.
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If I may speculate on what the future holds for man's
struggle against death, I think that death will eventually
be overcome as a limit, the body will indeed be eliminated
as the source of limits or necessity. But these
"achievements" will only be won for man at the cost of a
greater dependency on the technological order, socialist or
capitalist, which provides them. Here I will defer to a
writer much more attuned to technological development than I
am, and allow his description of the future to make these
points for me. The following is from the scientist Robert
Jastrow's The Enchanted Loom: Mind in the Universe;
hL 1KSt t?S *uman brain ' ensconced in a computer,as been liberated from the weaknesses of mortalflesh. Connected to cameras, instruments andengine controls, the brain sees, feels, and
responds to stimuli. It is in control of its owndestiny. The machine is its body; it is the
machine's mind. The union of mind and machine has
created a new form of existence, as well designedfor life in the future as man is designed for life
on the African savanna.
It seems to me that this must be the matureform of intelligent life in the Universe. Housedin indestructible lattices of silicon, and nolonger constrained in the span of its years by thelife and death cycle of a biological organism,
such a kind of life could live forever. It wouldbe the kind of life that could leave its parent
planet to roam the space between the stars. Man
as we know him will never make that trip, for the
passage takes a million years. But the artificial
brain, sealed within the protective hull of a star
ship, and nourished by electricity collected from
starlight, could last a million years or more.
For a brain living in a computer, the vovage to
another star would present no problems.
For those left behind on the "parent planet," however,
those who have yet to be "liberated from the weaknesses of
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mortal flesh," there certainly would be some problems. a
the planet becomes less hospitable to human life, due to th
abuse it has suffered from man's attempt to deny the limit
of the body through unceasing technological development, men
will need to be rid of their bodies, so that they can
"advance" to the new form of existence which thrives among
the stars. But this will not mark the end of necessity, or
the development of new needs. Why settle for a million-year
life-span? That limit can surely be pushed back. And as
for the time it takes to travel between stars, it will
surely be necessary to shorten this. There really will be
no end to the development of needs in space, just as there
have been none here on earth. And if any ends or limits
should arise, like death for the soon-to-be-obsolete
embodied man, it will have to be overcome. From my point of
view, overcoming "the technical limit" of death will not
mark the end of necessity, but will simply move it onto
another plane.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this essay, I mentioned that I
expected much resistance to my argument, since it challenged
both the liberal idea of the sovereign consumer, and the
primary value of that consumer. I also mentioned that the
success of my argument could be judged by the level of such
resistance which I could evoke from readers, and then
deflect toward the technological order. At this late point,
the best indication of the success of my argument appears to
be more specific, and to center around the evaluation of the
new frontier
- space. What I hope to have accomplished is
to evince some hesitance, if not resistance, to the head-
long rush to set the universe in order for man, to call into
the question the propriety of establishing a new form of
existence among the stars. My reading of the "settling" of
the American West in Chapter 4, I hope, has shed some light
on the way in which the "progress" that can be achieved by
settling space has a regulatory, disciplinary character.
Such progress is achieved only by more tightly and narrowly
regulating the selves that inhabit the frontiers. I hope
that at this point in my argument, Robert Jastrow's vision
of "the human brain, ensconced in a computer," appears as
more of a threat than a promise.
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In fairness to Arendt, whom I treated rather roughly
early on, I must point out that she was as troubled as I am
by the technological trajectory of modernity. m the
"Prologue" to The Human Condition, Arendt noted with some
dismay the reaction to the launch of Sputnik in 1957. In
the year following this launch, Arendt wrote:
The immediate reaction, expressed on the spur ofthe moment, was relief about the first "steptoward escape from men's imprisonment to the
earth." And this strange statement, far frombeing the accidental slip of some American
reporter, unwittingly echoed the extraordinaryline which, more than twenty years ago, had been
carved on the funeral obelisk for one of Russia'sgreat scientists: "Mankind will not remain boundto the earth forever."
This attitude toward the earth marked something quite
new. According to Arendt, "nobody in the history of mankind
has ever conceived of the earth as a prison for men's bodies
or shown such eagerness to go literally from here to the
moon." 2 And Arendt wondered whether the modern age, which
began with man's turning away from the Christian God who was
"the Father of men in heaven," might not "end with an even
more fateful repudiation of an Earth who was the Mother of
all living creatures under the sky?" 3 For Arendt, "[t]he
earth is the very quintessence of the human condition." 4
Now while I share Arendt » s concern about the modern
attempt to slip the bounds of earth, it is not just the fact
that the earth is being repudiated which bothers me. The
assault on the limits imposed by the earth is, to me, of a
me
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Piece with the modern assault on the limits imposed by the
body. The value of convenience, and the contempt for the
body which underlies this value, are central to these
developments of modern technology. But as I argued in
Chapter 2, Arendt • s own contempt for the body and the real
of necessity blinds her interpretation of modernity to th
role which the value of convenience plays in the
reinforcement and development of the modern, technological
order. (This, of course, is not to deny that all
perspectives, especially my own, have blind spots.) But it
is not just that Arendt misses what I find to be important;
her attitude toward the body and necessity promotes the very
trend I want to challenge. Arendt s attempt to sweep bodily
necessity back under the rug, so to speak, complements the
attempt to deny the body through the consumption of
technology. By removing bodily necessity from critical
reflection, Arendt unwittingly promotes the repudiation of
the earth, as well as the technological denial of the body.
But while I have tried to foster an awareness of the
way which the modern order uses the value of convenience to
maintain the shape of the modern self, my argument was also
intended to avoid any suggestion that the threat posed by
the technological order is simply an external one, which is
directed by capital or the state. On the contrary, the
modern individual, as an avid consumer of technological
apparatuses, implicates its self in the technological order.
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The asceticism of the modern, post-Christian self, which
seeks to deny and discipline the body through the
consumption of ever-more convenient technology, in a sense,
whips its self into shape. There is a fundamental contempt
for the body which has played a significant role in the
establishment and entrenchment of the modern order. And
while this contempt for the body is nothing new (recall
Aristotle's condemnation of the slavish attachment to the
body)
,
it does appear to me to be a problem with which
modern selves must come to grips. Resistance to the
technological order can begin, I have tried to show, by
critical reflection on the value of convenience, and what
the prominence of this value indicates about the modern
attitude toward the body and necessity.
It should be noted that my criticism of the value of
convenience has not been cast in terms of human freedom.
While I appreciate the Marxist-Marcusean ideal of unleashing
the developmental possibilities of a wide range of human
faculties, my argument against the value of convenience has
not been that such development has been restricted by the
dominance of this value. I am not calling for an increase
of human freedom. On the contrary, my argument calls for a
revaluation of that ideal of freedom which treats it as the
antithesis of necessity. I want to call into question the
modern denigration of necessity, which is central to my
understanding of the value of convenience, and argue for the
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value of necessity and limits. I want to challenge the
development of convenience, in which the limits of the body,
and ultimately the body itself, are overcome, and call
instead for an appreciation of the body and its limits (not
to mention an appreciation for the way in which those limits
have been used to maintain relations of power.)
Marcuse, of course, would see such a revaluation of
necessity as a submissive, defeatist attitude, one which
would play into the hands of the powers that be. But since
my concern is not limited to the capitalist form of
technological development, but the modern technological
order, which is extended and maintained by both socialist
and capitalist states (think, for example, of the recent
calls for joint exploration, and perhaps colonization, of
space by the United States and the Soviet Union)
, I see the
acceptance of the body and its limits as a route of
resistance to that order. The promise of immortality, which
for so long was the exclusive claim of Christianity against
the secular state, will soon enough become the provenance of
the technological order. The extreme power of that order
will shift from the imposition of death to the imposition of
eternal life. This power can be resisted, in my view, by
clinging to one's body and accepting its limits, especially
death.
At the less extreme level of ordinary consumption
practices, I hope to have indicated that the ideals of
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unlimited consumption and an endless proliferation of needs
are inextricably bound up with the technological order's
regulation of the modern self. This subject, who must be
fitted for a new form of existence among the stars, just as
peasants had to be fitted to the modern industrial order,
will require new needs which will allow him to overcome his
body to ever greater lengths, and eventually to leave it
behind as a sort of brutish husk or shell. Despite the
increases in bodily pleasures which modernity has provided
through the development of technology, it is crucial, from
my point of view, to recognize that there is an ascetic
dimension to such consumption, which denigrates and denies
the body. Modern subjects, the consumers of technology, are
not hedonists, as is so often claimed, or at least they are
not simply hedonists. At a certain level, it is not the
pleasure of the body which drives modern consumption, but
the desire to be rid of the body and its limits altogether.
To accept the body and the limits which it imposes, to no
longer treat such limits as conditions of unfreedom, is to
begin to challenge the hold of the technological order.
Endnot
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